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This article examines Iranian contentions on three issue areas that exemplify the politicised nature of its interactions with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These include access to military facilities, information credibility and the ‘nuclear activism’ of US-based non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
The 100th anniversary of World War I is a reminder of the risks of great power politics. The current dynamics of world politics rest on the relations among the US, China, Russia and India, and their interlocking relations with friends and enemies in a region that extends from the Gulf to the Japanese archipelago. A naval and nuclear arms race is underway that reflects these complex relationships. One of the numerous disputes could spread conflict across the whole region. This risk includes the nuclear factor.
The purpose of the nuclear security regime is to prevent, detect and respond to nuclear security events (e.g. illicit trafficking of nuclear material or a nuclear terrorism attack). Nuclear forensic analysis is a key technical capability that utilises signatures inherent to nuclear or other radioactive material to provide information on its source, production and history. It can be used as part of the response to the nuclear security event, as well as to help prevent it. Section I of this article will introduce the basic information about nuclear forensic analysis.
This article starts by discussing sensitive nuclear information and how malicious non-state actors could exploit this to facilitate acts of nuclear terror. Our analysis shows that there is a significant information security challenge in this area due to the diversity of sensitive information, the different communities within which it resides and the range of mechanisms by which it could be transferred. We then turn our attention to assessing different steps that could be taken to protect sensitive nuclear information.
The threat of nuclear terrorism should not be underestimated because it can have catastrophic effects if and when realised. Nor should the subject matter be politicised beyond a certain point because of its strong espousal by the United States, which has raised suspicions about whether the issue could be used as yet another instrument for asserting American hegemony. Institutionalisation of multilateral actions must therefore be supported and nuclear summit meetings must become the forums for addressing the doubts and concerns relating to the international initiatives.
The third Nuclear Security Summit will be held in The Hague, Netherlands in March 2014. This visionary nuclear diplomacy will be facing both old and new questions at its third meeting. The basic question relates to the future of the summit process, which has made a significant contribution to international security in a very short span of time. The summit process, however, may serve it better, and the strengthening of the regime must be continued through the next two summits. However, with or without the summit process, the nuclear security regime has to be strengthened.
The Nuclear Security Summits are at a midway point but have not yet reached their full potential of eliminating weak links in the global nuclear security system. The first two summits, in Washington and Seoul, have had a beneficial impact by identifying common objectives, galvanising international action and reducing stockpiles of vulnerable nuclear materials. However, improving nuclear security governance is an important new issue. It could be introduced at the 2014 summit in The Hague and be a springboard for action at the 2016 summit in the US.
This article attempts to make a realistic assessment of the danger of nuclear terrorism. While acknowledging the catastrophic consequences of an act of terrorism employing either an improvised nuclear device or a violent attack against a nuclear installation causing spread of lethal radioactivity, it also highlights the complexity of the challenges likely to be confronted by any would-be nuclear terrorist.
Security experts the world over agree that nuclear terrorism is one of the greatest threats to international peace and security in the 21st century. Since the end of the Cold War, there have been more than 20 confirmed cases of the illicit or unauthorised trafficking of fissile materials. Fissile material for more than 100,000 additional nuclear weapons is spread across the globe.
India has been dealing with terrorism for several decades, and is therefore constructively involved in all genuine exercises for countering the menace. As terror groups are expected to use weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), India fully supports the legal and other operational measures and mechanisms adopted by multilateral and international organisations to mitigate the risk of WMD terrorism. A resolution has been steered in the United Nations General Assembly to gain international support for fighting WMD terrorism.
The issue of nuclear security has several dimensions including security of nuclear materials and facilities, export controls, security of technologies and development of technologies that are proliferation-resistant. Each of these dimensions needs examination from an applicable perspective. India looks at nuclear technology and nuclear materials primarily as a resource for meeting a part of its requirements for electricity.
Disarmament and non-proliferation are rightfully viewed as two sides of the same coin: the two imperatives that need to be met if the prospect of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is to be realised. Although the existence of a link between the two concepts is obvious, the exact nature of this connection is perhaps not as clear. The central question here is whether it is politics or strategic realities that shape states’ nuclear options and by implication, the two-fold road to global zero.
On 11 May 1998, two events took place:
(1)India carried out nuclear tests; and
(2)India declared itself to be a state with nuclear weapons.1
India's relationship with the nuclear non-proliferation regime deteriorated sharply after its 1974 underground nuclear test which, according to India, was a peaceful nuclear explosion, but which was not accepted as such by the regime. That it did not follow up with immediate weaponisation challenged the core logic of the non-proliferation regime which operates on a Murphy's Law of ‘nuclear fatalism’, i.e. if a country has the know-how to produce nuclear weapons, it will certainly produce them.
The 2005 US—India nuclear pact created ripples of controversy and debates within in a short period of time. In the US, the nuclear agreement was weighed vis-à-vis the non-proliferation regime—does it strengthen or weaken the regime? On the contrary, in India concerns were raised regarding the implications for India's strategic as well as civilian nuclear programmes. This article highlights the disjuncture in the concerns raised in the US and India.
Currently, India's nuclear doctrine is one of inflicting ‘unacceptable damage’ in case of nuclear first use against it or its forces anywhere. The problem with this is that at current levels of vertical proliferation it is liable to face a counter strike of equal proportions. This may not be in India's interests when viewed in relation to the inevitable setback to its trajectory of progress. Therefore, there is a case for terminating nuclear exchanges at the lowest possible level in case of nuclear first use of low opprobrium quotient or violence.
The Indian Ocean Region (IOR), ranging from the Suez Canal in the west to the Strait of Malacca in the east, is of crucial importance for Europe. However, Europe's interest in the region's maritime space and its security challenges is limited.
The Indo-US nuclear deal not only opened the gates of international nuclear trade for India, but it also showed that India was ready to take its rightful place among the comity of nations as an emerging power. For three long years from 2005 to 2008, the world's strongest and largest democracies were involved in intense diplomatic parleys. At stake in these negotiations was not only the normative order in the form of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT), but also the very existence of the ruling political dispensation in India.
everal measures are being initiated by the international community to secure sensitive materials. Al Qaeda's open interest in acquiring nuclear weapons and the rise of terrorist activity in nuclear-armed Pakistan have triggered a global interest in the need to secure nuclear weapons and materials. In April 2010 President Obama invited some key countries and international organisations in Washington to frame a new regime for nuclear security. The emerging regime includes some older initiatives as well as some new mechanisms, and it must address a number of issues.
The recently issued joint statement by P-5 countries on preventing nuclear war and avoiding arms race, does not seem to go beyond the routine statements made in the past. The NPT member countries demanding concrete steps on nuclear disarmament will have to wait for more time.
Although the ideas of nuclear arms control, nuclear security and nuclear disarmament have featured in several US official statements and joint statements with other countries, will US adopt the ‘No First Use’ policy, remains to be seen.
The rapid increase in the nuclear forces of China, as revealed in the 2021 Pentagon Report, is a matter of serious concern. Several countries are undertaking exercises to ascertain the strategic and security implications of the feared expansion of the Chinese nuclear stockpile.
Showing readiness to sign the SEANWFZ treaty seems to be a low-cost, high-return proposition for Beijing. It could be a calculated symbolic gesture having no bearing on the region’s precarious security situation.
By making the emerging technology one of the cornerstones of the grouping, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) has shown its resilience to stay relevant in the fast-changing strategic environment of the Indo-Pacific.
The announcement of the trilateral security partnership “AUKUS” by Australia, UK and US, has prompted discussions on several issues, however, the submarine part of the agreement, about leveraging expertise from US and UK and facilitating the Australian acquisition of the nuclear-powered submarines, is attracting a lot of attention.
The Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons has not succeeded in adding any additional universal stigma to nuclear weapons. It lacks the support base needed for replacing the Cold War vintage “Mutual Assured Destruction” with “Mutual Assured Abstinence”. The nuclear weapon countries’ faith in the deterrence logic remains intact.
Even as nuclear safety protocols and processes have been strengthened since the 1986 disaster, learning from Chernobyl should be a continuing, ongoing process.
India’s decision to reject the NPT was a display of astute statecraft with idealist posturing used to masquerade pursuit of national interests.
As the focus and priority of the international community in recent years have been on averting nuclear terrorism and nuclear accidents, the nuclear experience of synergising safety and security can be highly useful in combating threats like COVID-19.
Even after five decades of its entry-into-force, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is largely seen as a Cold War era instrument that has failed to fulfill the objective of creating a pathway towards a credible disarmament process.
The SIPRI report on the volume of international arms transfers during 2015-19 highlights the strengths of key strategic partnerships such as Russia-India, US-Japan and China-Pakistan, reinforced by arms trade.
The Defence Minister’s recent statement on ‘no first use’ basically underlines the fact that India’s current nuclear doctrine is working well.
Nuclear doctrines and postures are dynamic processes that evolve with the security environment. Twenty years after India’s nuclear doctrine was first drafted, the time is ripe for a comprehensive review and suitable revisions.
The Arms Trade Treaty is flawed and requires strengthening. Ratified States need to take the lead in fortifying the Treaty before more member States are asked to join.
An ASAT in itself is not a defensive system that could ‘safeguard’ any asset. Instead, it is an offensive system that could solely be used for retribution in response to an attack on India’s space assets. In that sense, the capability can only be used as a deterrent against a potential rival.
While Iran and its European interlocutors (along with Russia and China) can be expected to mount a tough challenge to continue to make the JCPOA work in the light of Trump’s May 8 decision to ‘withdraw’ from the agreement, it remains to be seen to what extent they can succeed.
The standoffs in Doklam and North Korea offer insights on how crisis stability remains subject to the complexities of deterrence, especially in theatres with multiple nuclear-armed states, and what this entails for disarmament.
Removing the Kim regime’s fears about regime change and reducing the insecurity caused by North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests to the US and its allies are the essentials that must be addressed in a UN-led multinational dialogue to forge a negotiated settlement.
The Indian Air Force’s participation in Israel’s Blue Flag 2017 multilateral exercise adds an important layer to the matrix of cooperation between India and Israel.
