The Centre brings out bimonthly newsletter – East Asia Monitor – on China, Japan and the Korean Peninsula.
No posts of Books and Monograph.
The central focus of this article is to understand the evolution of the Chinese People's Liberation Army's engagement with UN peacekeeping operations in the light of China's military diplomacy. The article underlines that the PLA works as a foreign policy instrument in UN peacekeeping operations and furthers China's foreign policy agenda in many ways.
The responses to the arguments that I forwarded in my initial essay, ‘China in SAARC? To What Effect?’, have introduced interesting dimensions to this debate. While most of the respondents have agreed with my proposition that it is premature to think about China's entry into the South Asian regionalist project and that it would introduce complex challenges that would be difficult to manage, they disagree with some of the reasons that I have cited.
Is democracy a criterion for the membership of SAARC? It is not. One should not forget that it was General Zia ur Rahman, president of Bangladesh, who had initiated regional cooperation as a part of his strategy to diversify Bangladesh's Indo-centric foreign policy after Sheikh Mujib's assassination. The grouping in the beginning had two monarchs from Nepal and Bhutan, two military dictators from Pakistan and Bangladesh, and one authoritarian ruler from the Maldives, apart from India and Sri Lanka which were democracies as member countries.
‘China in SAARC: To What Effect?’ is a detailed article and the author has elaborated the modest achievements of SAARC despite its 25 years of existence. One of the foremost problems in the regional grouping has been a restricted charter which desperately needs a revision.
Sujit Dutta's article, ‘China in SAARC? To What Effect?’ is a thought-provoking essay. It raises an appropriate and timely debate on a theme that is of vital significance for the peace and prosperity of South Asia. Sujit has given a sound conceptual background on regionalism and has strongly argued against supporting China's membership in SAARC.
A recognised China specialist like Sujit sees the writing on the wall in view of the proposal of some of India's neighbours to include China in SAARC.
The debate on giving the People's Republic of China full membership of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is primarily seen in the context of positive and negative thinking. While China has an observer status in SAARC along with Australia, the EU, Japan, Iran, Mauritius, Myanmar, South Korea and the United States, its case for full membership is primarily advocated by Nepal and Pakistan but not supported by India.
There is a common tendency among analysts and policy makers to compare SAARC with the EU and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). This is not fair. There are significant differences among these three regional groupings. Geo-strategically India looms too large in SAARC in a manner incomparable with Indonesia in ASEAN or Germany and France in the EU. Economically, SAARC started with a poor economic base and there were no large investments from outsiders like in ASEAN and the EU to boost economic cooperation.
Professor Sujit Dutta's article, ‘China in SAARC? To What Effect?’ has made an excellent case for the desirability of regionalism as it offers public commons to members of such institutions. Indeed the EU and ASEAN are prime examples of such cooperation as they generate political, economic and security benefits for their members, though to different degrees.
Over the past few years there has been a move by some of the member states of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to induct China into the regional organisation. China, in turn, has indicated its desire to join. Since other extra-regional states were also keen to be involved, SAARC has opened its doors since 2007 for out-of region states through a new arrangement.
During the entire post-World War II period Japan isolated itself from the ongoing power struggle. Even during the height of the Cold War when its two neighbours – the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China – went nuclear, Japan followed the three principles of ‘not possessing’, ‘not introducing’ and ‘not manufacturing’ nuclear weapons. Successive Japanese parliaments also passed resolutions putting a one per cent GDP cap on defence spending and imposed a blanket ban on arms exports and arms-related technologies.
The 'Cheonan' incident has prodded and expedited the strategic comeback of the US in East Asia. The US offer to mediate the territorial disputes over islands and seabed minerals in the South China Sea at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting in July 2010 has provoked harsh criticism from the Chinese. This US diplomatic move appears to be a premeditated one to substantially diminish the influence of China in the region, to re-secure its own strategic forward military presence and to signal that it is not yet time for China to acquire absolute control over this critical waterway.
Sixty years for a human being may mean looking back, 1 taking stock of things and preparing to retire from active life. But for a nation it means more than just looking back to the path traversed. It involves looking to the future with confidence. Sixty years of India–China relations raises the significant question whether the two Asian giants could look to their bilateral relations with confidence.
This article argues that in contradiction to the conventional wisdom that the Sino-Indian rivalry is one-sided (with only India viewing China as a rival); China has always factored India in its strategic calculus. The Sino-Indian relationship is asymmetric only to the extent that while India regards China as its 'principal rival', China considers India as only one of its (many) 'strategic rivals' as opposed to the principal one. This article also analyses articles related to India published in English-language Chinese journals in recent years.
The drivers for sustaining the decades-long growth of the Chinese economy are the subject of enduring conjecture, controversy and even wonder. From a US$1 trillion economy in the 1980s, China's GDP has crossed the US$4 trillion mark and is vying with Japan for the status of the number two economy in the world. China has now set itself the task of becoming a major research and development (R&D) power in the medium-term, signalling its ‘arrival’ as a major power.
The emerging changes in the security calculus within the Korean Peninsula are forcing Japan to revisit its existing position on the nuclear issue. The changing security environment has triggered several debates within Japan on the nuclearisation of the island nation. Although, at present, domestic opinion within Japan is opposed to exercising the nuclear option, there has been a break in the hitherto established taboo to have an open debate on the country's nuclear policy.
This article examines the policies the Chinese state has taken towards the Uyghur Muslim community in Xinjiang since the Cultural Revolution and tries to analyse to what extent have these changed with time. The article argues that the Uyghur community has been seen as a threat to the stability of the state, which is why harsh measures have been directed towards this ethnic group. The party has tried to maintain control over these groups by force by attempting to confine all forms of religious activity and by suppressing any independent body.
President Barack Obama's foreign policy orientation towards East Asia seems to be characterised by continuity rather than change, and is not so very different from that of his predecessors. With Japan and South Korea, Obama is trying to revitalise bilateral alliances. With China, he continues on his predecessor's policy of greater engagement, though he has offered some concessions during his visit to Beijing in November 2009. However, North Korea remains a real and huge challenge for Obama to test his engagement in East Asia.
Specialists on Chinese studies are divided on whether or not China is moving towards democracy. Many scholars forcefully argue that China by now is fairly democratic. While conforming to these views, this article prompts the thesis that China is already somewhat democratic today and is becoming more so. This is argued by highlighting the trends and the progressive character in its emerging regime politics. On the surface, these progressive trends and character may be seen as rhetorical and more as a communist proposition to legitimize its ruling.
First it was Arunachal Pradesh, then Sikkim, and now it is Ladakh. There has been a shifting pattern in Chinese mischief along the Indian borders. But more curiously, when reports of Chinese incursions hit the headlines, China denied them while India played them down.
Experts are still searching for a settled answer to the causes and aftermath of the violent unrest between the Han and Uyghurs in China's Xinjiang province that erupted on July 5, 2009. The long-simmering resentment of the native Uyghurs against the Han-dominated groups coupled with the deepening economic crisis is believed to have been the major reason for the ethnic riots. The questions being asked now are: Was it a crisis of ethnicity or economy? Why did the crisis manifest itself this way? And was the crisis a prelude to China's terrorism problem?
India should seek to ‘redefine’ OROB to add a strong component for a ‘Digital Asia’, as that is where our comparative advantage lies, and for Asian connectivity to have two nodes, in China and in India, as has been the case throughout history.
India needs to engage more pointedly with South Korea, Japan, the United States and even bilaterally with DPRK to convey its concerns regarding the latter’s strategic cooperation with Pakistan.
Furthering the premise of an increasingly severe security environment, Japan’s latest defence white paper has accorded relatively more space to its ‘strong concerns’ over China’s ‘active maritime expansion’ as well as progress in North Korea’s missile development programme.
ROK is employing an effective combination of gifting equipment combined with joint ventures with local industry, which has the dual effect of increasing exports and forging partnerships with domestic industries in a region where it has hitherto had a very minimal defence relationship.
China’s push for influence among the Caribbean political elite has been replicated with an equally determined effort to court the military and the bureaucratic elite in the region, often deftly stepping in to take advantage of senseless overreactions on the part of the United States.
As the need for a modern and capable naval force grows ever more urgent, it remains to be seen if the Philippine Navy’s latest modernisation plans will become a reality or be still-born as was the case with earlier efforts.
While using unexceptionable language, India has actually not supported the Chinese position in the South China Sea and has called upon China to adhere to the limits laid down in the UNCLOS.
The Hague Tribunal’s decision and China’s take on it are unlikely to compel Duterte to ignore economic interests that can be furthered through cooperation with China.
Whether the ruling would induce China to adopt a fresh look at the dispute or it would only further complicate the domestic and regional political situations will depend on the domestic, regional and international responses in the coming days and weeks.
In purely legal terms, the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s decision will be binding, and a refusal to abide by its findings could have consequences. Beijing has, however, made it clear that in the event of a negative ruling it will simply ignore the judgment.
The United States, once the dominant influence over the armed forces of the region, is now in danger of losing that position to China and has already lost it in countries like Bolivia and Venezuela.
The leadership transition in the Rocket Forces shows that the service is not only integrating with other services but that its officials are increasingly called upon to other services to facilitate joint training and exercises.
The return of DPP to power is a significant development from the point of view of cross-strait relations and security in East Asia. Given its growing thrust on ‘Act East’, India needs to take note of the political shift in Taiwan and its likely impact at the wider regional level.
Considering China’s non-appearance, the tribunal must proprio motu take judicial notice of all relevant facts, data, case precedents and public statements not communicated to it, and must apply its ‘arbitral wisdom’ based on international law.
The problem lies not just with the anti-terrorism law’s tough provisions but also the manner of its operation and its implications in terms of tightening political control.
While the economic-cum-strategic thrust towards CLMV countries has to be invigorated, a re-look at the Act East Policy is warranted to give it a more north-east development oriented under-pinning.
For Indian observers, it is useful to extrapolate known Chinese position in the Indian Ocean Region and assess Beijing’s likely strategic behaviour. Indian policymakers might well recognise the fact that once China finds itself in a position of maritime advantage, diplomatic engagement has limited utility as a bargaining tactic.
India needs to start thinking about seeking a greater transformation in China from authoritarianism to embrace the culture of Buddhism and the impact such a change may entail for enduring relations between India and China.
India’s defence modernisation presents enormous opportunities for the Japanese defence industry, which until recently concentrated exclusively on the domestic market in order to demonstrate Japan’s commitment to peace.
Recent developments in India-North Korea relations make it an opportune time for India to devise a new approach for its engagement with the Korean Peninsula that will help redefine its Act East policy.
