The Centre brings out bimonthly newsletter – East Asia Monitor – on China, Japan and the Korean Peninsula.
No posts of Books and Monograph.
No posts of Jounral.
How India and Indonesia look at each other, the region and the world at large will determine the course of their relationship in coming years.
Gates has steered Japan and South Korea towards aligning their shared threat perceptions about North Korea and China.
North Korea’s offer of a dialogue is unlikely to elicit a positive response from South Korea which instead is militarily drawing closer to Japan to enhance deterrence.
The success of the visit was limited to strengthening links of economic diplomacy between the two Asian giants, ignoring the geo-political and strategic issues that act as de-stabilisers in Sino-Indian relations.
Soon after naming the North Korean regime as its “enemy”, South Korea has, quite abruptly, invoked the desirability of reverting to the Six-Party Talks.
If the achievements of Premier Wen’s visit to India were more pronounced in terms of economic content, his visit to Pakistan was more characterised by political and strategic significance.
The world needs India as a balancer – in trade, as a market, as an alternative model, and as a world power.
The conflict over rare earths is not only a consequence of the monopoly amassed by China but is also reflective of the current flux in global power hierarchies.
This Brief uses irony to communicate five propositions, that can be found in several discourses on Sino-Indian ties. It evaluates these propositions in the light of the tangible and intangible gains from Premier Wen Jiabao’s second official visit to India.
Would China’s strategic error in inviting Japanese hostility place more blocks to its rise as an unchallenged regional power or would it be able to override the Japanese threat in ample measure by altering its strategic game and finding a meeting ground with the United States?
China has all along been testing the limits of India’s tolerance and restraint and has once again given the Indian foreign ministry much home work for the next few months.
Kan’s statement about sending the SDF to the Korean peninsula to rescue Japanese citizens and people of Japanese origin in the event of an emergency has raised the spectre of a possible revival of Japanese militarism.
Japan’s adoption of a new defence Guidelines to secure its southern “outlaying islands” closer to China suggests major shift in Japan’s Cold War security policy.
Primer Wen’s visit should be devoted to enhance mutual trust and confidence but this should not be done by brushing longstanding problems under the carpet.
An initiative focusing on collaboration and innovation (COIN) in energy, health, infrastructure, and knowledge-intensive industries has potential to overcome emerging fissures and enhance India-China economic relations.
Wen Jiabao’s visit provides ground to bring better clarity on the Chinese stance over a range of critical issues to India, and to ask whether the sentiments expressed in 2005 were merely rhetorical.
Both the revelation of a highly refined capacity for uranium enrichment and the shelling of South Korean military positions amply demonstrate Pyongyang’s preparedness to push the crisis to the extremes.
Because of America’s refusal to engage North Korea, by default the reclusive nation dictates the rules of engagement in its favour.
North Korea’s intent appears to be to entice South Korea and the United States into resuming nuclear negotiations and to test their resolve.
India and New Zealand have a great opportunity to work together for the economic wellbeing of the Pacific Island nations.
