Reshmi Kazi

Nuclear terrorism is the most serious danger the world is facing today. Terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and Aum Shinrikyo have expressed their interest in acquiring a nuclear weapon. The only way to prevent this is to secure nuclear materials from falling into the wrong hands.

• Published: 2013
• Monograph

The Nuclear Security Summit process was an unprecedented event that achieved phenomenal success in drawing global attention to the danger of nuclear terrorism.

• Published: 2017
• Monograph

In the 21st century, nuclear security (NS) risks are more tangible with the probability of nuclear weapons and materials falling into the hands of terrorists becoming more real. The NS threat scenario presents a complex matrix of violent terrorism, Islamist militancy, a proliferation network originating from Pakistan (A. Q. Khan Network) and its spread to Iran, Libya and North Korea. To mitigate nuclear risks and inspire global nuclear confidence, an institutionalized structure is critical for strengthening NS.

• Published: March 2017
• Strategic Analysis

Associate Fellow, IDSA, Dr. Reshmi Kazi’s article titled ‘Nuclear Suppliers Group: What’s Next for India?’ was published by the South Asian Voices on December 7, 2016.

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• Published: 7 December, 2016

Terrorists pursuing an atavistic agenda through the brutal killing of common people are not performing jihad. They only seek to legitimize their vile acts in the name of Islam.

• Published: December 05, 2016
• IDSA Comments

With North Korea adding to the number of nuclear explosions on the eve of the 20th anniversary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), a renewed debate on the role of the treaty to ban nuclear weapons testing is necessary. Signed in 1996 and presently having 183 signatories and 164 ratifiers, the treaty remains in limbo because of a structural prerequisite that prevents it from entry into force. Specifically, Article XIV of the CTBT states that the treaty can enter into force only when all of the 44 states possessing nuclear weapons capabilities and research reactors sign and ratify the treaty. Of these 44 states, the treaty awaits formal ratification from the United States, China, Israel, Iran, and Egypt (which have already signed), and both signature and ratification from India, Pakistan, and North Korea, in order to implement a legally binding global ban on nuclear testing. Though short of signing the CTBT, India has endorsed the basic objective of the treaty by declaring a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. However, India has had and continues to have reservations about the CTBT.

India underscored the need for a test-ban treaty long before the establishment of the CTBT. In 1954, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was the first leader of a state to call for an “immediate standstill” agreement on nuclear testing between the United States and the former Soviet Union. However, ignoring India’s efforts, the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) was signed by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom in August 1963, which did little to halt the actual number of nuclear tests that presently figures at 2055 (including North Korea’s test this month). Thereafter, the worsening security concerns with China’s nuclear test in 1964, the 1965 India-Pakistan war, and U.S. intimidation in the 1971 war drove India to conduct a peaceful nuclear test in 1974 to keep the nuclear testing option open. However, India still continued supporting the idea of a nuclear test-ban policy—this is evident from a June 1978 statement calling for a ban on nuclear weapons testing at a Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), followed by a call in 1982 for a freeze on nuclear weapons production. In 1988, India proposed an Action Plan that advocated a ban on development of new weapons systems, and recommended nuclear disarmament in a time-bound framework of 22 years. Believing that the CTBT was a cardinal aspect of the disarmament process, India continued to support multilateral negotiations and jointly co-sponsored a consensus resolution on the CTBT at the UNGA in 1993.

However, India’s efforts towards a test-ban treaty, as a vehicle to eventually achieve total nuclear disarmament, were thwarted in 1995 with the indefinite extension of the NPT. India protested that not only did the NPT profess unequal obligations between the nuclear-haves and have-nots, but it also did not mandate the original NWS to adopt equal obligations towards universal nuclear disarmament. Simultaneously, the China-Pakistan illicit nuclear nexus heightened security considerations and compelled India to eventually conduct a series of nuclear tests in May 1998. Immediately after the tests, India declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and has continued to adhere to that position. Following the 1998 nuclear tests, India expressed a flexible position on the CTBT and specified its readiness to discuss a de jure formalization of its voluntary moratorium on future nuclear testing. However, India made it clear that its support for the CTBT could not exist in any “vacuum” and “depended on a series of reciprocal activities” from the P-5 nations: namely to refrain from conducting future tests under the guise of safety purposes, and to preclude all horizontal and vertical proliferation.

Regardless of these caveats, India has adhered to the fundamental obligation of the CTBT. Its voluntary commitment and restraint were meant to convince the international community of the need for meaningful negotiations to implement a more equitable CTBT and persevere towards global nuclear disarmament. In December 1998, the Indian government re-emphasized that India remains “committed to converting [its] voluntary moratorium into a de jure obligation.” While India had earlier stated its stance of “not now, nor later” on the “unequal” test ban treaty, that merely reflected its disapproval of the perceived preferential treatment given to the original NWS, and was not a condemnation of the moratorium on nuclear testing.

The 2005 U.S.-India civil nuclear deal highlighted the CTBT debate yet again. External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee confirmed after the conclusion of the nuclear deal that India will “continue to bind” itself to the unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing although he noted India’s reluctance to codify this into a “treaty-bound obligation.” However, India’s adherence to the basic ethos of the CTBT conveys to the international community its intent for meaningful engagement on an equal test-ban treaty.

A major factor influencing India’s position on the CTBT is that it awaits ratification from the United States and China. Given India’s security concerns vis a vis China, it is a matter of critical importance that China, along with the United States, takes the lead towards ratification of the Treaty and facilitates its speedy implementation by other nations. Equally important is that Pakistan and North Korea must also express their unconditional support to sign and ratify the CTBT.

India’s 1998 nuclear test was “fully successful” in testing fission and thermonuclear weapons capable of yields up to 200kt. This implies that India might not require additional nuclear tests, unless there is a significant deterioration in its security environment. Despite the change in governments over the years, India has continued to uphold its commitment to a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, signifying a political consensus on its stated position on the CTBT. Although India strongly believes that the CTBT is an integral aspect of global nuclear disarmament, it emphasizes that there must be no discrimination in favour of the original NWS in fulfilling the obligations toward the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Thus, India will only sign a CTBT that would enjoin equal obligations and responsibilities on all NWS.

The article was originally published in South Asian Voices

• Published: 23 September, 2016

As India recommences its bid for entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Pakistan has offered it a bilateral nuclear non-testing agreement. At first glance, this proposal might seem like a positive suggestion. However, deeper inspection suggests more interested motivations from Pakistan’s perspective, especially considering India already has a voluntary moratorium on nuclear tests and has expressed commitment toward a non-discriminatory and time-bound Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

There seems to be a two-fold motive behind Pakistan’s offer. The first is to undertake foundational work that would send positive signals to the Nuclear Suppliers Group about Islamabad’s professed non-proliferation credentials; the second is an attempt to malign India by highlighting its refusal to agree to Pakistan’s gesture, and to question India’s intentions towards nonproliferation objectives, including a voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing. However, Pakistan’s attempt to intermix its NSG prospects with that of India is fallacious.

Even ignoring Pakistan’s motivations, its proposition for a bilateral agreement on nuclear non-testing is not a feasible option for India. Unlike Pakistan, which has an India-centric nuclear weapons program, India’s nuclear strategy is more China-specific. China’s growing military and naval power, territorial assertion in the South China Sea, clandestine nuclear commerce with Pakistan, increasing naval logistic hubs in Pakistan, and existing border disputes with India keep New Delhi cautious about Beijing’s strategic ambitions. Most importantly, China has increased paramilitary deployment in Tibet and closer along the Indian border thereby bringing it within the firing range of China. Though these developments do not pose existential threats at present, they are potential sources of strategic concern that cannot be ignored by India. Given the complexities, it is detrimental to India’s interests to cap its strategic options prospects China and enter into a binding bilateral no-nuclear-testing agreement with Pakistan.

Pakistan had also offered such a bilateral arrangement on non-testing of nuclear weapons in the aftermath of the 1998 tests. The proposal was not acceptable to New Delhi even then given the security threats faced by India in the region. The clandestine China-Pakistan nuclear nexus coupled with Pakistan’s nuclear brinkmanship (firing of Ghauri missile in April 1998) had deeply imperiled India’s security interests. Two hostile nuclear neighbors (one overt and the other covert) pushed India to cross the nuclear rubicon in May 1998.

The existing stalemate makes any forward movement on confidence-building-measures (CBM) between India and Pakistan difficult. Post the 1998 tests, an attempt was made by India to effect a bilateral no-first-use (NFU) policy with Pakistan which strategically restrained both the nuclear-capable states without ignoring their existing security imperatives. It is also important to note that Pakistan too has turned down bilateral motions proposed by India to improve nuclear stability in South Asia, particularly in the area of no first use. After the May 1998 tests, Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee, in the official paper entitled Evolution of India’s Nuclear Policy, expressed India’s “readiness to discuss an NFU agreement [with Pakistan] as also with other countries, bilaterally, or in a collective forum.” This proposal was reiterated again in August 1998 when India announced that it “will not be the first to use nuclear weapons.” In January 2003, the Cabinet Committee on Security reviewed the progress in operationalizing India’s nuclear doctrine and re-emphasized a posture of NFU thereby underscoring that India would only use nuclear weapons for retaliation. However, Pakistan has consistently refrained from mutually reciprocating India’s proposal and retains a first-use posture.

Can there be a solution? Possibly, yes. NFU is an important CBM that can significantly contribute to strategic stability and ensure restraint and avoidance of an arms race in South Asia. An NFU policy would allow space for rational thinking during times of crisis, the reduction of brinkmanship, and the relaxation of higher-alert command and control structures, which would reduce the risks of nuclear accidents or unauthorized launches. As evident from India’s case, the NFU calls for a recessed deterrence posture by keeping nuclear arsenal de-mated and de-alerted. These enormously reduce salience on nuclear weapons, mitigate risks of nuclear terrorism, and strive for regional strategic stability. Apart from the mutual and regional strategic benefits, a bilateral NFU policy would ultimately be an assertion to the international community of the nuclear weapon status of India and Pakistan. The international community will welcome a bilateral NFU arrangement between the two nuclear neighbours that would invariably be tantamount to recognition of the nuclear weapon capabilities of India and Pakistan.

Will India’s NFU proposal be acceptable to Pakistan? Surprisingly, in November 2008, former President Asif Ali Zardari, speaking to an Indian audience, proposed a “no first nuclear strike” policy with India. However, the Pakistan Army quickly rebuffed him. Pakistan has maintained its need for a first use policy because it gives Pakistan the flexibility of forward deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to counter India’s conventional superiority in a crisis situation. However, between the forward deployment of nukes and their actual usage in a battlefield scenario, Pakistan would have to undertake a cost-benefit analysis keeping in mind bilateral stability and its own survival. Despite the military advantages first use provides Pakistan from a deterrence perspective, it is ultimately in Pakistan’s best interests to have a NFU policy because a symmetric nuclear posture would ensure sustainable strategic stability. It can be ascertained with a degree of presumption that Pakistan will exercise rational decision and not indulge in any nuclear misadventure. This was evident from the conduct of a nuclear war game between India and Pakistan in which the author was the political advisor from the Indian side. Contrarily, if Pakistan abandons a belligerent nuclear policy towards India and accepts India’s NFU proposal, it will display strategic pragmatism as is evident from nuclear dyads of Russia and China as also between China and India.

Russia and China have a bilateral NFU agreement irrespective of their strategic complexities vis-a-vis the US. There is a general understanding that the United States won’t be the first one in a conflict to use nuclear weapons. This perceived understanding provides strategic space between conflicting nuclear nations like Beijing and Moscow to commit to a NFU policy. Similarly, in the regional context, China has a NFU policy and the prospect for a high nuclear threshold is further assured with India’s declared policy not to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict. The double assurance should be an incentive for Pakistan to abandon first-use posture and adopt a NFU policy. Any such bilateral confidence building measure holds potential for enhanced nuclear cooperation as is evident from competing and conflicting nuclear nations of the United States and China. Despite strategic differences, both Washington and Beijing have taken concrete steps to communicate, cooperate, and collaborate on strengthening nuclear security.

Pakistan must cooperate with India in implementing a bilateral NFU policy in South Asia. Though a tall order, China must also take the lead in effecting a regional NFU policy in the greater interests of nuclear nonproliferation and regional nuclear disarmament.

The article was originally published in South Asian Voices.

• Published: 9 September, 2016

A watershed moment for nuclear security was reached when global leaders from more than 50 countries including India and other organisations met successively over six years (2010–2016) to develop an effective and sustainable plan for global nuclear security. At the end of six years, much has been accomplished to improve and upgrade nuclear security in several countries. Despite this perseverance, threats to nuclear security still remain undiminished, primarily because wrong people nursing a malicious agenda desire nuclear and radiological materials.

• Published: September 2016
• Strategic Analysis

India’s attempt to become a participating government of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was thwarted at the 2016 plenary in Seoul, principally because of opposition from China. Despite the initial impediment, this is not a permanent setback. It is significant that the NSG has taken up India’s application, implying thereby that the export control group has initiated the process. China has even indicated that there is space for negotiations, and a possible solution can be reached. International non-proliferation experts like Mark Hibbs suggest that irrespective of the existing “dilemma,” India could consider meeting “specific criteria or approach certain benchmarks as a condition for membership” to the NSG.

An important prerequisite for India’s membership has already occurred: There is a gradual reconsideration of the earlier position that India must be a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to become an NSG member. However, the argument that India ought to sign the NPT before being considered for NSG membership remains persuasive for China, the country that primarily opposed Indian membership. Thus, it is important to understand why India does not sign the NPT.

India has made it clear that it will not accept the NPT as the treaty propagates discrimination between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. India will not sign the NPT “as a non-nuclear weapon state.” However, acceptance of its nuclear weapon status might impact the current discourse in New Delhi. As for the NSG, its aim must be to have all supplier states abide by its established guidelines. It thus remains for the international nonproliferation regime to decide between having a responsible, nuclear-capable state like India consistently upholding the nonproliferation objectives inside the tent, or keeping it out.

A re-look at the need for India’s NSG admission is essential for practical reasons. The primary rationale for re-negotiation is that India is an emerging “competitive supplier” of nuclear items and technologies that has utility in building nuclear reactors. India has extensive skills in uranium mining and mineral processing facilities, and is seriously exploring possibilities for international collaboration in developing uranium-mining opportunities abroad. Having India within the NSG would ensure that Indian domestic export controls and safeguard agreements will continue to comply with NSG standards. Furthermore, with an advanced civilian nuclear energy program, India’s integration with the NSG could encourage it to use its nuclear energy program to more substantially contribute toward addressing the challenge of climate change.

Incorporating India into the NSG would strongly align with the IAEA’s preference that the NSG should remain open to supplier countries, in accordance with strengthening international non-proliferation efforts. Thus, New Delhi must continue to emphasize the economic and security benefits of its membership into the NSG, and India and global powers must encourage China to depoliticize what ought to be a net gain for the international non-proliferation effort.

In fact, non-proliferation experts suggest that India may consider certain principles, notably adherence to NPT Articles I and VI and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), if granted NSG membership. Established records show that India is committed to Article I by not contributing to an unauthorized transfer of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Further, India has pledged not to be a source for transferring enrichment and reprocessing technologies to any non-nuclear-weapon state, or assist any state to develop nuclear weapons. Additionally, India has undertaken several supplementary efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons and materials. India has joined the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) that seeks to protect nuclear facilities and safeguards. India has also taken additional steps to further strengthen its existing legislative and regulatory mechanisms to prevent proliferation, such as by amending the The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 to enhance punishment for any unauthorized possession of any weapons of mass destruction. It also passed the Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems Act of 2005 (WMD Act) that criminalizes any transfer of WMDs, missiles specially designed for their delivery, and WMD-usable materials, equipment and technologies.

In 2013, India tightened its export controls by updating its Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and Technologies (SCOMET) list to the standards of existing NSG and MTCR lists. The SCOMET list even contains provisions “more stringent than those practiced by the NSG and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).” Clearly, India has done a great deal to signal its commitment to nuclear nonproliferation, and it seems disingenuous for China and other countries to refuse Indian membership into the NSG on the grounds that it will have harmful implications for nonproliferation efforts.

As regards Article VI, India has persistently championed the case of global nuclear disarmament through several arms control and disarmament measures. While actively demanding for reduced salience upon nuclear weapons, India has annually insisted, in the United National General Assembly, on the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons. India has a no-first-use policy in place, indicating its restraint on any nuclear weapons use. India has supported the Non-Aligned Movement’s nuclear disarmament efforts, and has declared September 26 as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. It has agreed to convene a United Nations high-level international conference by 2018 to assess the progress achieved in nuclear disarmament. On the Fissile Material Cut Off-Treaty, India has agreed to work with the United States to facilitate early commencement of negotiations on the Treaty in the Conference of Disarmament. Also, India is in de facto observance of the CTBT by maintaining its unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosive testing.

India has consistently demonstrated that it is “like-minded” with the other 48 members of the NSG in undertaking effective measures to prevent nuclear proliferation. Though other members’ political and geopolitical motivations have impeded India’s efforts, India has taken extensive unilateral measures toward advancing its non-proliferation goals. Additionally, India might reconsider its position on the CTBT. Since both the United States and China have signed the Treaty, and India will certainly not conduct a nuclear test ab initio unless its national interests are jeopardized (such as in the event of a future nuclear test by China), a revisit to the CTBT debate may be desirable. India’s non-proliferation credentials and commitment towards nuclear disarmament is exemplary. Furthermore, India’s admission into the NSG would benefit the global community in having a credible member strongly committed to non-proliferation objectives. Thus, New Delhi should continue to pursue NSG membership, and current members ought to reconsider their objections, especially with India’s extensive de facto compliance with measures of Article I and VI of the NPT.

The article was originally published in the South Asian Voices

• Published: 27 July, 2016

The Nuclear Suppliers Group’s (NSG) plenary meeting of June 2016 ended at Seoul with an impasse over India’s admittance to the nuclear export club. The reason was, primarily, China’s truculence on the issue. Although the Chinese position is not entirely surprising, what appears questionable are the arguments forwarded by Beijing to negate India’s entry into the NSG. China associated India’s candidature to several conditions, flagging the Indian refusal to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), linking India’s membership to that of Pakistan, and placing presumptions about an impending strategic imbalance in South Asia.

In order to examine the credibility of the conditions attached by China to India’s proposed NSG admission, one must begin by assessing the basic ethos that went into the making of the NSG and India’s relations with the group.

India and the NSG

Following the conduct of India’s Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) in May 1974, a consensus emerged that the NPT (adopted in 1968) alone was not adequate to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology. Thus, the necessity to go beyond the NPT was felt, and the NSG was established that year. Meanwhile, in October, the French company, SGN, was contracted by the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) for the construction of a 100 Mt facility capable of separating 100-200 kilograms of plutonium annually. Since France was not an NPT signatory, it had no obligations to restrain its nuclear commerce. However, the French association with the NSG, despite its non-NPT status, led to the termination of its controversial nuclear agreement with Pakistan in 1978. Eventually, the NSG became a dedicated platform to preclude and stop illegal transfers of nuclear material, equipment, or technology. At present, the 48-member group operates through established guidelines adopted by consensus after appropriate data exchange and deliberations on proliferation concerns. The conditions that an aspirant government must fulfil for entry are specified in the NSG’s Procedural Arrangement.

In 2008, India was granted the NSG waiver that removed the country’s nuclear trade restrictions, ending a three-decade old denial and facilitating India to legally trade civilian nuclear fuel and technology with the global nuclear regulatory regime. The waiver also set the foundations to ‘discuss the NSG[’s] relationship with India’ at the group’s annual plenary meetings. On November 8, 2010, Barack Obama pledged the US’ support to India’s admission into the NSG. By the 2011 plenary meet of the NSG, the question of India’s membership found the US’ endorsement even on formal communiqués. A 2011 communication paper to the NSG from the US, titled ‘Food for Thought,’ explicitly called for accommodating India’s NSG bid and labelled India ‘a “like-minded” partner.’ The paper, most essentially, argued that the ‘factors [of the NSG’s Procedural Arrangement for considering admissions] “should be considered by participating governments” and are not mandatory criteria that must be met by any proposed candidate for NSG membership.’ It clearly emphasized that the ‘Procedural Arrangement does not require that a candidate meet all of the stated criteria,’ including the signing of the NPT. This is what sharply contrasts the Chinese position on the issue, which binds India’s NSG application to a formal acceptance of the NPT.

The essence of the NSG’s establishment is to identify and accept states that recognize the importance of preventing nuclear proliferation as critical. Its core concern is that the participating governments (or members) must exhibit like-mindedness on being ‘supportive of international efforts towards the non-proliferation of WMDs and their delivery vehicles, and have in force a legally-based domestic export control system which gives effect to the commitment to act in accordance with the guidelines.’ In other words, the intent is to ‘permit […] full membership of countries that have demonstrated responsible non-proliferation and export control practices, and the ability and willingness to substantially contribute to global non-proliferation objectives.’ Accordingly, India is well-eligible for entry into the club.

China’s Objections

The Chinese opposition to India’s NSG bid is not too shocking. After all, Beijing had played a forceful role in the unsuccessful attempt to impede the 2008 NSG waiver to India. It has, this time, played a successful role in blocking India’s admission to the NSG. China chiefly stymied India’s bid on the basis of its non-adherence to the NPT, calling the treaty the ‘bedrock of the international non-proliferation regime.’ While adherence to the NPT may be a procedural requirement for NSG admission, it is merely prescriptive and not binding, as explained above. With this understanding, successive plenary meetings of the NSG have ended with divided opinions on new memberships.

The Chinese insistence on India’s signing of the NPT is a non-starter, as, in India’s view, the NPT has flawed foundations that discriminate between nuclear ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’. This fundamental defect in the NPT conflicts with the non-proliferation objectives that India stands for. For India, an equitable mechanism that endorses and sustains shared responsibility towards a time-bound, universal disarmament must be the NPT’s predominant objective. However, the NPT, as it exists, is devoid of such essentials, and propagates a nuclear apartheid between nuclear and non-nuclear states. Irrespective of the NPT’s discriminatory status, nonetheless, the NSG acknowledged that India contributes to the ‘widest possible implementation of the provisions and objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,’ as enunciated in Paragraph 1(a) of the 2008 Indo-US Statement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation. Thus, logically, there exists no fundamental friction between India’s and the NPT’s intentions, if not objectives.

China has, likewise, unfairly linked India’s NSG entry with Pakistan. This is more of a tactical move initiated with the aim to scuttle India’s multilateral aspirations. Unlike India, Pakistan demonstrably has a poor proliferation record and lacks enough nuclear legitimacy. Unlike India’s, Pakistan’s nuclear program has not received any waiver from the NSG, which is a strong indicator of a state’s responsible nuclear conduct. Not only does the US suspect that remnants of the notorious network promoted by Pakistan’s nuclear spearhead, AQ Khan, may still be alive, but several Pakistani military entities continue to be under on the ‘ban list’ of the US Department of Commerce. Pakistan’s continuing ambiguity on the AQ Khan issue, its controversial nuclear commerce with China, and its reticence on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) generate major concerns for global non-proliferation efforts.

Thus, India’s non-proliferation record cannot be brushed with the same stroke as that of Pakistan’s. India has consistently contributed to the strengthening of initiatives for the improvement of nuclear security at both domestic and international levels. For instance, it backed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by declaring a moratorium after its 1998 nuclear tests – a stand maintained till date. More notably, India agreed to extend full cooperation on the negotiations of the FMCT as part of the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Agreement. Hence, India must not be hyphenated with Pakistan in terms of non-proliferation commitments and ambitions.

Lastly, China has asserted that India’s admission to the NSG ‘would shake the strategic balance in South Asia’ and ‘Pakistan’s strategic interests will be threatened.’ Here, it must be emphasized that India’s NSG bid, in today’s era of Sustainable Development Goals, is ‘not about an arms race and it’s not about nuclear weapons. [It] is about the peaceful civil use of nuclear energy.’ India shoulders the world’s fourth-largest requirement for power. About a third of its population still remains without power, as the thermal-hungry nation quests for alternate energy sources. However, both China and Pakistan have failed to understand such factors.

Does India Qualify?

India has actively upheld the NSG’s guidelines for nuclear and nuclear-related exports. It was India’s will to maintain its effective non-proliferation commitments under the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Agreement that facilitated its achievement of the 2008 NSG waiver. India’s ratification of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; adherence to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) of 2005; harmonizing of its Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and Technologies (SCOMET) list with that of the NSG; enacting of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Delivery Systems Act, 2005, an ‘overarching and integrated legislation prohibiting unlawful activities in relation to WMDs and their delivery systems’; and upholding of obligations under the UN Security Council’s Resolution 1540 to prevent proliferation of all WMDs constitute important steps towards the mitigation of international proliferation risks.

Additionally, India has voluntarily agreed not to transfer enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology to non-ENR states – an initiative not even specified in the NSG’s criteria for participation. To prevent black-marketing, India has set up a Counter Nuclear Smuggling Team to counter individuals or groups seeking to obtain nuclear or radioactive material for malevolent purposes. It is also setting up a specialized School on Nuclear Security under the aegis of the Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership (GCNEP) to impart training and education in areas of physical protection of nuclear materials and technology. Undoubtedly, India’s legal-institutional nuclear mechanism is one that conforms to the NSG’s core essence.

Conclusion

China’s opposition in this regard appears a systemic attempt at discrimination against India – a visibly responsible nuclear power. The Chinese state, while blocking India’s NSG candidature on the grounds of non-adherence to the NPT, has itself shown disregard for the recent International Court of Justice verdict over the South China Sea logjam in favour of Philippines. Nevertheless, it is important for India and China to engage more maturely and proactively in the interest of larger global non-proliferation goals. The two nuclear powers, with a declared no-first-use policy each, hold immense potential to mutually collaborate and improve nuclear security in Asia, especially South Asia. However, for that to happen, China must, at its end, rise above petty politics, and take cognizance of India’s nuclear status as well as its potential to benefit the international non-proliferation regime.

The article was originally published in the E-International Relations.

• Published: 20 July, 2016