Restraining Kargil: Nuclear Caution in the Shadow of Kashmir

The debate surrounding the stability of nuclear weapons has been a critical issue for the last half century. On the one hand, realists like Kenneth Waltz argue that the proliferation of nuclear weapons will foster greater stability due to the intrinsic deterrent logic associated with these weapons. The nuclear pessimists, on the other hand, argue that the accidental use of nuclear weapons and unstable regime types are a greater concern for the outbreak of nuclear war. With no clear consensus in sight, this article argues that the nuclear deterrent logic is the most compelling explanation for the lack of full-scale war. It takes as its case study the 1999 Indo- Pakistani conflict at Dras–Kargil. This crucial case study demonstrates that the caution and, therefore, deterrent effects associated with nuclear weapons in the Indo-Pakistan rivalry confirms that caution and stability result from the introduction of these weapons on the Sub-continent.

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