The Centre brings out bimonthly newsletter – East Asia Monitor – on China, Japan and the Korean Peninsula.
No posts of Books and Monograph.
No posts of Jounral.
Despite the generational change, the war memories continue to adversely affect foreign policy and feelings of slight, disrespect, and disparagement could well assume a latent credence that ignites national outrage and dislocates the fragile power equilibrium in the region.
Irritants like the Dokdo/Takeshima issue, if allowed to linger further, will affect Japan-South Korea relations including the security cooperation they have envisaged given common regional security concerns.
While China’s desire for economic prosperity in Xinjiang may be achievable, it has not seemingly found any solution to the sense of alienation felt by the local Uighurs.
Like in the 2011 edition of the Defence White Paper, this year too, the report warns that China’s military movements are “a matter of concern” for the Asian region and the international community, and “should require prudent analysis.”
China’s decision to set up a military garrison on the Yongxing Island and creating a city administration could be seen as a step in firstly expanding its military reach, secondly strengthening its claims in the South China Sea, and thirdly countering the US rebalance towards the region.
The timing of the proposal for the new Turkmen-Afghan-China pipeline is intriguing, setting off speculation about whether it was being conceived to stymie TAPI or is part of China’s strategy to guard against any extra-regional influence in Central Asia.
On territorial and sovereignty related issues, China is likely to increasingly display unilateral tendencies. This is commensurate not only with China’s growing power but also with the relative decline of the United States.
A tactical new missile in Tibet may be a good thing for China’s defence industry, but it is definitely not a good thing for India-China relations or for regional security.
Cooperation and goodwill of the South-East Asian nations and the international community far outweighs any purported advantage that China might gain in occupying these barren islands.
Even though both the national and metropolitan governments might eventually decide to come to an agreement, the possible repercussions on Japan’s bilateral relations with China and Taiwan might still create serious hurdles in proceeding with the nationalization plan for the Senkakus.
The gestation period of 3-5 years to implement this tourism project gives China sufficient time to complete several projects linked to Tibet that improve connectivity, trade and commerce.
Japan’s amendment of its atomic energy law with the inclusion of a “national security” clause is being viewed within the country as a ploy to pave the way for the acquisition of nuclear weapons.
While the Japanese government is facing pressure from the Tokyo Metropolitan government, Ishigaki municipal assembly and the main opposition LDP to nationalise the Senkaku Islands, a section of Japanese people have been asking it not to provoke China.
While expanding the SCO mandate and reviewing the membership criteria are some of the issues that make the Beijing summit a vital one, contentious global issues like Iran also lend the summit greater importance.
The Chinese decision to send warships to the Scarborough shoals was intended to send a message not only to the Philippines but also to the United States as well as other Asian countries in dispute with China over the South China Sea.
While maintaining a reserve of 100 days worth of imported petroleum consumption at present consumption rates may be the stated policy of the Chinese government, an analysis of the existing capacities seems to suggest that China may be in a position to store much larger strategic oil reserves should it so desire.
The crux of the problem in China lies in the lack of efficient enforcement of IP laws because of the disconnect between the law as it exists in theory and as it is practiced.
Chen’s departure from the US embassy in Beijing points to the unwillingness and inability of the US to bring to bear any pressure on China on human rights issues.
The issue of Chen Guangcheng will require much time and many rounds of negotiations so that neither China nor the US “lose face”.
Despite focused efforts undertaken by China in the aftermath of the 2009 riots, it has not been able to and, perhaps may never be able to, answer the structural problems of the Uighur discontent in Xinjiang.
