Building Frigates for The Philippines Navy
India should ensure that the deal does not slip away because of GRSE’s perceived financial inability, which may not actually be the case.
- Aman Saberwal
- July 06, 2016
Military Affairs
No posts of Books and Monograph.
No posts of Jounral.
India should ensure that the deal does not slip away because of GRSE’s perceived financial inability, which may not actually be the case.
As India embarks on a quest to boost its arms exports, the Latin America-Caribbean region offers India both markets and potential partnerships. Though India is not a stranger to the region, it needs to have a more systematic and coordinated approach.
Should GRSE and GSL deliver satisfactory services to their export customers, there is considerable potential for India to position itself as a competitive supplier of small and medium warships and patrol crafts.
The United States, once the dominant influence over the armed forces of the region, is now in danger of losing that position to China and has already lost it in countries like Bolivia and Venezuela.
A sound sensor array in the Indian Ocean could prove invaluable for India which has a major anti-submarine warfare handicap and a lack of operational submarines.
India’s future submarine fleet operations are likely to involve SSKs and SSNs operating in the littoral spaces, in a strategic environment sanitized and protected by SSBNs. If New Delhi can ensure compliance with present construction deadlines, it could put its submarine modernization plans back on track.
Ceding PoK as part of a settlement does not comport with India’s national and strategic interests, especially in terms of dealing with the challenge posed by China-Pakistan collaboration.
Only by making the concept of dharma central can a balance be evolved between the trivarga of artha, kama and dharma and lifestyle changes introduced to cope with climate change.
If PLA doesn’t change its ‘army-centric’ character and make way for professionals with domain expertise, the higher defence organisation will continue to be weak and the reform only in name.
Hitherto, the India-China border dispute was largely a land-air contingency. Now, the PLA Navy’s presence in the IOR adds the third dimension and needs to be factored in future planning and preparations.
The inability to portray greater strategic ambition for the Indian Navy renders this document an exercise in smart profile-building rather than one of purposeful image-projection.
If the IS has been able to successfully recruit Indians for the war in Syria and provide technical support for their travel, it is a matter of time before they find recruits willing to employ violence in India itself.
The wellbeing of veterans and their transition to a second career by ensuring implementable policy initiatives is a national obligation. This not only has a welfare agenda but also an economic sense to it.
Africa needs not only maritime administration frameworks and the local capacity to enforce regulations, but also a model for sustainable blue-economy development that does not result in the destruction of its natural maritime habitat. In this, it can use India’s assistance.
As India reorients its maritime posture to cater to the new realities of Asia, there is a realisation that regional maritime stability is increasingly susceptible to growing power imbalances.
We recommend that the histories of the 1965 and 1971 wars be revised, updated and reprinted as proper official versions with the correct title and logo.
Nothing conveys strategic intent as effectively as the large conventional warship whose mere presence can provide a decisive psychological advantage in strategic scenarios.
By engaging GCC navies through joint exercises, port calls, and training programmes, the Navy has successfully created a durable template of maritime relations in the Western Indian Ocean.
The ceasefire decision was influenced by the combination of three factors: absence of the prospect of a swift victory, concerns about Chinese military intervention, and concerted diplomatic pressure from major powers.
A growing Sino-Russian-Pakistani maritime nexus in the IOR poses a challenge to India’s influence in the Indian Ocean and heralds a potential change in the Asian balance of maritime power.
