The East Asia Centre is dedicated to study and research the domestic and foreign policies of individual countries of the region as well as India’s multifaceted relationships with these countries. With respect to China, the Centre’s research foci are its foreign policy (particularly towards the US, Russia, Central Asia and Asia Pacific), domestic politics, economy, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and India’s relationship with China in all its dimensions. The Centre’s research also focuses on Taiwan, its domestic politics, Sino-Taiwanese relationship and Indo-Taiwanese relationship, Hong Kong and India-Hong Kong relations. Japan and Korea are the other major focus of the Centre, with its research focused on their domestic politics, foreign policy and comprehensive bilateral relationships with India. The geopolitics of the Asia Pacific and the Korean peninsula are also studied in the Centre.
The centre brings out five monthly newsletters: East Asia Military Monitor, Japan Digest, China Science and Technology, Korea Newsletter, and China Military Digest.
No posts of Books and Monograph.
Much has been said about the India-China-Russia strategic triangle, a post- Cold War idea mooted by former Russian Premier Yevgeny Primakov.
In the emerging complex security situation in the Asia-Pacific region, Japanese security policies appear to be undergoing dramatic changes. The alliance with the US, especially the presence of American troops, is facing with some uncertainty after 9/11. The rise of China as a major economic and military power is seen to pose a serious challenge to Japan. Moreover, North Korea’s unabated attempts to develop WMD capabilities along with ballistic missiles threaten Japanese security directly. In response, Japan has initiated certain significant steps.
The US-Japan security arrangements have formed one of the most significant pillars of Japan’s security strategy ever since the end of the Second World War. However, what is noteworthy is the incremental growth in the Japanese profile within the alliance, from the time of its inception to the present. This paper traces the growing Japanese role within the alliance and argues that the relationship is likely to remain robust in the foreseeable future.
This paper is part of an international collaborative research project involving researchers from India, England, Japan and the United States. International terrorism has emerged as a major human concern after September 11, 2001 and an understanding of this against the backdrop of related security problems has emerged as a priority research area.
American security policy towards South Asia can basically be divided into three stages: balance of power in the Cold War era, beyond balance of power after the end of Cold War, and new balance of power after September 11.
China’s Defense Paper 2002 was released in December 2002. It is the fourth such Paper since 1995. It clearly affirms that the top priority for China is to continue its modernisation. In particular, economic security is given more attention. The report also echoes the guidelines set at the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party for the future development of China. As stated in the White Paper, “The 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China… has drawn up a grand blueprint for China’s development in the new century.
The origins of Chinese nationalism are traceable to the post-Cold War era which saw the gradual erosion of Communist ideology and the Chinese government’s use of nationalism to shore up party legitimacy. Yet, the Chinese nationalism which has emerged is representative of Han nationalism and ignores ethnic minority nationalism in the larger cause of China’s unity and integrity. Therefore, the strains in Chinese nationalism are visible today, in the separatist movements in Tibet and Xinjiang.
It all appears that the Indian army this time got clear orders to hold the ground and undo what the previous UPA government did – dismantled huts, bunkers and observation posts in exchange of PLA moving back from the Indian territory.
In the Chinese mind the settlement of the border issue with India cannot be divorced from regional, political and larger strategic issues. China has used the threat of intrusions across the LAC, as a part of its coercive diplomacy and it is too valuable an asset to give up.
The military gap between Indian and China is growing steadily as the PLA is upgrading the military infrastructure in Tibet to enable rapid deployment. China will stall resolution of the territorial dispute till it is in a much stronger position.
Can the two leaders go further and recognize the regional strategic interests of each other in the Pacific and the Indian Oceans? What about full support for India’s membership of the Security with the two countries working together in that forum?
President Xi Jinping’s visit to India is a new opportunity for infusing momentum in the bilateral relations. Economic dealings would be one aspect of the talks; but neither country can afford to bypass the sensitive security and strategic issues that dog their efforts to bring peace and stability.
The biggest takeaway for India from Prime Minister Modi’s visit is Abe’s assurance of $33.5 billion public and private investment and financing including ODA, doubling Japanese FDI and the number of companies in India over the coming five years.
The dominant challenges for Japan apart from China remain North Korea. The document expresses concerns on the launching of multiple ballistic missiles towards the Sea of Japan along with the possibility, for the first time, that the North Koreans may have acquired nuclear warheads.
Prime Minister Modi has to think beyond the immediate circle and leverage the Himalayas as a bridge for India reaching out to wider Eurasian space the access to which has blocked by Pakistan. A way out could be to promote a regional market across the border, woven by a web of spiritual and commercial interests.
While India needs to vigorously pursue its endeavour for APEC membership, it is crucial for the policymakers to comprehend the geo-political allusions of this Chinese invitation, which is linked with India-China ties as well as their balance-of-power politics in Asia-Pacific.
China’s announcement of a 10 billion Yuan ($1.6 billion) fund to finance the “maritime silk road plan” is a clear sign that it is serious about moving ahead with its stated plans. For India, it is instructive that the sales pitch of shared economic gains does not conceal the MSR’s real purpose: ensuring the security of sea lines of communications (SLOCs) in the Indian and Pacific oceans.
