The Centre brings out bimonthly newsletter – East Asia Monitor – on China, Japan and the Korean Peninsula.
No posts of Books and Monograph.
No posts of Jounral.
The demise of the North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il on December 17, 2011 has introduced a new dimension to the security situation in Northeast Asia. The future of East Asian security would largely be shaped by developments that unfold in the Korean peninsula.
The year gone by witnessed India’s firm responses to bilateral issues and China’s appreciation of the Indian position, thus providing a positive momentum to India-China relations.
The issue of “comfort women” continues to haunt Japan’s relations with its neighbour, South Korea. Koreans are unable to forget the atrocities committed by the Japanese military during the long colonial rule from 1910-1945 over the entire Korean peninsula.
Though India would be keen to expand defence cooperation on a one-to-one basis with Australia, especially on counter-terrorism and maritime security issues, it is likely to remain averse to joining any regional security grouping directed against China.
Kim Jong-Il’s death on December 17, 2011 has not only provoked concerns regarding security and stability on the Korean peninsula, but has also raised hopes of improved engagement with North Korea’s new leadership.
After ensuring that its people are only able to access ‘filtered’ news, the Chinese leadership has also decided to refurbish its image abroad through a major public relations effort.
The island hopping game being played out is an indication of China’s strategy for gaining access to the IOR by developing the capabilities of “reach”, “presence” and “sustainability”.
India must actively engage the island nations in the Western Indian Ocean and enhance the scope and deployment of the Indian Navy and its air aim in these waters.
In recent years the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been undergoing a series of transformations at various levels in keeping with its changed military doctrine which emphasises upon fighting `local wars under conditions of informationalisation`.
The India-China defence dialogue assumes significance in the context of the military build-up across the border and the persistence of the security dilemma between the two countries.
The people of Yeonpyeong Island remember with trepidation the devastating attack of November 2010. Since the Cheonan incident in March 2010 and chastened by the attack last year, South Korea has beefed up its military arsenal and strengthened its defence preparedness.
Coming close on the heels of the Chinese decision to build two nuclear power plants at Karachi as well as the continued assistance to the construction of nuclear reactors at Chashma, Xun Wang’s case raises the worrying spectre of spotty Chinese implementation of and compliance with international export control regulations.
The East Asian Summit was a rude awakening, for not one country spoke up on behalf of China on the issue of disputes in the South China Sea.
There certainly exists some logic behind India, Japan and the US working together, and that too in a region that lacks solid security architecture.
Not engaging North Korea is no more seen as an option even as it continue to build its nuclear capabilities.
It is apparent that both Russia and North Korea are seeking diplomatic currency. But so long as North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme remains an unresolved issue, Russia’s plan for a trans-Korean gas pipeline, however mutually beneficial that may be, is likely to remain unachievable.
There is considerable interest in a possible conflict with China. However, little discussion exists in the open domain on conflict possibilities. This Brief attempts to fill this gap by dilating upon conflict scenarios along the spectrum of conflict. It brings out the need for limitation to conflict and the necessity for a grand strategic approach towards China as against a military driven one.
This commentary analyses the implications of the growing Chinese footprint in India’s North West region, particularly in Northern Afghanistan and Pakistan occupied Kashmir.
The publication in the Global Times of two very contradictory articles on the same day on the South China Sea dispute clearly underlines the fact that the Chinese leadership is divided.
No party to the dispute, including China, has thus far challenged the principle of freedom of navigation for global trade through the South China Sea.
