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One of the provisions in the policy is that in the Information & Broadcasting and the Defence sectors, where the sectoral cap is less than 49 per cent, the company would need to be ‘owned and controlled’ by resident Indian citizens and Indian companies, which, in turn, are owned and controlled by resident Indian citizens. This is a virtual impossibility.
If we have no qualms about importing from other countries why cannot we buy ammunition from our own private sector companies? While restrictions could apply to production of small arms and ammunition, for large calibre arms and ammunition there is a case for permitting the private sector companies to chip in.
The recommendations of a committee set up in 2009 to review the delegated powers were accepted by the Defence Minister in December 2010 but soon thereafter these were held in abeyance because of the perceived fear that there was a large scale misuse of the delegated powers and that implementation of committee’s recommendations would result in excessive delegation of powers.
It is difficult to understand why the MoD should bind itself by asking for request for information (RFI) that cannot be compared across all the proposals. What would constitute ‘capability’ and ‘requisite infrastructure’ to license produce the aircraft is a matter of subjective interpretation and therefore, it would become difficult for MoD to assess whether the information provided by a bidder establishes that he/she has the requisite capability/infrastructure.
On Feb 14, 2014, MoD issued an office memorandum about operationalization of a Offsets Facilitation Cell. This is the perhaps the first positive step in a long time and the MoD needs to be complimented for it. However, absence of an operating procedure, clarity about the exact nature of mandate and guidelines for those who will man the cell could turn out to be a bane for this wonderful initiative.
The 10 per cent growth in the interim defence budget although looks impressive from outside, it has a poor outlook on the modernisation front. Much of the hike in the interim budget is consumed by the increase in salary, leaving very little to meet the defence modernisation requirements.
Projecting a demand which cannot be met is as pointless as allocating budget that is barely sufficient to sustain the armed forces and other departments of the MoD. The persistent neglect of this aspect of defence management is taking its toll not only on the stock of ammunition held by the armed forces, notably the Army, but also on serviceability levels of the equipment.
It is commonly viewed that in an election year, the incumbent government is tempted to present a populist budget. In that scenario, the MoD would have reasons to be unhappy, particularly so when the modernisation requirement of the armed forces has reached a stage which is now contingent upon substantial additional resources to remain on course.
The Defence Procurement Procedure 2013, as also its earlier versions, does not define an Indian company. Some would argue that the answer is very simple: any entity registered in India under the Companies Act, 2013 or any other relevant statute and operating with a valid license, where such a license is required, qualifies as an Indian company, enterprise, institution or establishment.
While there was perhaps no option for the MoD but to do what it has done, it would be naive to expect the seller to acquiesce in forfeiture of the bank guarantees, recovery of the sums allegedly paid in violation of the PCIP (assuming that it will be possible to recover this amount) and to simply take the three helicopters back without demur.
This programme was a sincere effort by the MoD to walk the talk on participation of the private industry in defence manufacturing. The success or failure of this programme will have a long lasting effect on MoD’s efforts to strengthen the defence industrial base in the country.
The avro replacement is not a design and development programme which will involve extensive use of the airfields for test flights. It is an aircraft that is already flying and will be built as per the OEM’s specifications that will go into manufacture of the aircraft in India.
India-US defence ties are shifting away from a ‘buyer-seller’ path to one of co- development and co-production. In Washington this is viewed as a change from a ‘culture of presumptive no to one of presumptive yes’.
The services will have no option but to reduce the allocation under the heads where the impact is not immediately visible: maintenance of infrastructure, purchase of spares for maintenance of equipment, procurement of ammunition, etc.
Though public-private partnerships is encouraged, privately the government continues to retain its monopoly on research and development and defence production through the DRDO, the ordnance factories and the defence PSUs.
Several issues have been raised in the last one year, one such issue concerns the need for amending the policy to enable the MoD to demand offsets in specific area(s) rather than being driven by the vendors.
The Office Memorandum has created a debate among various stakeholders, particularly the Indian IT and software-related companies which see a loss of business to the tune of $10 billion.
The MoD is possibly of the view that allowing foreign companies to set up manufacturing and assembling facilities in India will stymie the growth of indigenous design and development activities.
The objective of the TPCR is to give an opportunity to the Indian industry to draw up business plans for developing technologies which could be transformed into capabilities required by the armed forces.
The temporary abeyance of ‘services’ as a valid means of discharging the offset obligation could prove to be exasperating for the foreign vendors and the prospective IOPs.
