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A dissatisfied military is not in the interest of India which has to contend with multiple internal and external security issues. The nation at large and the political leadership must be alive to the prevailing sentiments and act appropriately.
China’s new military strategy as it applies to the Indian Ocean is not a matter of a minor shift in the balance of maritime power, but one that impacts India’s capacity and will to impose a deterrent cost.
The new version of US maritime strategy candidly recognises China’s maritime expansion and territorial claims as a source of regional unrest, but stops short of recognising the A2/AD challenge even as it pronounces “all-domain access” as a strategic prerequisite.
Despite the lessons learnt during the Kargil conflict, where artillery firepower paved the way for victory, modernisation of the artillery continued to be neglected. The recent acquisition of 814 truck-mounted 155 mm/52-calibre guns is a step in the right direction.
The incident raises important issues. First, the role of honours and awards in such crimes, second, the impact of punishment on the morale of troops who undertake a challenging responsibility and last, its impact on the population of the disturbed area at large.
The government’s ‘Act East Policy’ needs to legitimise the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept. Interestingly, only a few months after the release of the 2013 White Paper, Australia released a Country Strategy Document on India which identified the Indian Navy as possessing the most potential for a close maritime partnership
The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence’s figures reveals that the army's equipment modernisation is steadily falling. In 2008-09, the army spent 27 paisa of every rupee on capital expenditure. This fell to 24 paisa in 2009-10; 23 paisa in 2010-11; 20 paisa in 2012-13 and just 18 paisa in the last two years. Resultantly the army’s ambitious plans to transform from a ‘threat-based to a capability force’ by 2020 are being consistently thwarted.
China’s announcement of a 10 billion Yuan ($1.6 billion) fund to finance the “maritime silk road plan” is a clear sign that it is serious about moving ahead with its stated plans. For India, it is instructive that the sales pitch of shared economic gains does not conceal the MSR’s real purpose: ensuring the security of sea lines of communications (SLOCs) in the Indian and Pacific oceans.
India continues its elusive search for peace in Jammu and Kashmir(J&K), in the face of Pakistan’s proxy war and dissatisfaction among some sections of the youth in Kashmir Valley.
A country’s response to external threats and internal security challenges is based on its defence preparedness, advance planning for contingencies and the political will. The new government will have to make key decisions on different aspects of defence reforms. This Policy Brief puts forward some suggestions.
Ministry of Defence which accounts for 13-14 per cent of the central government expenditure, if one also takes into account the expenditure on defence pensions, could come under some pressure to prepare an action plan as the outcome of what it does is often intangible, undisclosable, or simply unmeasurable. The author puts forward some suggestions.
There is quite clearly reluctance all around to sharing data or at least in negating the sighting of the airliner on the radar by countries in the region for security concerns as well as the lack of a centralised regional command and control centre for coordinating and monitoring the operations.
The Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) is a small but positive sign towards better communication channels between navies to reduce tension in the seas. But for CUES to become a reality many issues need to be resolved including the time frame for implementation.
The naval exercise at Qingdao does not detract from the fact that the India-China maritime relationship is essentially an uneasy one. Each side is uncomfortable with the other’s presence in its own theatre of nautical influence, but both recognise the other’s dominance in their respective maritime ‘backyards’.
India has had a healthy tradition of the armed forces personnel being apolitical while being allowed to exercise their democratic right of voting in the electoral process. While the state police and central police and para-military units have been in the front tier of security network during the elections, the armed forces have discharged a crucial auxiliary-cum-supportive role.
Projecting a demand which cannot be met is as pointless as allocating budget that is barely sufficient to sustain the armed forces and other departments of the MoD. The persistent neglect of this aspect of defence management is taking its toll not only on the stock of ammunition held by the armed forces, notably the Army, but also on serviceability levels of the equipment.
The new optical fibre network being laid as an alternative to the 3G spectrum surrendered by the armed forces will go a long way in providing modern land-line communications in peace stations and to limited extent up to the war-time locations of higher formation HQ.
To reshape public confidence further, the Union Home Ministry should quickly address the long festering issue of redeploying at least one regiment of the sashastra seema bal (SSB) in Ladakh. Initially raised as Special Service Bureau in the 1960s, SSB effectively involved natives for building a second line of defence against adversaries.
With the INS Vikramaditya’s arrival in India, it is time to undertake a dispassionate assessment of the ship’s possible uses and deployment options. The Indian navy would be well served if it considered employing the ship in a ‘soft power projection’ role – as a versatile asset to be used in diplomacy and regional outreach, disaster relief and humanitarian missions.
Though the general elections are due this year, the need of the hour is to build a political consensus on the issue without further delay. It will be to the credit of the government if it is able to generate political consensus and appoint a Permanent Chairman CoSC or CDS.
