East Asia
About Centre
The Centre brings out bimonthly newsletter – East Asia Monitor – on China, Japan and the Korean Peninsula.
The Centre brings out bimonthly newsletter – East Asia Monitor – on China, Japan and the Korean Peninsula.
No posts of Books and Monograph.
India and Indonesia, the two major regional powers, have in the recent past initiated intimate bilateral relations. With globalization as a key driver, the two countries have reconfigured their relationship particularly in the economic and defence spheres. The signing of the strategic partnership in 2005 has been critical to strengthening of the bilateral ties. Security relations are complimentary. While India needs to safeguard its interests in Southeast Asia, Indonesia needs a benign power like India for its security concerns.
China's efforts to build 'nodes' of influence in the Indian Ocean Region have been increasingly discernible in recent years. This endeavour, many argue, is driven by Beijing's military-strategic ends. However, such an argument remains a speculation, backed by frail and somewhat disjointed evidence. At least in the public domain, it may be too early to marshal tangible evidence to prove or dismiss the hypothesis.
The Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are one of the variables of the distinctly pacifist security policy Japan has followed ever since the end of the war. Japan's ongoing 'normalisation' involves an enhancement of the role and functions of these forces. Although the SDF's role has considerably increased in the past decade, it cannot be characterised as Japan's remilitarisation because of strong domestic and external checks.
The traditional Sino-Pakistan friendship of 55 years now has a new objective—to improve the economic content of their relationship, which comprises trade, investment and energy co-operation within a bilateral framework. The result of this determination to implement the new economic agenda is visible in the quantum of Chinese investment in Pakistan.
The 'rise of China' discourse articulates the transformation of China's internal structure and growth of its comprehensive national strength. From a Chinese perspective, the 'rise of China' and 'peaceful development' are concurrent themes that express and blend with the twin trends of globalisation and multipolarisation. This article argues that by adhering to the processes of 'multilateralism' and promoting 'commercial diplomacy', China has consciously made efforts to improve its international image.
China's dependence on ship-borne energy resources forms the bedrock of its energy security. Critical to this is the issue of sea lane of communications (SLOCs) safety. SLOC safety is at once a non-conventional security challenge and a military one, which may trigger maritime conflicts. The difficulty in dealing with this challenge is that it is integral to geopolitics and hence subject to complicated major power relations. Geo-strategic politics will increasingly determine Beijing's SLOC policy of political cooperation and military hedging.
Chinese nationalism primarily represents Han nationalism and ignores ethnic minority sub-nationalisms and identities in the larger cause of the state's unity and integrity. The Chinese state calls for submerging of all minority identities within the predominant Han identity, for promoting national cohesion and nationalism, effectively precluding the possibility of the assertion of Tibetan nationalism and autonomy. Because of the suppression of Tibetans in China, a large number of them have fled and settled in India and elsewhere.
Contemporary Japanese nationalism is the principal force behind Japan's gradual shift towards 'normal' statehood and what has been called as 'reluctant realism'. The nature and content of this nationalism is, however, very much dissimilar to that which characterized its militarist past. This nationalist streak is largely elitist and assumes softer undertones as it percolates down to the masses.
Ensuring access to crude oil and natural gas forms a crucial component of India's security calculus. It also critically underlines the significance of sea transportation through which much of these vital resources are traded. With India virtually insular in terms of its land communications, its trade interests are increasingly focused on the maritime domain.
The global political architecture is undergoing a transformation with power increasingly shifting from the West to the East, according to most political observers.1 The two most populous nations, China and India, are on their way to becoming economic powerhouses and are shedding their reticence in asserting their global profiles.
Japanese foreign policy and security perceptions have undergone a perceptible and steady change over the past decade, especially under the leadership of former Prime Minister Koizumi (2001-2006). Its support for the US war on terror was a significant step in its growing international politico-security profile.
This paper seeks to understand the political dynamics that operates behind reforms in China. To interpret the political influences that have, and are, determining the course and trajectory of the reform process, two themes have been chosen. First, an examination of ideological trends (determinants) and their relationship with economic reforms, and the second, as an important corollary, the behaviour of factions (variables) within the Communist Party of China (CPC) that have differing
China’s relations with Angola have traditionally been friendly due to the fact that both countries were and still are ruled by Marxist Leninist regimes, but until recently the PRC’s presence in the country was rather insignificant. However, in the last five years or so China’s influence in the country has grown rapidly. From a marginal position in Beijing’s foreign policy priorities, Angola has move to the very forefront of China’s foreign relations. Today without question Angola is China’s most important partner on the African continent.
The end of the Cold War, the September 11 terrorists’ attacks, preponderance of US power and globalisation have shaped the present world order and posed new opportunities and challenges for China. China’s need to fulfill its grand strategy of acquiring comprehensive national power within this external environment and overcome the existing challenges has given rise to its post-Cold War foreign policy strategy. Given the challenges it faces, its primary need is to ensure continuance of a peaceful environment to sustain its reform and modernisation programme.
Electoral politics in Taiwan reflects the popular ambivalence in articulation of its political and national identity. This ambivalence is testing the strength of nascent domestic democratic institutions. Taiwanese democratisation has also introduced a new variable in crossstrait relations that China and the US both have to contend with. Greater democratisation of Taiwanese politics and the struggle over the country’s national and cultural identity is making the management of crossstrait relations more complex for all three parties, i.e., Taipei, Beijing and Washington.
China’s maritime territorial claims, and its diplomatic and military measures to attain them, have caused much regional concern in recent years. The expansive maritime sovereignty claims of China in the South China Sea flow from three key goals: the completion of its incomplete nationalist project of territorial consolidation and unifying the state; the desire to control the contested maritime periphery; and the garnering of sea-based resources such as oil and gas that have assumed critical importance for fuelling the economy of a rapidly modernising China.
The 2014 edition of the air show tried to reinforce the Chinese theme of a rising, strong and technologically advanced industrial base to the domestic constituency, international arms market and adversaries.
Escalation of tension has scarred relations between Japan and China. The fallout of this has been reflected in the trade and economic ties between the two. Stabilizing China-Japan bilateral relations is critical for peace in the East Asia and it has to be seen how this four-point agreement will translate into action.
The US sees the establishment of the AIIB as an attempt by China to pull South- East Asian countries closer to its orbit and a soft-power play that promises economic benefits while refurbishing its image among its Asian neighbours.
Beijing’s desire to manage the political process in Hong Kong stems from the ‘one country two systems’ model whereby it continues to retain its influence. It will not take much time for mainland to see a foreign hand in the islanders’ pro-democracy movements.
It all appears that the Indian army this time got clear orders to hold the ground and undo what the previous UPA government did – dismantled huts, bunkers and observation posts in exchange of PLA moving back from the Indian territory.
In the Chinese mind the settlement of the border issue with India cannot be divorced from regional, political and larger strategic issues. China has used the threat of intrusions across the LAC, as a part of its coercive diplomacy and it is too valuable an asset to give up.
The military gap between Indian and China is growing steadily as the PLA is upgrading the military infrastructure in Tibet to enable rapid deployment. China will stall resolution of the territorial dispute till it is in a much stronger position.
Can the two leaders go further and recognize the regional strategic interests of each other in the Pacific and the Indian Oceans? What about full support for India’s membership of the Security with the two countries working together in that forum?
President Xi Jinping’s visit to India is a new opportunity for infusing momentum in the bilateral relations. Economic dealings would be one aspect of the talks; but neither country can afford to bypass the sensitive security and strategic issues that dog their efforts to bring peace and stability.
The biggest takeaway for India from Prime Minister Modi’s visit is Abe’s assurance of $33.5 billion public and private investment and financing including ODA, doubling Japanese FDI and the number of companies in India over the coming five years.
The dominant challenges for Japan apart from China remain North Korea. The document expresses concerns on the launching of multiple ballistic missiles towards the Sea of Japan along with the possibility, for the first time, that the North Koreans may have acquired nuclear warheads.
Prime Minister Modi has to think beyond the immediate circle and leverage the Himalayas as a bridge for India reaching out to wider Eurasian space the access to which has blocked by Pakistan. A way out could be to promote a regional market across the border, woven by a web of spiritual and commercial interests.
While India needs to vigorously pursue its endeavour for APEC membership, it is crucial for the policymakers to comprehend the geo-political allusions of this Chinese invitation, which is linked with India-China ties as well as their balance-of-power politics in Asia-Pacific.
China’s announcement of a 10 billion Yuan ($1.6 billion) fund to finance the “maritime silk road plan” is a clear sign that it is serious about moving ahead with its stated plans. For India, it is instructive that the sales pitch of shared economic gains does not conceal the MSR’s real purpose: ensuring the security of sea lines of communications (SLOCs) in the Indian and Pacific oceans.
On 3rd July 1914 nearly a hundred years ago at Simla, Tibet and India signed the Simla Convention that gave birth to the McMahon Line separating Tibet from India in the eastern sector. Much is made by some that the Simla Convention was not a legal document but from the time of the Convention till 23rd January 1959, the Chinese government never officially, in any document, ever challenged the McMahon Line.
The global thrust on economic integration has certainly accrued greater space to India that the non-alignment actually stands for. It allows India to reach out to both the US and China without fear of taking sides and draw in the benefits from both of manufacturing, investments, trade and commerce.
The principal opposition of the Chinese on the McMahon line is that it is illegal and a mere product of British imperialistic designs on China. Such assessments completely disregard the fact that the McMahon line is entwined with the Tibet issue – the lynchpin of China’s territorial sovereignty and party legitimacy
The prospects for new states becoming SCO members seem remote. The new clause that requires all heads of the member states to sign the membership document is the main obstacle and the members appear careful about the intentions and behaviors of the observers-states as they see expansion could against the organizational interests.
A Sino-Japanese conflict is not in the US interest and certainly not in Japan’s. Stability in the regional security landscape cannot be solely guaranteed by reaffirming the US-Japan security alliance, which provides space for the US to flaunt its military might through deployment.
A re-look of the intentions of the Chinese is important because according to long-term economic trends around 2030 Asia will be the world’s powerhouse just as it was prior to 1800. China is expected to surpass the US by 2016 to become the largest economy, and India’s GDP is expected to exceed that of the US by 2060.
