Harald Muller

Dr. Harald Müller is Director of the Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt, and Professor of International Relations at Goethe University, Frankfurt. A member of the German delegation to the last three NPT Review Conferences, he served on the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters of the UN Secretary-General from 1999–2005. His two most recent books have been World Power India (2006, in German) and Building a New World Order: Sustainable Policies for the Future (2009, London, Haus Publishing).

Publication

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Pokhran 20 Years After: Did the World Change?

Was the 1998 Pokhran test a historical watershed as many contemporary observers believed? This article looks at its impact on the nuclear non-proliferation regime, regional security, India’s position in global institutions, and the ongoing global power shift: the non-proliferation regime continued along the old dispute lines; regional conflict behaviour did not change at all; India grew into global institutions not because of nuclear tests but because of her remarkable economic development; the re-arrangement of global power follows more basic trends as well.

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Looking at Nuclear Rivalry: The Role of Nuclear Deterrence

The 100th anniversary of World War I is a reminder of the risks of great power politics. The current dynamics of world politics rest on the relations among the US, China, Russia and India, and their interlocking relations with friends and enemies in a region that extends from the Gulf to the Japanese archipelago. A naval and nuclear arms race is underway that reflects these complex relationships. One of the numerous disputes could spread conflict across the whole region. This risk includes the nuclear factor.

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Between Power and Justice: Current Problems and Perspectives of the NPT Regime

The nuclear non-proliferation regime, despite being frequently criticised for an alleged lack of effectiveness, is in fact an amazing success story. The number of states which had conducted nuclear weapons activities in various stages but which have terminated them at one point surpasses the number of Nuclear-Weapon States (NWSs) by far. At the apex of its success, however, the regime is threatened by erosion from three different directions. A small number of rule-breakers and outsiders undermine its central objective: to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.