Engaging with a multilateral body requires constructive foreign policy forethought, especially for a country that is not a fully fledged member of that body. China’s overtures to the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) exemplify this approach. The Indian Ocean and India are the two most immediate elements in China’s policy approach to the IORA. With 20 member states, extra-territorial major powers as important dialogue partners, and the increasing importance of energy politics in the region, the IORA today is a significant multilateral body in China’s calculus.

• Jagannath P. Panda
• September 2014
• Strategic Analysis

This review essay examines the significance of India–China relations against the background of the current phenomenon of a multipolar world in the light of four recent publications on the subject. Tien-sze Fang’s and Jeff M. Smith’s works discuss the current facets of India–China relations, while William Antholis’s and Carl J. Dahlman’s works deal with the character and standing that India and China bring to their regional and global discourse.

• Jagannath P. Panda
• July 2014
• Strategic Analysis

In the last decade, the dynamics of inter-state relations in the Asia Pacific have changed rapidly, largely due to the rise of China. Competition rather than cooperation has become the order of the day. In the East and South China Seas, freedom of navigation, competitive claims over maritime boundaries and air space security are experiencing an evolution of new brinkmanship between the US, an established super power, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), an emerging super power, unfolding new challenges for the other potential regional players including India.

• Arun Kumar Sahu
• July 2014
• Strategic Analysis

Problems common to many Asian states suggest a pattern of crisis in Asia. The evidence suggests that the root cause is the similarity in the patterns of political development of postcolonial states. In Asia such states have attempted to reconcile state strength and internal diversity by constructing a triangular balance between identity construction, hegemonic governance and economic development. Unfortunately, this fragile balance eroded as state structures matured and economies grew, which increasingly exposed countries to escalating crises of legitimacy and instability.

• Björn Dressel , Michael Wesley
• July 2014
• Strategic Analysis

South Korean president Park Geun-hye visited India in January 2014 after India and South Korea marked 40 years of diplomatic relations the previous year.1 These developments symbolise a burgeoning relationship between two of Asia’s leading economies and democracies. However, they have added significance as Asia undergoes a shift in the strategic balance of power.

• Chietigj Bajpaee
• July 2014
• Strategic Analysis

More than a decade has passed since the European Union (EU) signed strategic partnerships with China (2003) and India (2004). The EU’s ‘honeymoon’ with China was over within a few years while cooperation on truly strategic issues with India is yet to emerge. The core of both these relationships is still economics.

• Gulshan Sachdeva
• July 2014
• Strategic Analysis

Within the first year of Xi Jinping’s elevation to the presidency, China has moved further ahead on its path to achieving primacy in the world. In the last week of November 2013, Beijing imposed an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the conflicted Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, much to the consternation of its feuding neighbours such as Japan and South Korea. Their howls of protest found expression in the US attempt to challenge China to promulgate what it has done in deed.

• Pinaki Bhattacharya
• May 2014
• Strategic Analysis

It is a matter of widespread belief that on assumption of supreme power, Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s overall ambition was to emerge as an iconic figure in the same league as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. At the very outset, Xi realised this would necessitate the elimination of any political challenge and his first step was therefore to consolidate an unassailable position within the Standing Committee of the Party Politburo (PBSC). To achieve this objective, Xi chose to emulate some of the policies and methods of the late Mao Zedong, albeit with modern underpinnings.

• R. S. Kalha
• May 2014
• Strategic Analysis

Scholars studying China are quite familiar with themes like national humiliation, nationalism as a new source of regime legitimacy vis-à-vis communism, and China’s anti-US and anti-Japan polemic. Zheng Wang’s book Never Forget National Humiliation captures the interrelated nature of these themes in a skilful manner and is a valuable addition to the study of Chinese nationalism.

• Prashant Kumar Singh
• January 2014
• Strategic Analysis

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) are not necessarily two contending trade liberalising models, but their import and arrival have posed stiff political challenges for many countries, including China and India, Asia’s two heavyweights. With these two initiatives, the regional trade of Asia is entering an interesting phase of liberalisation and integration.

• Jagannath P. Panda
• January 2014
• Strategic Analysis

Since June 2013, there has been a spate of activity on the Tibet controversy. Sparking it off was the interview of Professor Jin Wei1 from the Central Party School in Asian Weekly2 on June 6, entitled ‘Reopen Talks and Resolve Tibetan Issues’, in which she advocated engaging the Dalai Lama rather than demonising him. Soon after, the International Campaign of Tibet reported that China had lifted the 17-year ban on the display of Dalai Lama portraits in Sichuan and Qinghai.

• Dolma Tsering
• January 2014
• Strategic Analysis

Over the past few years, ‘trilateral economic cooperation’ and ‘vibrant bridge’ have become buzzwords in Nepal’s foreign policy discourse, and have also caught the popular imagination at home in India. These proposals have generated both curiosity and anxiety in Delhi’s diplomatic and academic circles that are otherwise largely indifferent to Nepal. The Chinese diplomats in Delhi also raising the issue with the Indian officials has added to India’s anxiety all the more. With some notable exceptions (e.g., C.

• Post Bahadur Basnet
• September 2013
• Strategic Analysis

Integrating the restive Tibetan minority with China has been the primary domestic challenge for Beijing. Thus far, its Nepal policy has been crafted essentially to address the Tibetan question. The idea of trilateral cooperation between India, Nepal and China apparently floated by Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) in April 2013 was, in effect, first made by the former Chinese ambassador to Nepal, Yang Houlan, in 2012.

• Abanti Bhattacharya
• September 2013
• Strategic Analysis

Trilateral cooperation between India, Nepal and China needs to be seen from the perspective of how beneficial it is for all three countries. However, such cooperation cannot be divorced from India’s security concerns and its close relations with Nepal. Moreover, there are several issues that come into question, too. Are there any objectives behind this proposal? Does it involve only developmental cooperation? Does it undermine India’s security interests?

• Smruti S. Pattanaik
• September 2013
• Strategic Analysis

Prachanda’s proposal for trilateral cooperation between India, Nepal and China seems reasonable on the face of it. However, both China and Nepal should be aware that it will create a lot of misunderstandings in India. The reasons for this are as follows:

• Arvind Gupta
• September 2013
• Strategic Analysis

Pushpa Kamal Dahal, alias Prachanda, made the trilateral proposal during his official visit to India in April 2013. This was the third time since 2010 that Prachanda had raised this issue. This concept seems to be a modified version of his earlier ‘equidistance policy’, which was declared after he became prime minister in September 2008. He proposed trilateral cooperation for the first time in October 2010 after visiting Beijing.

• Nihar R. Nayak
• September 2013
• Strategic Analysis

Pushpa Kamal Dahal, alias Prachanda, the chairman of the United Communist Party of Nepal (UCPN) (Maoist), visited India on April 27–30, 2013, shortly after he had returned from a week-long visit to China. During his visits to China and India, Prachanda proposed trilateral cooperation between India, Nepal and China. Although he assured India that this trilateral cooperation would be founded on the bilateral relations that Nepal already shares with India, he clearly did not elaborate on the nature of this trilateral cooperation and the issues that need to be discussed within this framework.

• Editorial Board
• September 2013
• Strategic Analysis

This article examines the EU weapons embargo on China as a major foreign policy challenge that China’s new leadership has inherited. The article argues that the continuation of the embargo constitutes a failure of Chinese foreign policy to project China as a responsible global player. The article examines the legal framework and the political debate within the EU to emphasise that the embargo has been largely ineffective in its objective of denying advanced military technology to China.

• Sonika Gupta
• September 2013
• Strategic Analysis

Although the nature of warfare has changed beyond recognition since the 1920s and 1930s when Chairman Mao Zedong penned his main military writings, his military thoughts are still a point of reference for any discussion on military thinking in modern China. Developments in warfare have superseded Mao’s operational principles and tactics visualised in his three-stage warfare; however, his philosophical and political understanding of war has value that transcends time and space.

• Prashant Kumar Singh
• September 2013
• Strategic Analysis

Two new factors have appeared on the Tibetan political scene after the recent leadership change in China. First, the ‘spiritualisation’ of politics: paradoxically, the atheist Chinese Communist Party (CCP), also known as The Communist Party of China (CPC) seems increasingly interested in ‘spiritual’ matters. The CCP has started promoting reincarnated Lamas, known in China as ‘Living Buddhas’, in a big way. The purpose is to prepare for the post-Dalai Lama era. The second new development is the emergence of a ‘Tibet Gang’.

• Claude Arpi
• September 2013
• Strategic Analysis

The incremental and calibrated improvement in the India-China defence ties has withstood the test of time. The next step in building M2M relations could provide the required impetus to further accelerate the process of strengthening peace and stability along the LAC.

• Mandip Singh
• September 16, 2019
• IDSA Comments

The current impasse in Hong Kong poses the most serious challenge to the Chinese leadership since the territory’s integration with the mainland. The “One Country, Two Systems” arrangement appears to be at crossroads, set to be consigned to the archives well before its expiry date.

• G.G. Dwivedi
• August 27, 2019
• IDSA Comments

While Japan envisions its role as a leading promoter of rules-based liberal international order, the G20 tested Japan’s leadership in championing the cause of trade liberalisation and resisting protectionism.

• Titli Basu
• July 12, 2019
• IDSA Comments

While still in the evolution stage, BRI has the potential to be a game changer in China’s quest to shape a ‘Sino-Centric’ Global Order.

• G.G. Dwivedi
• May 22, 2019
• IDSA Comments

The decade-long effort to list Azhar showcases the pragmatism that marks India's multilateral diplomacy and questions the general perception that India's multilateral approach is ambivalent and inconsistent.

• Rajeesh Kumar
• May 09, 2019
• IDSA Comments

It is neither the Wuhan spirit nor India’s zero tolerance on terrorism but China’s own vulnerability to terror that caused Beijing to ultimately take on board New Delhi’s concerns on terrorism.

• Abanti Bhattacharya
• May 06, 2019
• IDSA Comments

As the East Asian regional order becomes fragmented, how is Prime Minister Shinzo Abe managing Tokyo’s strategic interests within the US-Japan-China relations?

• Titli Basu
• January 17, 2019
• Issue Brief

China has managed to establish an edge in solar energy manufacturing and technology, and any shift in its solar policy is likely to affect countries looking to increase their solar energy capacity.

• Chithra Purushothaman
• December 31, 2018
• Issue Brief

There is a need to close the perception gap in India’s assessment of the state of Chinese politics, to distinguish between transformation and conflict, and respond accordingly.

• M.S. Prathibha
• December 20, 2018
• IDSA Comments

While broad agreement at the top leadership level has been easy to achieve, negotiations relating to defence equipment and technology cooperation have proved to be difficult, shaped as these are by a complex interplay of variables like cost-competitiveness, technology transfer and domestic politics.

• Titli Basu
• August 31, 2018
• IDSA Comments

India must jettison the attempt to maintain a balance between China and the US and instead take advantage of China’s internal and external vulnerabilities to gain an upper hand in the asymmetric power equation that has developed.

• Abanti Bhattacharya
• August 27, 2018
• IDSA Comments

While the US may be able to ensure the security of its homeland, it is bound to gradually yield strategic space to China in the region. All said, prevailing alignments in the region are in for a definite reset.

• G.G. Dwivedi
• June 22, 2018
• IDSA Comments

The summit brought out ambiguities in America’s policy towards denuclearisation of Korean Peninsula. To translate outcomes of the summit into concrete deliverables, Trump administration would not only have to clearly define its denuclearisation action plan in terms of goals, methodology and timeline but also bolster its alliance with South Korea and Japan.

• Titli Basu
• June 19, 2018
• IDSA Comments

While the recent Korean Summit marks the beginning of the new era, to achieve lasting peace will require intense diplomatic efforts.

• G.G. Dwivedi
• May 04, 2018
• IDSA Comments

It may be time for India and China to discuss nuclear issues bilaterally with a view to mediating the uncertainties borne of their differing perspectives and postures.

• Rukmani Gupta
• April 19, 2018
• IDSA Comments

Kim will drive the hardest bargain possible and be willing to make only small concessions like maintaining some type of a freeze on future tests of missiles and nuclear weapons.

• Ashok Sajjanhar
• April 09, 2018
• IDSA Comments

External balancing is re-emerging as an element of policy driven by the yawning power asymmetry between India and China and China’s turn towards assertive behaviour and territorial claims.

• S. Kalyanaraman
• March 28, 2018
• Issue Brief

India should carefully understand the evolving foreign policy strategy of China under Xi Jinping, and notably, his worldview, and try to position bilateral relations accordingly.

• Jagannath P. Panda
• March 27, 2018
• Issue Brief

Xi rides the Dragon which is externally formidable but internally fragile. He is aware of the consequences of his policies going awry.

• G.G. Dwivedi
• March 14, 2018
• IDSA Comments

Doklam brought into perspective the fractured relationship between India and China on the global stage and increased fears of China’s growing unilateralism as it inexorably broadens its interests and sphere of influence, especially in South Asia.

• Shruti Pandalai
• January 01, 2018
• Issue Brief