Publisher: IDSA and Knowledge World
ISBN: 81-86019-29-4
Rs. 550
Publisher: IDSA and Knowledge World
ISBN: 81-86019-26
Publisher: IDSA and Knowledge World
ISBN: 81-86019-18-9
Nuclear weapons cannot obviate wars, but can change its complexion and influence the manner of its conduct. In order to keep nuclear weapons from entering into real warfare, it is important to intelligently judge an adversary's nuclear thresholds and to calibrate one's own conventional strikes. For India, the exploration of this space is particularly important in order to deny Pakistan a free hand to indulge in sub-conventional conflict even as it holds the threat of an all-out nuclear war against an Indian conventional response.
Ten years later, the Kargil War still arouses deep emotions turning around Pakistan's gross perfidy, an intelligence failure, great heroism, military improvisation and innovation, a national upsurge, a most open inquiry leading to a comprehensive review of vital issues long closed to scrutiny and reform. Its report, prepared in record time, was uniquely presented to the nation as a commercial publication. (From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report, Sage, New Delhi, December 1999.)
The Kargil conflict can be categorized as a 'limited war'. It was initiated by Pakistan to achieve mixed military and political objectives, but made important misjudgments that doomed the enterprise to failure. The questions discussed in this article are: why was India surprised; why did both countries observe such great restraint; did the Kargil conflict have a nuclear dimension; and is 'limited war' a viable concept with nuclear deterrence obtaining in South Asia. It also argues that the Kargil conflict was an exception, in some dimensions, to the 'stability-instability paradox'
This paper is an endeavour to appraise the importance and 'value' of India-US defence exercises for Indian policy makers. It examines their dividends, costs, and pitfalls. The paper argues that such combined exercises are not only useful in functional terms but are also necessary. While such exercises are invariably embedded in inter-state relations and grand-strategic issues, in this case the paper confines itself to operational and military-strategic issues.
In the immediate aftermath of the Second Israel-Lebanon War, most observers have concluded that Israel lost its war against Hezbollah. Although at the end of 34 days of violent engagement there is no clear victor or loser, this article, on the contrary, argues that Israel succeeded in achieving the most important among its political and strategic objectives.
The one-armed picture of Lord Nelson, perhaps the most celebrated and eulogised of British seafarers, is synonymous with the victory at Trafalgar and the bicentennial celebrations of this famous sea battle began on June 28 with an International Fleet Review in the Solent off south England. India apart, the 35 participating navies include the French and Spanish navies who were defeated by Nelson’s superior skills in that decisive battle on October 21, 1805.
In the last decade, there have been fundamental changes in the nature, form and variety of peace operations. In fact, the very coining of a new term, ‘Peace Operations’ (PO), as distinct from the earlier ‘Peacekeeping Operations’ (PKOs), illustrates a new degree of diversity and complexity in these operations. India has been, and continues to be, a major player in UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs). It has participated in 41 of the 59 UN Missions established so far and has contributed more than 70,000 personnel.
Military diplomacy has long been one of the essential constituents of international diplomacy and an effective method to foster bilateral and regional relationships. Arms transfers serve as an important foreign policy tool and have become, a crucial dimension of world politics. Conventional arms transfers entail not only the provision of weapons/ equipment but carry with them a number of military commitments that have long‐term implications. The PLA has always had a significant role in shaping and implementing China's foreign policy.
The paper takes a critical look at various issues connected with India’s acquisition of the Russian aircraft carrier, the Admiral Gorshkov. It examines India’s choice of fighter and various problems it is likely to face in making the carrier operational and fully effective for its task. It recommends the early acquisition of aerial refuelling and early warning systems by the Navy. The paper also argues for greater jointmanship among the services and an increase in specialist cross-postings in order to improve inter-service rapport and the pool of trained manpower.
The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) moves on the wheels of Technology, Doctrine and Organisation; however, the main support structure, which gives it the predominant strength, is undoubtedly the technology. The changing concepts of warfare are driven by the available technology of the times. While sophisticated weapons and sensors have greatly enhanced combat efficiency, developments in Information and Communication Technology (ICT) have enabled greater connectivity and information sharing among widely spread force components.
Military innovation is peculiar and distinctive, and has no direct parallels. The military environment itself, with focus on hierachy, discipline and tradition makes innovation a daunting challenge. The process is further influenced by civil-military relations and metrics used for measuring effectiveness of innovative efforts. Factors influencing the process of military innovation vary when examining innovation at the policy and strategy level, at the doctrinal level, during peacetime and under conditions of war.
The paper examines the utilisation of air power in the 1962 India-China war and in the 1999 Kargil conflict. The study reveals a certain continuity in the attitudes to the use of offensive air power in limited conflicts. Both in 1962 and in 1999, the use of air power was hedged about with various restrictions. Underlying these appears to be the belief that the use of offensive air power is fundamentally escalatory. Hence there is a hesitation to commit offensive air power assets.
Military diplomacy has long been one of the essential constituents of international diplomacy and an effective methodology, to foster bilateral and regional relationships. Military training cooperation is an essential component of military diplomacy and helps to build close ties with other nations. Such cooperation also helps to strengthen strategic security relationships and address common security concerns. The Indian armed forces have rich expertise of operating in varied terrain, as also live combat experience in a vast spectrum of operations.
Guerrilla warfare is not a new phenomenon and history is witness to its repeated occurrence. In the modern era, it acquired prominence during the Napoleonic Wars which led to an examination of its role by leading nineteenth-century thinkers including Clausewitz, Jomini, Marx and Engels. Over the course of the subsequent century, the concept and practice of guerrilla warfare was integrated within social, economic and political programmes that aimed to overthrow established authority and transform society through an armed struggle.
The official position of USA and Nigeria in favour of military cooperation rather than a military pact does not necessarily demean its value in defence and strategic thinking. The withdrawal of military assistance to Nigeria on March 23, 2003 should be seen as a strong protest against Nigerian reservations on the US-led war on Iraq rather than a complete end to it.
China is no longer interested in maintaining previous patterns of its relationships with India and US. It seeks to forge new types of relationships that are reflective of the extant balance of power. China expects India to demonstrate awed subservience and refrain from security cooperation with US.
Japan’s quest for pre-emptive strike capability indicates a major shift in its defence doctrine. It is only a matter of time before Japan takes up such an offensive defence doctrine carrying a high possibility of conflict initiation/escalation with it.
While both India and the US face similar fiscal constraints, the approach towards military manpower cost in the two countries significantly diverge. The prevailing debate in India about the imperative to greater economic efficiency in military manpower cost would benefit from a holistic examination of approaches undertaken by the US in managing its manpower expenditure.
It is time that the constraints imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic are converted into an opportunity to upgrade and evolve the present method of human interaction prevalent in think tanks across the world.
Smaller, smarter, potent and cheaper combat entities — linked and networked – will be at the heart of future warfare.
The lack of international cooperation and trust deficit to tackle the COVID-19 crisis is stark. The pandemic of fear may deepen an ongoing shift towards increased anarchy reflected in ‘everyone for himself’ and could further energise the process of weakening international institutions and agreements.
Draft DPP 2020 needs to cut out obfuscation, repetitions, and bring out core issues for the consideration of the decision-makers in a concise and clear manner.
The large scale social and economic disruption caused by COVID-19 has brought to our attention the socio-economic plight of urban migrant workers and the need for a more effective information dissemination.
The Indian Army is at the cusp of a huge change. It has to concurrently manage the matter of Women Officers as seamlessly as possible. Success in this venture is predicated squarely on the mindsets of the seniors in charge and the WO community
The adverse impact of lowering of colour service of soldiers below pensionable service will not only be felt at the structural and functional level but also the psychological level.
The laser-based aerospace defence assets, as and when they are fully developed and deployed, could prove to be a potent deterrent.
The proposal to create an Air Defence Command is a bold move. Rather than resorting to less contentious issues to commence the integration process, the CDS has selected a very pertinent and significant operational issue. However, the way the proposed Air Defence Command is structured will be crucial as it will set the tone for further integration of all three services.
Considering the loss of tactical advantage that would come about by not adopting automation and autonomous weapon systems in future, militaries would invariably be obligated to adopt the concept of full automation while keeping humans on the loop.
Availability of logistics support facilities with partner countries will further enhance the ability of the Indian Navy to maintain appropriate ‘presence’ for extended periods in the wider Indo-Pacific.
Considering the wide expanse to be covered on both sides of the Indian Peninsula, and the possibility of concurrent operations on either side, it is imperative that India maintains an operational carrier battle group on both sides, and at all times.
The blueprint for the operationalisation of CDS would require intensive deliberation to make sure that no aspect of its implementation is left unaddressed.
The decision to appoint CDS is an important milestone in India’s quest for complete integration of its defence forces; a significant step towards seamless coordination, better efficiency, and greater effectiveness of the national defence architecture in meeting the challenges of the 21st century.
India’s decision to ally with America would be contingent upon the degree of convergence between their positions on core issues and the extent of military assistance needed in a two-front war scenario.
While the scope of responsibility of the CDS is being worked out, it would be instructive to see what changes could be implemented immediately within the current organisational structures through greater jointness, before getting into the gamut of full integration which should be the logical end state.
The Annual Joint HADR exercises, conducted by Indian Navy, help in proactively preparing participating nations with tools for developing standard operating procedures (SOPs), streamlining interoperability and practicing procedures for collaborative participation when necessary.