The concept of nuclear terrorism is possibly the least understood of all dangers emanating from nuclear weapons. However, certain drivers like the nuclear black market (the AQ Khan Network), proliferation of nuclear technology, and the increasing demand for nuclear energy can make it easier for terrorist organizations like Al Qaida to acquire fissile material. The threat of nuclear terrorism cannot be ignored any longer. Nuclear terrorism is a plausible phenomenon that deserves adequate consideration, substantial countermeasures, expertise, and competence to combat it.

• Reshmi Kazi
• July 2009
• Strategic Analysis

• Bharti Chhibber
• July 2009
• Strategic Analysis

Nuclear weapons cannot obviate wars, but can change its complexion and influence the manner of its conduct. In order to keep nuclear weapons from entering into real warfare, it is important to intelligently judge an adversary's nuclear thresholds and to calibrate one's own conventional strikes. For India, the exploration of this space is particularly important in order to deny Pakistan a free hand to indulge in sub-conventional conflict even as it holds the threat of an all-out nuclear war against an Indian conventional response.

• Manpreet Sethi
• May 2009
• Strategic Analysis

The November 2008 Mumbai terror attacks that shook the world again had tangible links to the security and intelligence establishment of Pakistan. The emergent situation is forcing the policy-making community to take appropriate action so that the culprits are brought to justice and the elements sponsoring the terror attacks in India are adequately deterred. Several options were being exercised and explored for the purpose. As the Pakistani Government is undertaking only cosmetic and deceptive steps to ward off international pressure, the world and India appear far from convinced.

• Rajiv Nayan
• May 2009
• Strategic Analysis

India-Pakistan relations are best understood as an example of nuclear rivalry, in which nuclear weapons both exacerbate and limit hostility. In all such relationships, the minimal possession of nuclear weapons suffices to deter. Both India and Pakistan have adopted a minimalist posture, yet their strategic thinking tends to be inconsistent, which makes them vulnerable to needless expansion. This essay points to the conceptual basis for an optimal doctrine.

• Rajesh M. Basrur
• May 2009
• Strategic Analysis

Nuclear weapons deter by the possibility of their use, and in no other way. Although US and Soviet arsenals became grotesquely excessive in both numbers and diversity in the late 1960s, by the later 1908s there had been very extensive reductions in both numbers and types. NATO's collective doctrine had accepted that the only sen-sible role for its nuclear weapons was for war-termination. Western governments had increasingly accepted the idea of sufficiency, recognizing that notions of nuclear supe-riority were vacuous.

• Michael Quinlan
• May 2009
• Strategic Analysis

Contrary to the arguments of proliferation pessimists, this article contends that the overt nuclearization of South Asia has contributed to stability in the region. To that end this article carefully examines two recent crises in Indo-Pakistani relations and concludes that in the absence of nuclear weapons they would have culminated in full-scale war. Accordingly, while Indo-Pakistani relations may remain fraught with tension, the likelihood of major war in the region has dramatically diminished.

• Sumit Ganguly
• May 2009
• Strategic Analysis

The tenth anniversary of India and Pakistan's 1998 nuclear tests enables scholars to revisit the issue of South Asian proliferation with a decade of hindsight. I argue that nuclear weapons have had two destabilizing effects. First, nuclear weapons' ability to shield Pakistan against all-out Indian retaliation, and to attract international attention to Pakistan's dispute with India, encouraged aggressive Pakistani behavior. This provoked forceful Indian responses, ranging from large-scale mobilization to limited war.

• S. Paul Kapur
• May 2009
• Strategic Analysis

Although the broad contours of India's nuclear doctrine were announced within the days of May 1998 nuclear tests, the formal doctrine was made public only five years later. This article will critically examine the evolution of India's nuclear doctrine in terms of the 1999 Kargil conflict and the 2001-2002 military confrontation with Pakistan. This article concludes that the one-page nuclear doctrine of 2003 remains sketchy and subject to varied interpretations.

• Rahul Roy Chaudhury
• May 2009
• Strategic Analysis

The earliest years of offsetting nuclear weapon capabilities between rivals can be the most harrowing. India and Pakistan have certainly followed this pattern. But over time, rivals can moderate their competition, especially with regard to nuclear weapons. Formal arms control treaties, like those negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union, are unlikely for southern Asia. India and Pakistan can, however, employ tacit agreements, confidence-building, and nuclear risk-reduction measures to allay mutual concerns over nuclear weapons.

• Michael Krepon
• May 2009
• Strategic Analysis

Major powers have tried to use military training programmes, manifested through military-to-military cooperation running the gamut of training exchanges to joint exercises, to defence-related dialogues through seminars and the like, in order to engage and influence other countries in the furtherance of their strategic interests. The US model is notable for being innovative, flexible, scalable, and broad in its approach, and this has fetched it considerable dividends.

• Cherian Samuel
• March 2009
• Strategic Analysis

Improved India-Vietnam relations are guided both by their common historical experiences and their mutual concerns in the post-cold war context. Both have suffered aggression from China in the past and had good relations with the former Soviet Union. In fact, India was the only non-communist country to recognize the unified Vietnam and, ever since, they have had a friendly relationship, one that has stood the test of time. However, in the post-cold war context the shadow of China looms large over this relationship.

• Pankaj K Jha
• November 2008
• Strategic Analysis

The 1998 Belfast Agreement brought to an end over three decades of armed conflict in Northern Ireland. This paper summarizes the role of actors within and outside Northern Ireland, and the processes and mechanics of the Agreement itself. The Agreement is placed in the context of previous unsuccessful peace initiatives in the region, and elements within the political and economic environment at the time that facilitated agreement are identified. The consociational nature of the Agreement is set alongside concern about continuing sectarian division.

• Marie Breen-Smyth
• November 2008
• Strategic Analysis

Being a non-NPT state with advanced nuclear capability, India's contributions to the non-proliferation movement have often been scrutinized. India was for long treated as part of the 'proliferation problem'. Since the 1998 tests, there is a steady process of integrating India with the international nuclear community. However, India is reluctant to assimilate with many of the US-promoted counter-proliferation initiatives though it has largely adopted the normative standards of the NPT system.

• A. Vinod Kumar
• September 2008
• Strategic Analysis

This article offers a Chinese perspective on reducing the threat of nuclear weapons due to nuclear weapons proliferation and its deterrent gestures, long employed since the Cold War. It is pointed out that nuclear weapons are increasingly irrelevant to nuclear weapons states. However, some non-nuclear weapons states may view this differently. Nuclear abolition has presented a visionary opportunity for all sides to relinquish those weapons increasingly unnecessary for nuclear weapons states.

• Dingli Shen
• July 2008
• Strategic Analysis

• Jason Miklian
• May 2008
• Strategic Analysis

• Reshmi Kazi
• May 2008
• Strategic Analysis

Today, it is necessary for India to respond to the current crisis of the NPT and weigh its options vis-a-vis the Treaty. This paper is an attempt to explore answers to the question of what ought to be India's policy in the light of the new nuclear reality. It analyses three policy options that India could pursue and concludes that India must strive to join the NPT as a nuclear weapon country, because joining the non-proliferation regime by evading the NPT is likely to prove costly and is also unlikely to remove destabilizing irritants.

• Rajiv Nayan
• November 2007
• Strategic Analysis

• A. Vinod Kumar , J Nandakumar
• November 2007
• Strategic Analysis

India is uniquely placed in the international security and political environment as it neither falls within the NPT 'definition' of 'nuclear weapon states' nor is it a country that can be ignored in any international arrangement without taking into account the reality of its being a state with nuclear weapons capability. At a time when proliferation challenges are assuming disturbing levels, this article seeks to examine the policy options available for India to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

• Rajesh Kumar Mishra
• September 2007
• Strategic Analysis

Three issues of contention have animated the debate about the role of the IAEA vis-à-vis the JCPOA. These relate to resolving concerns relating to PMD, those governing ‘anytime, anywhere access’, and the IAEA’s ability to ensure Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA.

• S. Samuel C. Rajiv
• August 07, 2015
• Issue Brief

An Indian application for NSG membership should face less resistance than what china had faced. Such an option is certainly worth an attempt instead of waiting indefinitely for the NSG PGs to arrive at a consensus on inviting India.

• G. Balachandran
• July 20, 2015
• IDSA Comments

Time and again, civilian masses the world over have been at the receiving end of legions of conventional weapons systems leaving destructive direct and indirect consequences in their wake. The copious arms -and their ammunition- currently in circulation range from assault rifles, rocket launchers, anti-aircraft weapons to pistols, machine guns as well as missiles, grenades and other explosive ordnances.

• Sourabhi Mukherji
• June 23, 2015
• Issue Brief

The 2015 NPT RevCon ended on an expected dismaying note. The only positive outcome was its endorsement of the recent initiatives to project the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, though not adopting its underlying theme - a nuclear weapons prohibition treaty.

• A. Vinod Kumar
• May 26, 2015
• IDSA Comments

This Issue Brief looks back at the implementation of the JPOA and examines the extent to which the recent framework (JCPOA) agreed upon at Lausanne adheres to the letter and spirit of the JPOA, specifically as it relates to the pledge to treat the Iranian nuclear programme “as that of any non-nuclear state party to the NPT”.

• S. Samuel C. Rajiv , G. Balachandran
• April 23, 2015
• Issue Brief

The collective silence of the guardians and the state-parties by no means signifies the NPT’s good health, especially when they continue to emphasise upon the slow pace of disarmament and enduring pressures on the non-proliferation regime.

• A. Vinod Kumar
• March 02, 2015
• IDSA Comments

The Modi’s government determination to adopt a muscular stance on national security and its commitment to expedite defence modernisation are likely to translate into greater political and defence engagement with Israel.

• S. Samuel C. Rajiv
• February 19, 2015
• IDSA Comments

There is a general feeling among analysts that while US government lawyers may have been satisfied that the CLNDA is compatible with CSC in light of explanations offered by the Indian government, this view is being reportedly challenged by nuclear industry lawyers.

• G. Balachandran
• February 19, 2015
• Issue Brief

India’s nuclear deal with the US is driven less by technology requirements than by the need to be integrated into the global nuclear community and gain access to uranium imports for fuelling its nuclear power expansion plans.

• Sarosh Bana
• February 10, 2015
• IDSA Comments

While the exact nature of the understanding between the two countries is yet to be announced and in fact may never be officially released, it is possible to offer an outline of the possible “memorandum” with possible understandings on all the three liability issues as well as the administrative arrangements.

• G. Balachandran
• February 10, 2015
• Issue Brief

India is already in de facto observance of the spirit of the CTBT by maintaining its unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosive testing. Given that additional nuclear tests may not be needed, it could well reconsider its current position on signing the treaty.

• Reshmi Kazi
• December 24, 2014
• Issue Brief

India’s Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act has emerged as an appropriate template that could rekindle the nuclear energy sector while also safeguarding the public interest.

• A. Vinod Kumar , Kapil Patil
• December 06, 2014
• Issue Brief

As Australia and India have to deepen their security cooperation for a peaceful prosperous and stable Asia-Pacific region, both the countries will have to manage global nuclear commerce together.

• Rajiv Nayan
• September 15, 2014
• IDSA Comments

The editorial also intrinsically marks the return of the ‘pro-Pakistan’ lobby in the US non-proliferation community, and the American media, which was culpable in encouraging the many indulgences of the Pakistani military and nuclear establishment for many decades and facilitating favourable non-proliferation policies for Pakistan to effectively pursue a clandestine nuclear programme with technological aid from Western companies.

• A. Vinod Kumar
• July 07, 2014
• IDSA Comments

“Credible minimum deterrence” is the cornerstone of India’s nuclear doctrine. It, used in conjunction with the concepts of “No First Use” (NFU) and “Non Use” against non nuclear weapon states, clearly indicates that India envisages its nuclear weapons as only a deterrent and not as a means to threaten others.

• Satish Chandra
• April 30, 2014
• Issue Brief

The success of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 should not make the international community overlook persisting problems. The objective of the 1540 is to internationalise WMD security by targeting the entire supply chain.

• Rajiv Nayan
• April 28, 2014
• IDSA Comments

In the years to come, a lot more activity on nuclear security can be expected and much of it will arise from the commitment taken by states at the three nuclear security summits and the voluntary pledges undertaken by different countries. A good deal of pressure from civil society and think tanks on nuclear security issues can be expected.

• Arvind Gupta , Rajiv Nayan
• March 29, 2014
• IDSA Comments

There are no properly functioning Asian security institutions or regimes to regulate Asia’s nuclear politics and has to rely on global institutions and regimes for regulation of its nuclear politics and management of nuclear order. Treaties like the NPT are struggling to provide stability in the world as in Asia.

• Rajiv Nayan
• March 28, 2014
• IDSA Comments

Riyadh anticipates that in the long run a nuclear Iran will be challenging Saudi’s proxy conflicts with Iran in states like Palestine, Bahrain, Yemen and Syria. Amidst such concerns, Riyadh’s rejection of a UN Security Council seat in October 2013 followed by the revelation of the BBC news about possible nuclear weapons cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in November 2013 has raised questions whether Riyadh aspires to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

• Reshmi Kazi
• January 07, 2014
• Issue Brief

The November 24, 2013 Joint Plan of Action between Iran and its P5+1 interlocutors is the first agreement since November 2004 that contains Iran’s acceptance of certain short-term limitations on its nuclear programme.

• S. Samuel C. Rajiv , G. Balachandran
• December 09, 2013
• Issue Brief