Emerging Trends in West Asia: Indian and Iranian Perspectives

Chair: Amb. C R Gharekhan
Speakers:

• Dr. Mostafa Dolatyar, Director General, IPIS — Developments in West Asia: Iranian Perspective
• Prof. P R Kumaraswamy, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi – Developments in West Asia: Indian Perspective
• Mr. SiddharthVaradarajan, Editor, The Hindu – The Nuclear Issue: Indian Perspective

In his opening remarks Amb. Gharekhan noted that the ongoing events in West Asia have a lot to do with Iran and the sectarian Shia-Sunni conflict within the region. He said that countries outside the region were not able to reconcile with the fact that Iran was a regional power, whereas Iran was anxious to be recognised as a power in its own right. He noted that repeated attempts had been made to reduce Iran’s influence in the region. In this context, the case in point is the Syrian crisis. He also noted that it was important on part of Iran to do more to convince its friends in the developing world about its nuclear intensions.

Dr Mostafa Dolatyar, elaborated on Iran’s strategic concerns in West Asia and its relations with India. He stressed that the recent developments in the region, usually referred to as the ‘Arab spring’, was an ‘Islamic awakening’ that had far reaching consequences for not just countries within the region, but for the wider international community. He noted that the variety of international responses to these events had helped the people of the region differentiate between friends and foes. While the pace of change in the countries influenced by the Arab spring was not uniform, he said that these countries would reap the benefits of the movement depending on their specific political, economic, socio-cultural and historical contexts.

Dr. Dolatyar pointed out that Iran has played a constructive role in maintaining energy security and acting as the regional security provider. Noting that several developing countries would be dependent on energy for their future development, he stressed that it was up to those countries to use Iran’s potential. He argued that despite facing decades of sanctions, Iran has sustained itself and has not decreased its energy production.

Regarding India’s reducing trade with Iran he pointed out that India was doing so to pacify the US. It was noted that it was India that was adversely impacted by this decision. According to him, Americans were selling wheat to Iran whereas India had been reluctant to do so. He argued that the sanctions imposed on Iran were meant to counter American competitors who were benefiting from the Iranian market, by preventing countries like India from engaging with Iran. He articulated that sanctions were not against Iran but against other countries including India to stay away from Iranian market. Dr. Dolatyar stressed that Iran has been a reliable energy partner for any country that wants to engage with it.

While India and Iran both have important stakes in the stability of Afghanistan, it was important to take Afghanistan’s other neighbours, particularly Pakistan, into consideration and make them part of the solution rather than the problem. He also expressed that the situation in Afghanistan had become worse after American intervention with the country still lacking a viable army, police, judicial and education system.

Dr. Dolatyar rejected reports of Shia-Sunni conflict as only propaganda by the Western media. He claimed that while there were intellectual disagreements between Shias and Sunnis due to difference in interpretation of some aspects of Islam, violence between the two communities was a result of external interference that sought to weaken the Muslim society. Despite their differences, Iran has been able to manage its ties with the Muslim world and will continue to do so.

Chiding India for what he felt was its pro-US stance, Dr. Dolatyar stressed that it was in India’s long-term interest to move beyond just rhetoric and improve ties with Iran. Asking India to reconsider the nature of its relationship with Iran, he pointed to the predominantly friendly and constructive nature of historical ties between the great civilizations of the two countries as the benchmark.

Discussing the current status and future of Palestine, Dr. Dolatyar remarked that by supporting the two-state solution, India was merely echoing the stance of the US, Israel and their allies who were not keen to establish Palestine. He added that Iran, as the ‘voice of wisdom’, has maintained a consistent stance since 1948 that the real solution for Palestine was to let people who feel a sense of belonging to the land to engage with each other and live together in peace in order to overcome economic and political inequalities.

On the situation in Syria, Dr. Dolatyar reiterated Iran’s position that no outside forces should intervene and that the future course of events must be determined by the Syrian government and people. He noted that Iran has been in touch with the opposition in Syria and asked them to engage with the government to reach a solution.

Prof. Kumaraswamy presented a comprehensive outlook of India’s response to the events of Arab spring. Noting that the common feature of the Arab spring was the popular movement for change and the opposition to authorities and with the exception of Qatar, he pointed out, the people were demanding greater accountability, transparency and good governance.

He said that the Arab spring has revealed the double standards of external powers that support authoritarian regimes in one country, while supporting the opposition in another in the name of values and ideology. He put forth four possible responses that India could have adapted to the Arab spring;

1. India could support the people’s movement in the Arab spring calling for greater public participation in governance as an objective in tune with its democratic traditions. The predominantly peaceful, popular, non-violent nature of protests could seem almost Gandhian to many Indians. However, as the realist view of international affairs convincingly argues, nation-states have only interests, not morality and thus supporting the protestors are not viable for India’s national interests.
2. India cannot identify with authoritarian regimes that do not represent all sections of their societies. Moreover, there is no way of knowing how long these regimes will survive in order to consider supporting them.
3. As the world’s largest democracy, India could directly or indirectly intervene to promote democracy in the region. However, considering India’s non-aligned history and principled stand of not intervening in sovereign nations, this is unlikely.
4. India cannot afford to be indifferent to the Arab spring since it has vital interests in the region that include trade, energy and most importantly, the significant presence of an Indian diaspora.

He noted that India has no broad regional policy and works on a country-specific basis. According to Prof. Kumaraswamy, India’s main priority remained ensuring the safety of the Indian diaspora and thus in effectively planning for their evacuation. Carefully wording it ‘homecoming’ instead of the more politically sensitive term ‘evacuation’, around 17000 Indians were brought home from Libya. In the case of Egypt, the Indian Foreign Minister issued a statement asking Hosni Mubarak to listen the sentiments of his people, only after ensuring that all Indians were back home safe. The initial Indian response included issuing travel advisories and setting up hotlines to help members of the diaspora.

Prof. Kumaraswamy noted that India’s position was articulated only after a consensus was reached both within the affected country and the region. Thus, the overwhelming anti-Mubarak feeling among Egyptians contributed to India supporting their stance. On the other hand, in case of Syria, complexity of the situation has meant that India has not issued a statement calling for Assad to step down. He pointed out that despite its own misgivings about the International Criminal Court, India supported the regional consensus between the Arab league and the African Union to call on the ICC to investigate the crimes committed by Libya. However, India abstained from the Security Council Resolution 1973 that called for a no fly zone due to its fears that it would enable a Western military campaign. India has also supported reforms in Syria, once regional powers came to a similar consensus. He concluded by noting that India’s policy towards the Arab spring seemed to be based on the old Indian argument that when many things are happening around the world, it is better to remain silent.

Siddharth Varadarajan, provided an Indian perspective of the nuclear issue vis-à-vis Iran. He stated that in many ways India was a reluctant nuclear weapons state that was forced to acquire weapons due to proliferation in its neighbourhood. China’s first nuclear weapons test in 1964, two years after its war with India and its close help and support to Pakistan for building its own nuclear arsenal contributed to India choosing to become a nuclear weapons state. He noted that India has always considered the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a discriminatory regime and thus has not become a signatory. Many developing countries regarded the NPT as discriminatory too and it was only by the early 1980s that the NPT began to achieve its present universal status. Thus, while other countries including Iran have chosen to become part of the NPT, Mr Varadarajan pointed out that India has stuck to its initial position.

He argued that India was the only nuclear weapons state actively pushing for concrete measures towards disarmament, while the US and other countries merely paid lip service. He called on Iran to take into consideration the fact that India has taken steps that include voting for the nuclear weapons convention that seeks to ban the use of nuclear weapons and adopting a no first use policy.

He stated that India does not want more countries acquiring nuclear weapons since it could lead to a scenario where a conflict might occur in the name of preventing a country from acquiring these weapons. He alluded to the 2003 Iraq war fought on the basis of the fraudulent claim that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. He added that even if there was evidence of Iran having a nuclear weapons programme, India would not support the option of a war to prevent Iran from acquiring these weapons and would instead explore other options. He explored several interpretations about the status of Iran’s nuclear programme:

1. The Iranian government says it does not want to acquire weapons. The need for clandestine facilities is not due to the intention to produce nuclear weapons, but rather a product of US efforts to deny Iran the facilities to develop a civilian nuclear programme. He pointed out that publicly available IAEA documents support this view.
2. Iran toyed with the idea of acquiring nuclear weapons before 2003 but has stopped since then. Mr Varadarajan said that IAEA’s dossier of charges against Iran related to development activities prior to 2003.
3. The US, Israel and their allies believe that Iran wanted to acquire nuclear weapons before 2003 and that it continues to pursue this goal. The legitimacy of the stolen laptop with files that supposedly prove the existence of Iran’s nuclear weapons programme has been disputed by many.

According to Mr Varadarajan, the 2004 Paris Agreement process opened the door to resolve not just the nuclear issue but also the issue of Iran’s relationship with the US and other Western countries. He said that the unhelpful attitude of the US even when Ahmadinejad offered to run the Natanz nuclear facility as a multinational facility demonstrated how the West had held back even when Iran made an offer. He pointed out that India remains concerned primarily because the approach taken by the P5 + 1 with regards Iran’s nuclear programme has not brought us closer to a solution. He also said that Israel, the elephant in the room, is not comfortable with Iran possessing any nuclear facility, even if it possessed 100% safeguards.

Noting that Iran had implemented the IAEA’s Additional Protocols on nuclear safeguards voluntarily as a confidence building measure prior to 2006, Mr Varadarajan offered a suggestion for a possible way to kick-start dialogue; he proposed that in exchange for suspension (not removal) of sanctions, Iran could agree to re-implement (but not sign) the additional protocols that enable the IAEA to inspect Iran’s nuclear facilities more often. He also argued that friends of Iran should be allowed to join the P5+1 (UNSC permanent members and Germany) to make the process of diplomacy regarding Iran’s nuclear programme more balanced and capable of providing an outcome than it is today.

Discussion

In the discussion that followed, Indian and Iranian speakers debated various issues that hamper good relations between the two countries. Indian participant noted that Iran’s views on Indian shortcomings would find greater acceptance if they were more balanced and also considered the important question of whether Iran had lived up to India’s expectations. One of the Indian participants expressed concern about Iran’s support to the Taliban and its negative role in blocking India’s route to Afghanistan. He also criticised Iran for spreading its brand of radical Islam among Indian Shia Muslims and noted that Iran has always supported Pakistan in its conflicts with India. Indian speaker proposed that India delink energy security and the nuclear issue vis-à-vis Iran, seeing as it needed Iran for its energy resources and equally required the US to further its great power ambitions.

Responding to the Indian questions, Iranian side stressed that by voting against Iran in the IAEA, India had destroyed the social capital in Iranian Society. In fact, by doing this India has destroyed the goodwill of the Iranian people it had earned because of historical and cultural ties. Iranian participant explained how the Iranian nuclear programme had been actively assisted by the Americans and other Western powers until the Iranian Revolution and added that Iran had suitably responded to and clarified ambiguities that the IAEA had raised about its nuclear programme by allowing IAEA officials to inspect any installation that they wanted to. It was argued that Obama had not reacted suitably to the progress made by Iran, Turkey and Brazil through the nuclear fuel swap agreement of 2010. Iranian side also affirmed that Iran was prepared to keep its commitments to the NPT.

Iranian speaker said that nuclear weapons were useless in practical terms. It was noted that India and Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons had not solved problems between the two countries or made their people safer. They stressed Iran’s sovereign right to decide the course of its nuclear policy and proposed that focusing on soft power rather than hard power would be the key to the future. Responding to allegations that Iran was exporting Shia extremism to India, Iranian speaker pointed out that Iran was a land of modernity and moderation and argued that India should look at the scenarios enabling extremism within its borders. On engaging the US, it was noted that as a matter of principle, Iran has kept open the official channel of communication with the US for the last two decades.

One of the Iranian speakers stressed the positive role Iran had played in maintaining good relations with India and pointed out that Iran had rejected the call of Wahabbis and Salafis who had asked Iran to declare jihad against India following the demolition of the Babri Masjid.