The Centre brings out bimonthly newsletter – East Asia Monitor – on China, Japan and the Korean Peninsula.
IDSA Asian Strategic Review 2008, the second volume in the series of Annual Surveys revived by the Institute in the previous year, is divided into six sections.
The 21st century has been described as the ‘Asian Century.’ Home to 60 per cent of the world’s population and accounting for one-fourth of its Gross Domestic Product, by 2050, Asia will also have three of the world’s largest economies—China, India, and Japan. A dynamic hub in this rising Asia is the Southeast Asian region—encompassing diverse countries, peoples and cultures. The 9th Asian Security Conference addressed a range of issues and trends affecting this crucial region and their implications for regional and Asian security.
The volume, divided into four sections, deals with strategic developments pertaining to Asia. Recognising the diverse 'push' and 'pull' factors impinging on a country's strategic posture, the volume starts off by dealing with issues which the Advisory Committee of Experts guiding this publication felt were of immediate relevance.
Publishers: Promilla & Co. and Bibliphile South Asia
ISBN: 81-85002-76-2
Rs. 295
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Publishers: IDSA and Promilla & Co.
ISBN: 81-86019-51-9
Rs 1350
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Publishers: IDSA and Shipra
ISBN: 81-7541-189-9
Rs 650
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Publisher: Roli
ISBN: 81-7436-310-6
Rs 450
Publishers: IDSA and Shipra
ISBN: 81-7541-167-8
Rs 1250
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Publisher: IDSA & Knowledge World
ISBN: 81-86019-37-5
Rs. 650
Publisher: IDSA and Knowledge World
ISBN: 81-86019-26
Publisher: IDSA and Knowledge World
ISBN: 81-86019-28-6
Rs. 650
Publisher: IDSA and Knowledge World
ISBN: 81-86019-18-9
Publisher: IDSA and Knowledge World
ISBN: 81-86019-20-0
Publisher: Sanchar Publishing House
ISBN: 81-7203-033-9
Rs. 350
Since 2012, Japan’s foreign policy under Prime Minister (PM) Abe has been characterized as assertive, welcome or provocative. By employing the fear of abandonment/entrapment theory as the analytical framework, this article finds that Japan’s regional foreign policy under Abe is characterized by consolidation and investment in broad-based multilateralism, proactive engagement with partners in the region, including China, and strategic hedging.
The article assesses China’s Indian Ocean strategy against the backdrop of its naval base development in Djibouti. It argues that China’s naval force posturing stems from a doctrinal shift to ocean-centric strategic thinking and is indicative of the larger gameplan of having a permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean. China’s maritime strategy comprises four key components. First, to channel naval reinforcements for securing its maritime trade and economic interests in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)—even as it strengthens the Maritime Silk Road initiative.
In a strong response to the nuclear warhead test of Pyongyang on September 9, 2016, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) at its 7821st meeting, held on November 30, 2016, adopted Resolution 2321 (2016)—officially known as S/RES/2321—imposing fresh sanctions on the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea). The Resolution specifically imposes restrictions on the DPRK’s exports that assist Pyongyang in generating revenue for its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.
In Smart Diplomacy: Exploring China-India Synergy, P.S. Suryanarayana has sought to answer the questions: ‘Will China and India live at peace with each other? Will they be able to overcome the deficit of trust between them? Will they be able to find amicable solutions to their disputes over their borders, Pakistan, Tibet, rivers, and trade, etc.?’ (p. iv). These questions, raised by Ambassador Tommy Koh in his foreword to the book, concern all those who want a stable and productive future for the two countries that Suryanarayana characterizes as the sunrise powers of the 21st century.
Xi Jinping became the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China in November 2012 and the President of the People’s Republic of China in March 2013. Ever since, under his leadership as the Chinese President, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been progressively tightening its control over the media. In a Communist structure, the media is perceived to be the ‘mouthpiece’ of the Party and is supposed to be used for propaganda. Media is a very essential tool in spreading the government agenda and controlling the public discourse.
Prof P. Stobdan (Senior Fellow, IDSA)’s reading of history fails to predict Tibet’s future from the beginning. The Dalai Lama has informed the Tibetan people about his thinking on the succession issue since as early as 1969. Later on September 24, 2011, the Dalai Lama took a definite position on the succession issue, where the Dalai Lama made it very clear that the decision to continue or not continue with the institution of the Dalai Lama lies with the Tibetan people. The real reason for ‘Younghusband’s visit’ to Tibet was not to lay a telegraph line.
Sino-Indian relations were governed by concerns about an unsound bilateral bonhomie, internal as well as external strategic and political considerations, and in addition, national interests and priorities not necessarily oriented towards pacifying the bilateral relations.
The Paracel Islands dispute has recently resurfaced as a source of conflict between Vietnam and China, who both claim sovereignty over the islands from ‘time immemorial’. This article re-examines their respective claims from an international law perspective. It also focuses on delineating the respective claims with emphasis on sovereignty, territory and self-determination. Based on available sources, this article suggests that Vietnam appears to have a more credible sovereignty claim over the Paracel Islands vis-à-vis China.
An investigation into the prospects for including political talks in the cross-strait dialogue enables a better assessment of cross-strait relations. China’s push for political talks and Taiwan’s resistance to them imply that their political positions on the fundamental issues of sovereignty and ‘living space’ for Taiwan remain unchanged. Considering Taiwan’s complex domestic political scenario, which is largely against unification with Mainland China, the likelihood of Taiwan agreeing to political talks for unification is remote.
In November 2012, soon after the conclusion of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), President Xi Jinping put forward for the first time the idea of the ‘Chinese Dream’. In March 2013, Xi further elaborated on this concept at the closing ceremony of the First Session of the 12th National People’s Congress.
Will India and China resolve their boundary dispute during the tenure of Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping? The strategic communities in both countries are optimistic, particularly after the high tension prevailing along the border during President Xi Jinping’s tour of India in September 2014. Both Prime Minister Modi and President Xi are seen as decisive leaders.1 Both are expected to hold power in their respective countries for a few years to come. Personalities and personas matter greatly for scoring political brownie points. The boundary dispute, quintessentially, is political in nature.
After a successful visit by Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Colombo in March, Indian policy elite are hopeful that the new Sri Lankan government will roll-back some of the geopolitical concessions made by the Rajapaksa regime to Beijing, thereby restoring India’s primacy in its near neighbourhood. India’s policy elite are hopeful that Maithripala Sirisena, the new president, will roll back some of the geopolitical concessions made by his predecessor to Beijing, thereby restoring Indian primacy in its near neighbourhood.
China has reoriented its foreign policy strategy since Xi Jinping became president. This could significantly recast China’s relations with Asian countries. The process that began with Xi Jinping’s coming to power in 2012–2013 reached, in a sense, a definitive moment, with the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs held in Beijing in November 2014.
With the take-over of power by the military on May 22, 2014, under General Prayuth Chan-O-Cha, the chief of army, Thailand has gone full circle in coup d’états, from democratic deficit to fractious political struggle between different social groups leading to acute and irreconcilable political instability that gives leverage to the army to finally intervene and seize power by suspending the constitutional processes. Democracy in Thailand is not only a recent phenomenon, but is also periodic and short-lived.
This article examines how the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) conflict management process in the South China Sea (SCS) has been conducted and whether the ASEAN way can effectively manage the dispute, in which China is a prime and important actor. It argues that rising tensions in the South China Sea are a direct result of the changed balance of power in the region given the asymmetry between China and ASEAN members. China has taken advantage of ASEAN efforts to develop a code of conduct that is premised on the ASEAN way.
In his Murmansk speech in 1987, Gorbachev proposed the Arctic as the shortest sea route linking Europe to the Far East and the Pacific Ocean, triggering a new perspective on the region.1 Since then, the 1991 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), referred to as the Finnish Initiative, has been created as a multilateral, non-binding agreement among Arctic states to protect the environment by monitoring, assessment, emergency preparedness/response, and conservation of the Arctic zone.
For nearly a quarter of the past century a series of notable changes have taken place in the Arctic. All of them, whether political, economical, environmental or climate-related, inevitably had an impact on regional and global governance. This commentary mainly focuses on the role of China in Arctic affairs in the context of global change and global governance.
South Korea is not a traditional Arctic state, but it has several key interests in the region. This article explores the sources of those interests and the country’s commercial activities in the Arctic in the areas of shipping, shipbuilding and hydrocarbons. Since the country’s polar interests transcend commerce, however, attention is also paid to the importance of science and research and development in Korean culture.
On November 7, 1950, Vallabhbhai Patel wrote his celebrated letter to Jawaharlal Nehru on India’s China policy. ‘The Chinese Government has tried to delude us by professions of peaceful intention’, he stated, referring to Beijing’s decision to move troops into Tibet. A new challenge confronted India as a result of the ‘disappearance of Tibet, as we knew it, and the expansion of China almost up to our gates’. ‘Chinese ambitions … not only cover the Himalayan slopes on our side but also include the important part of Assam.
Beijing’s stance on Afghanistan’s political crisis and its approach towards the Taliban regime is a critical variable that will shape the geometrics of the China–Taliban–Pakistan nexus versus India and the West.
The COVID-19 pandemic has situated the policy conversation on economic security at the centre stage of national security calculus not just in US and Europe but also in Japan. For Japan, it would entail attaining “strategic autonomy” in critical supply chains at the national level, and pursuing “strategic indispensability” at the global level.
The Digital Silk Road can give China the power to shape global digital governance norms in its favour and the political, economic and strategic tools to be a technological hegemon, posing enormous challenges to emerging economies like India.
Envisioned as a sustainable alternative to China’s BRI, US-led Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative seeks to narrow down infrastructure deficit in the developing world. However, with their several distinct areas of focus, BRI & B3W can possibly share both complementary & competitive equations.
The drawbacks of over-reliance on China as a single manufacturing source has led to countries adopting “China Plus One” strategy to diversify supply networks. Whether Supply Chain Resilience Initiative by India-Japan-Australia can assist in partial decoupling from China is yet to be seen.
The CCP has invested heavily in telling “China’s Story Well” by amplifying its discourse power. However, looking at China’s discourse politics from an absolutely narrow propaganda lens would be a folly, for the stakes for India are much higher, more nuanced and across multiple domains.
Xi’s rousing words at CCP’s centenary celebrations have reaffirmed China’s intentions to make every effort in actualising its domestic goals and global ambitions—without holding much regard for the rules-based order.
Two key elections are approaching in Japan. As Prime Minister Suga seeks public mandate with just one year's report card amidst a pandemic, his political future is contingent on rapid inoculation and a successful Olympics.
The future of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) will depend on the choices that China makes.
As and when the draft Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) 2020 is finalised, it is expected to incorporate the perspectives of multiple stakeholders in a balanced manner.
Despite change in leadership in Japan, the new Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide looks set to continue the policies of his predecessor, Abe Shinzo. Both domestic and external factors may affect policies.
There is a need to widely disseminate China’s insidious role as an illegal occupier of Kashmir’s territory, including its territorial grab in the trans-Karakoram tract, in order to raise public awareness of the issue – both in India and at the international level.
Abe Shinzo made his mark as an astute statesman in international politics with intellectual bandwidth and a global vision to conceptualise grand strategic constructs such as the Free and Open Indo-Pacific anchored on universal values.
With Chinese unilateral efforts altering the maritime status quo on the one hand and lack of progress on denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula on the other, Japan is revisiting its strategic options.
The ruling DPP Government in Taiwan is likely to further build on the gains made in domestic politics and in ‘pragmatic diplomacy’ internationally, occasioned by COVID-19, without indulging in any geopolitical exuberance.
Considering that the US, Japan, Australia and India are committed to working for a free, open and rules-based Indo-Pacific, it is time for India’s strategic partners to review their cartographic positions on India’s borders.
The PLA’s approach to COVID-19 has shown that the military reforms have im-mensely benefited their coordination and response. It has intensified China’s desire to maintain military preparedness and the resolve to demonstrate it too.
Whether Abe can turn the battle against the COVID-19 pandemic into an opportunity to demonstrate decisive leadership will define Japan’s future course, as the resilience of the economy and good governance is at stake.
President Xi’s Kathmandu visit sets a new parameter for the China-Nepal ties, moving away from the traditional interstate relations based on simple bilateral modes of engagement. Beijing seems to be orchestrating a Himalayan approach in its relations with Kathmandu – revealing a grander Chinese policy in making.
Given China’s stated policy of using its rare earth dominance for strategic purposes, countries have been looking for ways to diversify their sources of supply. India too needs to acquire expertise in valorising rare earth minerals and shift to developing its downstream sector.
