The Centre brings out bimonthly newsletter – East Asia Monitor – on China, Japan and the Korean Peninsula.
No posts of Books and Monograph.
The article seeks to assess the evolution of the Tibet question against the backdrop of the problems associated with the succession of the Dalai Lama. It also discusses the implications of all this for India and provides policy recommendations the Indian authorities could use to deal with this situation.
The India–Brazil–South Africa (IBSA) forum, which was formalised in June 2003 through the adoption of the Brasilia Declaration based on the spirit of South–South solidarity, turns a decade old in 2013. The event will be celebrated at its first decadal summit in New Delhi. At the same time, this event needs to be juxtaposed with the fifth consecutive leadership summit of Brazil–Russia–India–China–South Africa (BRICS) in Durban in March 2013. Both IBSA and BRICS are in the limelight for their cross-continental politics.
China is undergoing a transitional period of rapid economic and social development. The way in which this period is managed will hold significant implications for the Chinese state concerning both its internal and external security. While fundamentally resting upon progressing from a developing to a developed economy, this transition highlights deep issues and tensions affecting China—ranging from rising societal inequalities to various separatism threats to mounting individualism.
The Sino-Indian border dispute is one of the longest running border disputes in the world, which has so far eluded a solution. While China has settled its territorial disputes with most of its neighbours, including Russia and Vietnam, the border dispute with India is yet to be resolved, even after 15 rounds of negotiation under the new framework of Special Representative Talks initiated in 2003 during Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to China, which indeed gave an impetus to the border talks.
Chinese economic and military growth in the last decade has heightened interest in the country's functioning and political system. The world at large is highly intrigued by the way the Chinese political system functions and there is also a curiosity regarding the strengths and weaknesses of this system.
Chinese foreign and domestic policies cannot be understood without understanding the evolving nature of Chinese nationalism. Bhavna Singh's book on Chinese nationalism deals with this issue in a detailed manner. The Communist Party of China (CCP) has relied heavily on the notion of patriotism, which overlaps that of nationalism, for domestic and international legitimacy. All eyes are on the leadership transition in China and its implications for the world. It will be interesting to see how the new leadership deals with the growing nationalistic sentiment in the country.
India's rise as a regional and global power could potentially alter the geopolitical landscape of the Asia-Pacific. With its economic growth and concomitant investments in military modernisation, many see India as evolving into a strategic pole in Asia. David Brewster in this volume sets out to examine ‘the consequences of India's rise on the Asia Pacific strategic order’ (p. ix) and asks whether India will indeed join the ranks of major powers in the coming years.
AResurgent China: South Asian Perspective, edited by Tan Tai Yong and S.D. Muni, is a timely book. The simultaneous rise of India and China is a defining reality of the Asian and global order. The trajectory of Sino-Indian relations will have an impact on South Asia. Since the mid-1980s, the two countries have made efforts to unfreeze the relationship, and in the last 10 years the Sino-Indian bilateral relationship has been transformed politically and economically.
China's emergence as a global actor has fuelled much speculation over its ‘intentions’ in the long term. Arguably, debates on the issue have centred around China's growing military and economic power and concurrent challenges to the maintenance of the existing status quo in the international system. This article seeks to understand China's foreign policy motivations by studying the conceptualisation of ‘national interest’ within China.
The strum and drang that has accompanied China's arrival as a major economic and diplomatic actor in Africa has divided the continent into advocates, alarmists and analysts. 1 For the advocates, the integration of China into the African architecture is one to be promoted as an alternative to the tired policy pronouncements of an increasingly enervated West, not least because of the practical rationale that Beijing has the financial means and political will to invest in Africa's future.
China and India are two of the fastest growing economies of the world today. While it may seem like the proverbial hare and tortoise race, with China way ahead, there is no denying the fact that both economies will be looking for additional energy resources, mineral resources, secure lines of communication, higher productivity at lower cost and finally, of course, larger markets to sustain this growth.
The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is becoming increasingly significant in the world arena, with the United States, India and China—the most important stakeholders in the region—playing substantial roles. Judging from the three countries' strategic thought, concerns, interests and power balances, it is the US–India potential competition for maritime dominance in the IOR that demands the most attention. However, competition does not mean confrontation.
In recent years, China's strategic community has emerged as an increasingly vocal and influential constituent of Chinese policy debates. This article focuses on Chinese analysts steeped in the realpolitik tradition. These intellectuals and strategists discern a troubling trend towards intense competition and zero-sum interactions in the Indian Ocean. In their view, a progressively assertive India will set the pace of the impending maritime rivalries among the great powers.
The Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)’s recent accomplishments are impressive but have not gone beyond ‘pocket excellence’, as its overall structure and equipment are still out of date. However, the PLAN now has ships and powerful weapons that enable it to extend its combat range and engage its foes in a relatively large-scale maritime campaign beyond the Yellow Sea—its traditional battlefield. Depending on the nature of operations, it may already be able to carry out blue water missions around the first island chain in the West Pacific.
The Indian Ocean has long been a hub of great power rivalry and the struggle for its domination has been a perennial feature of global politics. It is the third largest of the world's five oceans and touches Asia in the north, Africa in the west, Indo-China in the east, and Antarctica in the south. Home to four critical access waterways—the Suez Canal, Bab-el Mandeb, the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca—the Indian Ocean connects the Middle East, Africa and East Asia with Europe and the Americas.
Though the original focus of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was primarily economic cooperation, the adoption of the ASEAN charter in November 2007 officially included cooperation on human rights. This article examines three hypotheses to determine the causes of cooperation problems: regime type, non-interference policy, and absence of an enforcement mechanism in the ASEAN charter.
China is a thirsty country desperately in need of water—a lot of it. In order to meet its water and energy requirements in the densely populated and fertile northern plains, it is successively making interventions in the Tibetan rivers in the southern part through dams and diversions. While China is well within its riparian rights to do so, a set of externalities involving the principles of water-sharing and lower riparian needs—stretching from Afghanistan to Vietnam—raise concerns.
Writings on India–China relations in recent years are increasingly seen to be imputing Machiavellian realism to the political and, increasingly, economic sphere of interaction.
China is gradually increasing its economic and commercial presence in Eastern Europe by signing bilateral agreements with countries that are still in transition, some of which are members of the European Union (EU).
The recent fad among Western security commentaries is to portray India as a natural member of East Asian political life.
Removing the Kim regime’s fears about regime change and reducing the insecurity caused by North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests to the US and its allies are the essentials that must be addressed in a UN-led multinational dialogue to forge a negotiated settlement.
For the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to succeed, China needs to engage in serious and sincere dialogue with BRI participants, ensure respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, uphold the internationally accepted norms of transparency and observe principles of financial responsibility, among other key issues.
Xi envisions China as a key player in shaping the new global order with Chinese characteristics. His grand strategy is in consonance with the Chinese strategic culture of ‘thinking deep and far’
The inclusion of the Belt and Road Initiative in the Charter of the Communist Party of China indicates that it is not merely an economic policy but rather a ‘political project’.
China and to a lesser extent Pakistan have helped North Korea with its nuclear and missile development programmes.
The various connectivity projects put forward by India show its involvement as an investor in capacity-building efforts in the recipient countries across sectors of their particular needs and choices, not as an overarching and imposing economic power.
While the crisis has been defused for the time being, the probability of a future flare up cannot be ruled out. A holistic strategic review ought to be carried out over a wide spectrum and in a multi-dimensional manner with specific timelines.
The India-Japan ‘action-oriented partnership’ is founded on the pillars of mutuality of interests, shared universal values and commonality of vision in the Indo-Pacific.
The crisis over North Korea’s reckless but successful pursuit of nuclear- weapon capability and the misguided response thereto by the United States is taking the world nearer to an unnecessary and perfectly avoidable catastrophe.
Will the next meeting between PM Modi and President Xi at the Xiamen BRICS Summit lead to what Foreign Secretary Jaishankar has described as a new equilibrium?
Before selectively invoking historical contexts and postulates such as Panchsheel, Chinese officials need to ask themselves “do we have the right to say this.”
Unfortunately, the incoherence in US policy under Trump makes one fear that the probability of a disastrous miscalculation is truly worrisome.
To effectively cope with the PRC’s hostile attitude, India needs to reduce the power asymmetry, articulate a clear security policy based on a realistic threat assessment, reorganise the military, and revamp the border management mechanism.
It will take some time before the PLA can claim to be a modern military, at par with Western armies, capable of undertaking extended global missions. But the PLA is poised for a “Giant Leap”, and that is bound to dramatically change the ‘balance of power’ dynamics.
India should take the lead in forming an overarching security quad along with Australia, Japan and the US in the Indo-Pacific region.
The vision document considers maritime security cooperation as a lynchpin in the MSR and attempts to redesign the existing maritime security architecture in the oceanic arena of MSR.
A rational decision maker in the White House does not have all options on the table and cannot start a war without South Korea’s consent. Diplomacy is the only option and this is as obvious as obvious can be.
The strategic dialogue should focus on the fundamentals of shared beliefs and political culture, and be supported by widespread engagement at the provincial, governmental and academic levels.
AIIB is a Chinese dominated bank and the Chinese excitement about AIIB is based on the control and strategic clout that Beijing, the bank’s main architect, wields over its functioning.
It is time to engage in a dialogue process not just for enhancing strategic trust but also to think more cunningly about how to benefit from China’s riches by gaining access to Chinese credit and technology, and securing markets for Indian products.
