Rapporteur Report on Session V

November 5, 2009

Role of Extra-regional powers

This session explored the role of extra-regional powers in South Asia. The critical import of this session related to power relations between the primary actors within the region and external powers. The key issues flagged related to (1) how regional powers manipulated extra-regional powers to advance their own regional interests; (2) China’s role in the region and how China relates to South Asia; (3) how smaller regional powers such as Nepal and Afghanistan have coped with internal unrest, instability and the role other powers have played in influencing domestic political order in these countries. The session also addressed whether regional strategies can be pursued to deal with the region’s vexing problems.

Professor Rajesh Rajagopalan (JNU): Extra-Regional Powers and Emerging Security Scenario in South Asia: According to Prof. Rajagopalan, the general assumption in much of the literature on regional security is that it is a sub-set of global security concerns of extra-regional powers. Regions and regional powers are generally seen as victims or subjects of global power political machinations. But regional powers have been dexterous in utilizing global interests of extra-regional powers to pursue regional interests. Indeed, they have usually been more successful in securing their way than global powers have been at advancing their global agenda at the regional level. South Asia presents good examples of this phenomenon, both during the Cold War and after. In essence, then, the key driver of extra-regional involvement in South Asia is likely to continue to be the regional security agenda of local powers much more than that of extra-regional powers. Examples: Pakistan joins US-led SEATO and CENTO to countervail India during the Cold War. In the post-Cold War period Pakistan leverages proliferation, geography and terrorism as instruments to manipulate bigger powers such as the United States.

Professor Swaran Singh (JNU): China and South Asia: China’s South Asia policy remains predominantly India-centric and security-centric. Under this wide bandwidth, there has been an undulating trajectory in Sino-Indian relation with crests and troughs. But the relationship is also pragmatic and favourable towards India. Supporting people in Kashmir in the 1960s and insurgents in North-eastern India in the 1970s marked the low-point of Cultural Revolution radicalization of China’s foreign policy. China’s celebrated neutrality during the Kargil War (1999) was the epitome of Beijing’s pro-India leanings. This has been the result of rapprochement since the late 1970s followed by India’s rise as an emerging economic power since the 1980s. India’s neighbours, especially Pakistan, still continue to be an important pillar of China’s South Asia policy. The credit must go to India’s continued engagement and China’s often reluctant yet positive reciprocity, that the two sides have assiduously evolved and codified a whole set of confidence building measures that form the base of their ties. However, some vestiges of old habits and equations continue to create difficulties. So theses like ‘String of Pearls’ and encirclement of India remain an integral part of analysis on China’s South Asia policy, often fuelling scepticism in their mutual perceptions and policies.

Mr. Nishchal Nath Pandey: The Role of Extra-regional powers and the Future of the Peace Process in Nepal: Mr. Pandey noted that the Maoist leadership’s decision to shun a decade-long armed insurrection and embrace competitive multi-party politics through participation in the first-ever elections to the Constituent Assembly was a welcome change. There was anticipation that lasting peace would return to the country. The first elected Prime Minister under the republican order Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’ managed to instil a new spirit of confidence and optimism, but his tenure of nine months was barely enough to tackle the enormous challenges that the civil war-ravaged country faced at multiple levels. According to Mr. Pandey, certain powers got anxious with the possibility of a prolonged dominance of an extreme leftist outfit in the polity of Nepal. In addition, he noted that the reckless decisions made by an inexperienced Maoist leadership triggered a constitutional crisis. While regional powers urged all sides to put aside their differences and work together for a new Constitution within the stipulated deadline of May 2010, others such as the United Nations Mission to Nepal (UNMIN) have been more assertive. The issues of federalism, integration of ex-Maoist combatants into the Nepal Army, wider debate on security sector reforms, crisis in the Terai, rising religious intolerance and ethnic tension remain challenges. These challenges, according to Mr. Pandey, require deft handling by all political parties. But these challenges involve other powers whose interests clash with one another. This could turn Nepal into another Lebanon.

Mr. Ahmad Shayeq Qassem: Afghan Conundrum: Can there be a Regional Approach?: Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, Afghanistan came under world attention. According to Mr. Qassem India, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Central Asia and China all took part in the enterprise to cooperate. The Afghan government amended many of its laws and signed numerous agreements in a bid to foster greater regional cooperation. Yet stability has eluded Afghanistan and remains a millstone around the necks of its neighbours. A narrow security-centric concept premised on the notion that an over-centralized political system would best serve the interests of stability is misleading.

Afghanistan should confront the concerns of the Pakistani leadership. Pakistani interests would be better served in Afghanistan if it stopped patronizing the Afghan Taliban. Mr. Qassem noted that as two sovereign independent countries, India and Afghanistan have a right to decide for themselves as to how they conduct their relations in pursuit of their national interests and in accordance with the principles of international law. However, some aspects of the bilateral relationship need to be revisited for greater peace.

Q&A and Comments

1. US has no choice but to stay engaged with Pakistan. It is the only access point to Afghanistan, because relations with Iran are fraught with tension. This is a situation the US has created for itself due to the disastrous invasion of Iraq.
2. US strategy in Af-Pak is al Qaeda-centred. Taliban is unlikely to sunder ties with al Qaeda and other transnational terror groups, including Kashmiri groups operating out of Afghanistan.
3. During the Cold War, US power also boosted Pakistan, thereby constraining Indian power. Extra-regional powers also had influence over regional powers. Nevertheless, India countervailed through the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1971, secured Soviet vetoes at the UN and dismembered Pakistan in 1971.
4. India-Pakistan need to create an effective mechanism for relating with each other in the context of Afghanistan.
5. China is a bigger player in Afghanistan than India. It has plans to invest three billion dollars. Chinese strategy is calibrated and it is not in favour of any solution that excludes the Taliban, thus bringing back the China-Pakistan nexus. Nevertheless, Afghanistan-India relations are more multifaceted than China’s relations with Afghanistan.
6. US interest in Afghanistan seems to be waning, but it cannot extricate itself completely.
7. China’s political context is different from India’s. There has been limited liberalization in the political sphere, but China is reluctant to allow full fledged political parties. China’s democracy will not be like India’s. The CCP ten years down the road will still be important and there will not be any vestige of communism. Aims, motives, and sentiments are different.
8. Tibet will be a far more limited issue between India and China after the departure of the Dalai Lama. Only the Dalai Lama is a force against the Chinese, because of his global profile and widespread popularity.
9. Water and trade will be among the key drivers in Sino-Indian relations. India’s river navigation system needs improvement. On trade, the export basket between India and China is not evolving. There is a trade imbalance against India. India cannot deal with China on its own; must coordinate with others and should avoid direct confrontation.
10. China should be brought into SAARC. Beijing is not very excited to join and common ground has to be found among SAARC members as well. China’s foreign policy has encouraged ‘independence’ of foreign policy among India’s smaller neighbours. China has tilted away from defence-centric relationship with Pakistan to trade-centred relations. It has concluded an FTA as well.
11. China does not have a regional vision or approach to South Asia. It is India-centric, which is both positive and negative. China’s operational policy is based on a single pillar: engaging the No.2 power of the region – Pakistan. China defines its relations in terms of clear territoriality.
12. Increasing links between Maoists and Naxals in India.
13. Unlike the LTTE in Sri Lanka, the Maoists never rejected a political solution.
14. A comprehensive peace has been hard to achieve.
15. Recruitment to the Nepal Army has become a problem. Nepal Army demanded that ex-Maoist combatants give up their ideology as a pre-requisite for entry.
16. The 12-point agreement has been challenged by all.
17. The issue of Bhutanese refugees in Nepal is a complicated problem that cannot be resolved quickly.

Prepared by Kartik Bommakanti, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis