Currently, India's nuclear doctrine is one of inflicting ‘unacceptable damage’ in case of nuclear first use against it or its forces anywhere. The problem with this is that at current levels of vertical proliferation it is liable to face a counter strike of equal proportions. This may not be in India's interests when viewed in relation to the inevitable setback to its trajectory of progress. Therefore, there is a case for terminating nuclear exchanges at the lowest possible level in case of nuclear first use of low opprobrium quotient or violence.

• Ali Ahmed
• July 2012
• Strategic Analysis

The international community inside and outside the Conference of Disarmament is underscoring the need for concluding a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). The Indian government, for a long period, has been sponsoring the idea. Notwithstanding the international stagnation, the issue has been instigating periodic debate in India on the Indian approach. The periodic revival of the issue requires that India revisit its policy on fissile material production as well as its approach towards a possible FMCT.

• Rajiv Nayan
• January 2011
• Strategic Analysis

President Obama made history by coming to office with the promise of working towards a nuclear weapons-free world. Envisioning a new non-proliferation momentum, Obama promised to revive the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) system and create nuclear security and energy architectures that will secure nuclear materials and make proliferation difficult. A year later, Obama realised the difficulties of selling his vision to his bureaucratic-military establishment, which resisted efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons while pushing for nuclear modernisation.

• A. Vinod Kumar
• March 2011
• Strategic Analysis

The India–China nuclear-strategic relationship has been surprisingly under studied, given the rising interest in the strategic interaction between the two countries. 1 Part of the reason is that India's nuclear capabilities have been relatively limited vis-à-vis China, though this is exaggerated by the tendency among Indian analysts to focus on the need to target Beijing. There is no evident reason why China should not be deterred by the targeting of other cities that are closer to India.

• Kartik Bommakanti , Rajesh M. Basrur
• March 2011
• Strategic Analysis

The rising economic and political profile of India is making it to search for a new pattern of interaction with global forces. India's unique relationship with export controls is passing through a new and positive phase. In recent years, India is trying to integrate itself fast with global best practices for export controls. However, it is facing roadblocks in its integration with the existing system.

• Rajiv Nayan
• May 2011
• Strategic Analysis

This article focuses on the evolving place of the US in the Central Asian arena, analysing how US interests have changed in this region since the 1990s. It studies how strategic relations were transformed around the NATO Partnership for Peace, the growing cooperation in the Caspian Sea, and the building of a regional security architecture surrounding Afghanistan. It also analyses Washington's difficulties in promoting 'civil society' and the limits of the US economic engagement in the region.

• Marlene Laruelle , Sebastien Peyrouse
• May 2011
• Strategic Analysis

The danger of nuclear terrorism and ways to thwart it, tackle it and manage it in the event of an attack is increasingly gaining the attention of nuclear analysts all over the world. There is rising awareness among nuclear experts to develop mechanisms to prevent, deter and deal with the threat of nuclear terrorism. Nuclear specialists are seeking to develop and improve the science of nuclear forensics so as to provide faster analysis during a crisis.

• Reshmi Kazi
• July 2011
• Strategic Analysis

The nuclear non-proliferation paradigm 1 has rarely remained static. Its logic or the underlying principle has however been singular – non-proliferation should lead to nuclear disarmament, and eventually total elimination. It is the approach to the paradigm that has evolved over the years, often accentuated by, and many a time succumbing to, the transformations in the global security environment. Milestones in this evolution have often been construed as shifts in the paradigm, as newer security imperatives necessitated augmentations in existing approaches to proliferation challenges.

• A. Vinod Kumar
• July 2011
• Strategic Analysis

Non-proliferation is now an accepted norm in international security and international relations. Most countries perceive global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation as being inseparable in principle, although there is disagreement among countries on the ultimate objective of non-proliferation. Most countries generally want non-proliferation to be a transitional arrangement before total nuclear disarmament, which at present is a desirable though distant goal. The classical bargain for balancing the two has tilted in favour of non-proliferation.

• Rajiv Nayan
• July 2011
• Strategic Analysis

That a nuclear taboo exists indicates the divide between conventional and nuclear war. It is no wonder then that India – though a nuclear weapons power – deems nuclear weapons not for military use but for deterrence purposes. These are, therefore, taken as political weapons. Seeking to deter use of nuclear weapons against India or its forces anywhere, India's nuclear doctrine promises ‘massive’ punitive retaliatory strike in case of nuclear use by its enemy. This is evidence that the Indian leadership is cognizant of the special status of nuclear weapons.

• Ali Ahmed
• March 2010
• Strategic Analysis

Command and control of nuclear weapons was the edifice upon which great power nuclear strategy was based. Empirical Cold War research later proved that this edifice was, in fact, only a power keg. Therefore, US non-proliferation-minded analysts propounded logical reasons for their claim that new nuclear nations will be unable to demonstrate prudence in nuclear weapons management. The unique Indian case, pronounced from the organisation theory perspective, proves to the contrary.

• S Sasikumar
• May 2010
• Strategic Analysis

The debate around strategic autonomy offers a conceptual framework to understand how India, as an emerging power, tries to negotiate autonomy in its security and military relationship with the United States. In the context of Indo-US rapprochement, the dynamics of power relations are not commensurate with India's will to keep an acceptable degree of autonomy.

• Guillem Monsonis
• July 2010
• Strategic Analysis

Has the power and influence of the United States declined in recent years? Does the current global recession, the outcome of the US invasion of Iraq and the resilience of the Taliban in Afghanistan provide adequate rationale to profess waning of US influence? Has China's power and influence grown to an extent that can effortlessly put it on the top of the global hierarchy of power? Is the US–China interdependence equitable enough to work as a deterrent against unbolted conflict?

• Chintamani Mahapatra
• July 2010
• Strategic Analysis

Nuclear energy is undergoing a global renaissance. While nuclear energy has been contributing between 14 and 16 per cent of the total electricity in the world in recent years, most of the countries that are operating nuclear power reactors are expanding and/or reviving their nuclear energy development programmes, including countries such as the US and the UK. At the same time, several new countries and regions, many of which are rich in other energy resources, are also opting for nuclear energy.

• Rajiv Nayan
• November 2010
• Strategic Analysis

Major powers have tried to use military training programmes, manifested through military-to-military cooperation running the gamut of training exchanges to joint exercises, to defence-related dialogues through seminars and the like, in order to engage and influence other countries in the furtherance of their strategic interests. The US model is notable for being innovative, flexible, scalable, and broad in its approach, and this has fetched it considerable dividends.

• Cherian Samuel
• March 2009
• Strategic Analysis

Nuclear weapons cannot obviate wars, but can change its complexion and influence the manner of its conduct. In order to keep nuclear weapons from entering into real warfare, it is important to intelligently judge an adversary's nuclear thresholds and to calibrate one's own conventional strikes. For India, the exploration of this space is particularly important in order to deny Pakistan a free hand to indulge in sub-conventional conflict even as it holds the threat of an all-out nuclear war against an Indian conventional response.

• Manpreet Sethi
• May 2009
• Strategic Analysis

The November 2008 Mumbai terror attacks that shook the world again had tangible links to the security and intelligence establishment of Pakistan. The emergent situation is forcing the policy-making community to take appropriate action so that the culprits are brought to justice and the elements sponsoring the terror attacks in India are adequately deterred. Several options were being exercised and explored for the purpose. As the Pakistani Government is undertaking only cosmetic and deceptive steps to ward off international pressure, the world and India appear far from convinced.

• Rajiv Nayan
• May 2009
• Strategic Analysis

India-Pakistan relations are best understood as an example of nuclear rivalry, in which nuclear weapons both exacerbate and limit hostility. In all such relationships, the minimal possession of nuclear weapons suffices to deter. Both India and Pakistan have adopted a minimalist posture, yet their strategic thinking tends to be inconsistent, which makes them vulnerable to needless expansion. This essay points to the conceptual basis for an optimal doctrine.

• Rajesh M. Basrur
• May 2009
• Strategic Analysis

Nuclear weapons deter by the possibility of their use, and in no other way. Although US and Soviet arsenals became grotesquely excessive in both numbers and diversity in the late 1960s, by the later 1908s there had been very extensive reductions in both numbers and types. NATO's collective doctrine had accepted that the only sen-sible role for its nuclear weapons was for war-termination. Western governments had increasingly accepted the idea of sufficiency, recognizing that notions of nuclear supe-riority were vacuous.

• Michael Quinlan
• May 2009
• Strategic Analysis

Contrary to the arguments of proliferation pessimists, this article contends that the overt nuclearization of South Asia has contributed to stability in the region. To that end this article carefully examines two recent crises in Indo-Pakistani relations and concludes that in the absence of nuclear weapons they would have culminated in full-scale war. Accordingly, while Indo-Pakistani relations may remain fraught with tension, the likelihood of major war in the region has dramatically diminished.

• Sumit Ganguly
• May 2009
• Strategic Analysis

China and to a lesser extent Pakistan have helped North Korea with its nuclear and missile development programmes.

• Prabha Rao
• October 30, 2017
• Issue Brief

Trump’s new policy statement on Iran has enveloped the UNSC-approved Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in a shroud of uncertainty that could lead to further instability in conflict-ridden West Asia.

• S. Samuel C. Rajiv
• October 24, 2017
• IDSA Comments

While thermonuclear weapons are not necessary for maintaining a credible deterrent, they serve the purpose of enabling India to make effective use of its relatively limited fissile material stockpile.

• Sanjay Badri-Maharaj
• September 22, 2017
• IDSA Comments

The nuclear escalation risk cannot be contained by the revision of India’s minimum deterrence policy but with a change in Pakistan’s behaviour.

• Sanjana Gogna
• September 11, 2017
• IDSA Comments

A rational decision maker in the White House does not have all options on the table and cannot start a war without South Korea’s consent. Diplomacy is the only option and this is as obvious as obvious can be.

• K. P. Fabian
• May 03, 2017
• IDSA Comments

There will be little legitimacy for a pre-emptive US strike on North Korea unless Pyongyang launches a pre-meditated strike on any nation.

• A. Vinod Kumar
• April 12, 2017
• IDSA Comments

India’s current nuclear doctrine does not call for an automatic massive retaliation for Pakistan’s use of TNWs against Indian troops on Pakistan soil. However, this does not mean that such an attack will go unanswered.

• G. Balachandran , Kapil Patil
• March 27, 2017
• IDSA Comments

The advocacy by Pakistani analysts of the Indian disinclination to retaliate massively in response to their use of TNWs on their own soil indicates either a flawed analysis or a bluff that the Indian armed forces would be inclined to call.

• Gurmeet Kanwal
• September 21, 2016
• Issue Brief

Given that the NSG may not be able to withhold the India membership question for long, in spite of China’s inconsistent positions, it would be unwise on India’s part to forfeit any advantage it has on the SCS issue.

• A. Vinod Kumar
• August 24, 2016
• IDSA Comments

Membership in the NSG is essential to safeguard future Indian interests in nuclear commerce, even if it is not a necessary condition for India to engage in nuclear exports.

• G. Balachandran , Shruti Pandalai
• July 06, 2016
• Issue Brief

Until the next plenary in Switzerland in 2017 or the interim meeting before the end of 2016, India should actively engage with all members and particularly with those who have expressed doubts or raised queries, including China.

• Ashok Sajjanhar
• June 27, 2016
• IDSA Comments

The outcome of the NSG plenary in Seoul is most likely to be the admission of India to the NSG, denial or postponement of a decision on Pakistan’s application, but deferment of both announcements to a later date.

• G. Balachandran , Reshmi Kazi , Kapil Patil
• June 22, 2016
• Special Feature

India is keen to become a member of the NSG and other export control regimes so as to expand its nuclear power generation and enter the export market.

• Ashok Sajjanhar
• June 21, 2016
• IDSA Comments

There is no documentary evidence to substantiate the Pakistani claim that Pakistan had entered into any voluntary safeguards agreement with the IAEA in respect of KANUPP.

• G. Balachandran
• June 21, 2016
• IDSA Comments

China’s continuing complicity in nuclear proliferation networks would weaken the global nuclear security regime. Hence, China must cooperate with the international community for reinvesting the benefits achieved by the Nuclear Security Summit process, and help develop stronger nuclear security architecture in the Indian subcontinent.

• Reshmi Kazi
• April 22, 2016
• IDSA Comments

The pivotal question is whether a judicial intervention, in the absence of any political stimulus, can make a meaningful difference to the disarmament movement.

• A. Vinod Kumar
• April 06, 2016
• Issue Brief

Along with physical and system operational security at nuclear power plants, cybersecurity of electronic assets and computer/ICS networks have also become a major concern.

• Munish Sharma
• March 30, 2016
• IDSA Comments

The January 6 ‘thermonuclear’ test is the fourth in the series of nuclear tests in North Korea’s consistent quest to attain credible deterrence against the United States.

• Skand Tayal
• January 22, 2016
• IDSA Comments

Like a section of the US non-proliferation community that relishes supporting and sympathising with China and Pakistan, Levy and the Center for Public Integrity have followed the same approach.

• Rajiv Nayan
• January 04, 2016
• IDSA Comments

Expediting India’s membership process would be a win-win situation for both India and the MTCR. The prevailing uncertainty will end for India and the MTCR will get an effective and positive member.

• Rajiv Nayan
• October 16, 2015
• IDSA Comments