No posts of Books and Monograph.
Rajiv Nayan's article is both important and interesting. It is important because nuclear weapons pose a threat to humanity and the planet that in magnitude, severity and immediacy is the gravest of all known risks confronting us today.
The danger of nuclear terrorism and ways to thwart it, tackle it and manage it in the event of an attack is increasingly gaining the attention of nuclear analysts all over the world. There is rising awareness among nuclear experts to develop mechanisms to prevent, deter and deal with the threat of nuclear terrorism. Nuclear specialists are seeking to develop and improve the science of nuclear forensics so as to provide faster analysis during a crisis.
The nuclear non-proliferation paradigm 1 has rarely remained static. Its logic or the underlying principle has however been singular – non-proliferation should lead to nuclear disarmament, and eventually total elimination. It is the approach to the paradigm that has evolved over the years, often accentuated by, and many a time succumbing to, the transformations in the global security environment. Milestones in this evolution have often been construed as shifts in the paradigm, as newer security imperatives necessitated augmentations in existing approaches to proliferation challenges.
Non-proliferation is now an accepted norm in international security and international relations. Most countries perceive global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation as being inseparable in principle, although there is disagreement among countries on the ultimate objective of non-proliferation. Most countries generally want non-proliferation to be a transitional arrangement before total nuclear disarmament, which at present is a desirable though distant goal. The classical bargain for balancing the two has tilted in favour of non-proliferation.
The rising economic and political profile of India is making it to search for a new pattern of interaction with global forces. India's unique relationship with export controls is passing through a new and positive phase. In recent years, India is trying to integrate itself fast with global best practices for export controls. However, it is facing roadblocks in its integration with the existing system.
This article focuses on the evolving place of the US in the Central Asian arena, analysing how US interests have changed in this region since the 1990s. It studies how strategic relations were transformed around the NATO Partnership for Peace, the growing cooperation in the Caspian Sea, and the building of a regional security architecture surrounding Afghanistan. It also analyses Washington's difficulties in promoting 'civil society' and the limits of the US economic engagement in the region.
President Obama made history by coming to office with the promise of working towards a nuclear weapons-free world. Envisioning a new non-proliferation momentum, Obama promised to revive the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) system and create nuclear security and energy architectures that will secure nuclear materials and make proliferation difficult. A year later, Obama realised the difficulties of selling his vision to his bureaucratic-military establishment, which resisted efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons while pushing for nuclear modernisation.
The India–China nuclear-strategic relationship has been surprisingly under studied, given the rising interest in the strategic interaction between the two countries. 1 Part of the reason is that India's nuclear capabilities have been relatively limited vis-à-vis China, though this is exaggerated by the tendency among Indian analysts to focus on the need to target Beijing. There is no evident reason why China should not be deterred by the targeting of other cities that are closer to India.
The international community inside and outside the Conference of Disarmament is underscoring the need for concluding a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). The Indian government, for a long period, has been sponsoring the idea. Notwithstanding the international stagnation, the issue has been instigating periodic debate in India on the Indian approach. The periodic revival of the issue requires that India revisit its policy on fissile material production as well as its approach towards a possible FMCT.
Nuclear energy is undergoing a global renaissance. While nuclear energy has been contributing between 14 and 16 per cent of the total electricity in the world in recent years, most of the countries that are operating nuclear power reactors are expanding and/or reviving their nuclear energy development programmes, including countries such as the US and the UK. At the same time, several new countries and regions, many of which are rich in other energy resources, are also opting for nuclear energy.
The debate around strategic autonomy offers a conceptual framework to understand how India, as an emerging power, tries to negotiate autonomy in its security and military relationship with the United States. In the context of Indo-US rapprochement, the dynamics of power relations are not commensurate with India's will to keep an acceptable degree of autonomy.
Has the power and influence of the United States declined in recent years? Does the current global recession, the outcome of the US invasion of Iraq and the resilience of the Taliban in Afghanistan provide adequate rationale to profess waning of US influence? Has China's power and influence grown to an extent that can effortlessly put it on the top of the global hierarchy of power? Is the US–China interdependence equitable enough to work as a deterrent against unbolted conflict?
Command and control of nuclear weapons was the edifice upon which great power nuclear strategy was based. Empirical Cold War research later proved that this edifice was, in fact, only a power keg. Therefore, US non-proliferation-minded analysts propounded logical reasons for their claim that new nuclear nations will be unable to demonstrate prudence in nuclear weapons management. The unique Indian case, pronounced from the organisation theory perspective, proves to the contrary.
That a nuclear taboo exists indicates the divide between conventional and nuclear war. It is no wonder then that India – though a nuclear weapons power – deems nuclear weapons not for military use but for deterrence purposes. These are, therefore, taken as political weapons. Seeking to deter use of nuclear weapons against India or its forces anywhere, India's nuclear doctrine promises ‘massive’ punitive retaliatory strike in case of nuclear use by its enemy. This is evidence that the Indian leadership is cognizant of the special status of nuclear weapons.
In order to construct an operational nuclear device, terrorists need to obtain the requisite fissile materials - Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) or plutonium. It has been proved that, generally, it is much simpler to devise a crude nuclear bomb with HEU than with plutonium. Hence, terrorists can have 'reasonable confidence' in the performance of weapons-grade HEU bombs. The magnitude of the threat of nuclear terrorism from Pakistan's HEU-based nuclear weapons programme is assuming alarming proportions. However, adequate preventive steps can be taken to minimize the danger.
In the aftermath of North Korea's second nuclear test and the launch of three short-range missiles on May 25, 2009, followed by the launch of seven ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan on July 4, there has been widespread speculation on Japan's principled position on non-proliferation and disarmament and whether it will abandon its nuclear abstinence and acquire nuclear capability. This possibility has been echoed recently by the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert Gates.
After eight years of governance by a Republican Administration, the United States elected a Democrat as its president. The Democrat President, Barack Hussein Obama, assumed presidency and appointed several key officials to implement his agenda. Though some believe that democracy forces political parties to evolve a common agenda and towards consensus on several key issues, there are others who see differences between the Republican agenda and those of Democrats.
In his April 5 speech in Prague, President Barack Obama made a renewed pledge to push the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as a practical and immediate step to ‘seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons’. However, global efforts to attain Global Zero as spearheaded by Obama have been interrupted by the refusal of the United States and China to ratify the treaty. The CTBT is also contingent on the approval of the threshold nuclear weapons states – India, Pakistan, and Israel – who have refused to sign and ratify the treaty.
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is emerging as a key anti-proliferation platform with a global reach. However, being a US-promoted initiative with a military dimension, the PSI is yet to gain a multilateral character and raises concerns among nations. While backing the further expansion of this initiative, President Barack Obama seeks its institutionalization and cooperative enhancement. India is exhorted to join this initiative as part of the strategic cooperation with the United States. However, India is yet to decide its approach towards the PSI owing to various concerns.
On February 6, 2009, the Pakistani judiciary acquitted Abdul Qadeer (AQ) Khan, the symbol of Pakistani involvement in clandestine nuclear commerce. Since 2004, he had been under house arrest after the proliferation network, linking several countries, including Pakistan, was uncovered. Though he has been put under ‘unspecified security measures’, yet the release of AQ Khan – dubbed by the United States State Department spokesman Gordon Duguid as a ‘serious proliferation risk’ – is considered to be a disturbing development for the non-proliferation regime.
China and to a lesser extent Pakistan have helped North Korea with its nuclear and missile development programmes.
Trump’s new policy statement on Iran has enveloped the UNSC-approved Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in a shroud of uncertainty that could lead to further instability in conflict-ridden West Asia.
While thermonuclear weapons are not necessary for maintaining a credible deterrent, they serve the purpose of enabling India to make effective use of its relatively limited fissile material stockpile.
The nuclear escalation risk cannot be contained by the revision of India’s minimum deterrence policy but with a change in Pakistan’s behaviour.
A rational decision maker in the White House does not have all options on the table and cannot start a war without South Korea’s consent. Diplomacy is the only option and this is as obvious as obvious can be.
There will be little legitimacy for a pre-emptive US strike on North Korea unless Pyongyang launches a pre-meditated strike on any nation.
India’s current nuclear doctrine does not call for an automatic massive retaliation for Pakistan’s use of TNWs against Indian troops on Pakistan soil. However, this does not mean that such an attack will go unanswered.
The advocacy by Pakistani analysts of the Indian disinclination to retaliate massively in response to their use of TNWs on their own soil indicates either a flawed analysis or a bluff that the Indian armed forces would be inclined to call.
Given that the NSG may not be able to withhold the India membership question for long, in spite of China’s inconsistent positions, it would be unwise on India’s part to forfeit any advantage it has on the SCS issue.
Membership in the NSG is essential to safeguard future Indian interests in nuclear commerce, even if it is not a necessary condition for India to engage in nuclear exports.
Until the next plenary in Switzerland in 2017 or the interim meeting before the end of 2016, India should actively engage with all members and particularly with those who have expressed doubts or raised queries, including China.
The outcome of the NSG plenary in Seoul is most likely to be the admission of India to the NSG, denial or postponement of a decision on Pakistan’s application, but deferment of both announcements to a later date.
There is no documentary evidence to substantiate the Pakistani claim that Pakistan had entered into any voluntary safeguards agreement with the IAEA in respect of KANUPP.
India is keen to become a member of the NSG and other export control regimes so as to expand its nuclear power generation and enter the export market.
China’s continuing complicity in nuclear proliferation networks would weaken the global nuclear security regime. Hence, China must cooperate with the international community for reinvesting the benefits achieved by the Nuclear Security Summit process, and help develop stronger nuclear security architecture in the Indian subcontinent.
The pivotal question is whether a judicial intervention, in the absence of any political stimulus, can make a meaningful difference to the disarmament movement.
Along with physical and system operational security at nuclear power plants, cybersecurity of electronic assets and computer/ICS networks have also become a major concern.
The January 6 ‘thermonuclear’ test is the fourth in the series of nuclear tests in North Korea’s consistent quest to attain credible deterrence against the United States.
Like a section of the US non-proliferation community that relishes supporting and sympathising with China and Pakistan, Levy and the Center for Public Integrity have followed the same approach.
Expediting India’s membership process would be a win-win situation for both India and the MTCR. The prevailing uncertainty will end for India and the MTCR will get an effective and positive member.
