In addition, the Centre focuses on the security and foreign policies of Russia as well as of the post-Soviet republics. India continues to depend on Russian defence supplies and benefits from Russian cooperation in the fields of hydrocarbon and nuclear energy. In the past, India and the erstwhile Soviet Union had invested heavily in a strategic relationship. That continues to be an important goal in official pronouncements. Russia is still politically, diplomatically and militarily important for India.
The Centre has published several books, reports, articles and policy papers on a wide variety of issues in the region. It has been conducting a series of security dialogues with the countries of the region at the bilateral and multilateral levels. The Centre also focuses on security and strategic issues in Central Asia that impact on India. Attention is also directed towards the energy security and economic linkages between India and Central Asian States.
No posts of Books and Monograph.
No posts of Jounral.
Russia seems both happy as well as worried about US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Concerns about Central Asian security apart, now with the sectarian strife in West Asia flaring up, the Russian anxieties would heighten about possible spread of ISIS type assertion along its southern belt.
There is a growing sense that Putin, after what he did to Crimea, has prepared a fine blueprint for similar intervention in Central Asian states should it become a necessary case for protecting Russian interests in these countries.
In a three part series the author analyses Russia's strategic play. In this first part, the recently held military "snap inspection" drill by Russia involving 65,000 troops is examined and significantly the intent and purpose behind it.
The recent additional economic sanction on Russia is yet another severe jolt. But faced with a gripping economic problem, sanctions can just be the incentive that Russia needs to implement structural reforms and reduce its dependency on the West. The emergence of anti-West and patriotic sentiments can help the Kremlin to push through difficult initiatives.
The prospects for new states becoming SCO members seem remote. The new clause that requires all heads of the member states to sign the membership document is the main obstacle and the members appear careful about the intentions and behaviors of the observers-states as they see expansion could against the organizational interests.
While the ‘compromise’, as put forth by Russia is a welcome development in so far it helps to diffuse the potential confrontation yet it does raise two pertinent questions: What made the key players arrive at such an agreement? And can this deal be implemented?
It is unlikely that Russia has serious plans to invade Ukraine and there is no reason to believe that EU or even US really wants a war. Yet, US, and perhaps Russia too, are prepared to play brinkmanship and it is not beyond the realm of possibility that there can be a war that nobody wanted.
Three meetings to discuss Ukraine are scheduled for the week beginning on Monday, April 14. The first meeting is of EU foreign ministers at Luxembourg on April 14. They are supposed to consider further sanctions on Russia. The next day the EU defence ministers are going to meet. The third meeting in Geneva on April 17 will bring together US, Russia, EU, and EU.
The reasons for abstention go far beyond the immediate issue at hand and are enveloped in deep Chinese strategic interests. The Chinese leadership is adamant that there can be no dilution of the concept of the principle of non-violation of the territorial integrity of nation states in the international system.
Putin seems to have concluded that Russia must draw the line at Ukraine. The EU bid to sign trade agreement with Ukraine in December drew Russia’s ire and now Russia has moved to make Crimea its part thus changing the borders in Europe once again and deepening the distrust between Russia and the West at a time when serious issues like Syria, Iran and Afghanistan are yet to be resolved.
The West will be compelled by their own threats to impose economic sanctions against Russia. But Russia is no Iraq or Iran and may very well retaliate against Western companies, for example, Exxon Mobile is active in Russia and there are 6,000 German companies in Russia.
While President Putin has conveyed the message of tough military action, it is highly unlikely that he will order his troops to invade the majority ethnic Russian region of Crimea. Military brinkmanship can be seen as an attempt to force the West to include Russia as a partner in settlement of the crisis.
Russia has signalled its intentions in Crimea. With neither the US nor Europe willing to be engaged in another crisis in Eastern Europe, the Russian strategy would be to re-enter the scenario not as a junior partner of the West but as a recognized primary power in the region, without whom Ukraine cannot be stabilised.
The India-China relations in 2013, in spite Depsang incident, had a more positive than negative tone. Premier Li chose India as his first overseas stop and the pronouncement to deepen ties with India as “strategic choice” along with promise to make “greater efforts” to resolve boundary issue. Equally positive voice came from the Indian leadership for rejecting the relevance of “containment” in favour of “cooperation” that could bring more gains instead.
In this final part of the Policy Paper series, P Stobdan deliberates that if India and China make a calibrated move for working together in Afghanistan, the outcome could be more harmonizing than conflicting. So when India reviews its post-2014 Afghan policy, the China factor should not be seen in a zero-sum perception for many in the West may press India playing a countervailing role to China.
In this third part of the Policy Paper series, P Stobdan argues that India should continue to remain engaged in Asia-Pacific for reasons not only confined to mercantile interest but also because it is an arena shaping the major powers behaviour. At the same, a regional rebalancing and attention to equally critical Central and West Asia will broaden India’s prospects for shaping the global order.
In this second-part of the Policy Paper series, P Stobdan suggests that in the recent Indian strategic discourse, commentators have been exulting the US ‘Asia Pivot’ and seriously hoped that the idea will offset China’s regional outreach, for it also appeared similar to India’s own ‘Look East’ policy, which to an extent enabled New Delhi to ruffle a few feathers in the East Asian region.
In a 4-part series of Policy Papers, P Stobdan analyses India's response to the global shifts and how India’s strategic perception seems to have altered dramatically in the recent years. What it essentially means is that embracing the cold-war perception or adopting any containment strategy is unlikely to be enduring in the longer run.
India-Russia ties will continue to be mutually beneficial. While defence cooperation remains the mainstay, the two countries can explore common synergies in co-developing more weapons platforms with cutting edge technology and organise more joint military exercises.
Into its third year, the Syrian conflict has been fuelled by a multiplicity of interest groups and countries, overshadowing the initial cause of the protests. Gains for either side in Syria have come to mean corresponding losses for different regional and international stakeholders.
