The tenth anniversary of India and Pakistan's 1998 nuclear tests enables scholars to revisit the issue of South Asian proliferation with a decade of hindsight. I argue that nuclear weapons have had two destabilizing effects. First, nuclear weapons' ability to shield Pakistan against all-out Indian retaliation, and to attract international attention to Pakistan's dispute with India, encouraged aggressive Pakistani behavior. This provoked forceful Indian responses, ranging from large-scale mobilization to limited war.

• S. Paul Kapur
• May 2009
• Strategic Analysis

Although the broad contours of India's nuclear doctrine were announced within the days of May 1998 nuclear tests, the formal doctrine was made public only five years later. This article will critically examine the evolution of India's nuclear doctrine in terms of the 1999 Kargil conflict and the 2001-2002 military confrontation with Pakistan. This article concludes that the one-page nuclear doctrine of 2003 remains sketchy and subject to varied interpretations.

• Rahul Roy Chaudhury
• May 2009
• Strategic Analysis

The earliest years of offsetting nuclear weapon capabilities between rivals can be the most harrowing. India and Pakistan have certainly followed this pattern. But over time, rivals can moderate their competition, especially with regard to nuclear weapons. Formal arms control treaties, like those negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union, are unlikely for southern Asia. India and Pakistan can, however, employ tacit agreements, confidence-building, and nuclear risk-reduction measures to allay mutual concerns over nuclear weapons.

• Michael Krepon
• May 2009
• Strategic Analysis

On February 6, 2009, the Pakistani judiciary acquitted Abdul Qadeer (AQ) Khan, the symbol of Pakistani involvement in clandestine nuclear commerce. Since 2004, he had been under house arrest after the proliferation network, linking several countries, including Pakistan, was uncovered. Though he has been put under ‘unspecified security measures’, yet the release of AQ Khan – dubbed by the United States State Department spokesman Gordon Duguid as a ‘serious proliferation risk’ – is considered to be a disturbing development for the non-proliferation regime.

• Rajiv Nayan
• July 2009
• Strategic Analysis

The concept of nuclear terrorism is possibly the least understood of all dangers emanating from nuclear weapons. However, certain drivers like the nuclear black market (the AQ Khan Network), proliferation of nuclear technology, and the increasing demand for nuclear energy can make it easier for terrorist organizations like Al Qaida to acquire fissile material. The threat of nuclear terrorism cannot be ignored any longer. Nuclear terrorism is a plausible phenomenon that deserves adequate consideration, substantial countermeasures, expertise, and competence to combat it.

• Reshmi Kazi
• July 2009
• Strategic Analysis

• Bharti Chhibber
• July 2009
• Strategic Analysis

After eight years of governance by a Republican Administration, the United States elected a Democrat as its president. The Democrat President, Barack Hussein Obama, assumed presidency and appointed several key officials to implement his agenda. Though some believe that democracy forces political parties to evolve a common agenda and towards consensus on several key issues, there are others who see differences between the Republican agenda and those of Democrats.

• Rajiv Nayan
• September 2009
• Strategic Analysis

In his April 5 speech in Prague, President Barack Obama made a renewed pledge to push the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as a practical and immediate step to ‘seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons’. However, global efforts to attain Global Zero as spearheaded by Obama have been interrupted by the refusal of the United States and China to ratify the treaty. The CTBT is also contingent on the approval of the threshold nuclear weapons states – India, Pakistan, and Israel – who have refused to sign and ratify the treaty.

• Reshmi Kazi
• September 2009
• Strategic Analysis

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is emerging as a key anti-proliferation platform with a global reach. However, being a US-promoted initiative with a military dimension, the PSI is yet to gain a multilateral character and raises concerns among nations. While backing the further expansion of this initiative, President Barack Obama seeks its institutionalization and cooperative enhancement. India is exhorted to join this initiative as part of the strategic cooperation with the United States. However, India is yet to decide its approach towards the PSI owing to various concerns.

• A. Vinod Kumar
• September 2009
• Strategic Analysis

In order to construct an operational nuclear device, terrorists need to obtain the requisite fissile materials - Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) or plutonium. It has been proved that, generally, it is much simpler to devise a crude nuclear bomb with HEU than with plutonium. Hence, terrorists can have 'reasonable confidence' in the performance of weapons-grade HEU bombs. The magnitude of the threat of nuclear terrorism from Pakistan's HEU-based nuclear weapons programme is assuming alarming proportions. However, adequate preventive steps can be taken to minimize the danger.

• Reshmi Kazi
• November 2009
• Strategic Analysis

In the aftermath of North Korea's second nuclear test and the launch of three short-range missiles on May 25, 2009, followed by the launch of seven ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan on July 4, there has been widespread speculation on Japan's principled position on non-proliferation and disarmament and whether it will abandon its nuclear abstinence and acquire nuclear capability. This possibility has been echoed recently by the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert Gates.

• Reshmi Kazi
• November 2009
• Strategic Analysis

• Jason Miklian
• May 2008
• Strategic Analysis

• Reshmi Kazi
• May 2008
• Strategic Analysis

This article offers a Chinese perspective on reducing the threat of nuclear weapons due to nuclear weapons proliferation and its deterrent gestures, long employed since the Cold War. It is pointed out that nuclear weapons are increasingly irrelevant to nuclear weapons states. However, some non-nuclear weapons states may view this differently. Nuclear abolition has presented a visionary opportunity for all sides to relinquish those weapons increasingly unnecessary for nuclear weapons states.

• Dingli Shen
• July 2008
• Strategic Analysis

Being a non-NPT state with advanced nuclear capability, India's contributions to the non-proliferation movement have often been scrutinized. India was for long treated as part of the 'proliferation problem'. Since the 1998 tests, there is a steady process of integrating India with the international nuclear community. However, India is reluctant to assimilate with many of the US-promoted counter-proliferation initiatives though it has largely adopted the normative standards of the NPT system.

• A. Vinod Kumar
• September 2008
• Strategic Analysis

Improved India-Vietnam relations are guided both by their common historical experiences and their mutual concerns in the post-cold war context. Both have suffered aggression from China in the past and had good relations with the former Soviet Union. In fact, India was the only non-communist country to recognize the unified Vietnam and, ever since, they have had a friendly relationship, one that has stood the test of time. However, in the post-cold war context the shadow of China looms large over this relationship.

• Pankaj K Jha
• November 2008
• Strategic Analysis

The 1998 Belfast Agreement brought to an end over three decades of armed conflict in Northern Ireland. This paper summarizes the role of actors within and outside Northern Ireland, and the processes and mechanics of the Agreement itself. The Agreement is placed in the context of previous unsuccessful peace initiatives in the region, and elements within the political and economic environment at the time that facilitated agreement are identified. The consociational nature of the Agreement is set alongside concern about continuing sectarian division.

• Marie Breen-Smyth
• November 2008
• Strategic Analysis

Despite its excellent record in the field of non-proliferation of technologies, know-how and equipment related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to other states, India has been essentially a passive actor in global non-proliferation initiatives. As a result, it does not as yet have a comprehensive framework or strategy within which it defines its anti-proliferation objectives.

• A. Vinod Kumar
• January 2007
• Strategic Analysis

The most visible manifestation of a strategic relationship between two countries is cooperation in the defence sphere. When the Defence Framework Agreement was signed in June 2005, it was widely assumed that the Agreement provided a skeleton that would be fleshed out over a period of time.

• Cherian Samuel
• March 2007
• Strategic Analysis

The article considers why New Delhi has shied away from full participation in the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative despite compelling national interests in improving Indian maritime forces and cooperating with the United States at sea. Some factors examined are polarized domestic politics, Indians' ambivalence about non-proliferation arrangements that formerly targeted them, and New Delhi's desire for regional primacy. Until Indian leaders come to believe that the benefits of PSI participation outweigh its drawbacks, they will continue to hold the initiative at arm's length.

• James R. Holmes
• March 2007
• Strategic Analysis

Three issues of contention have animated the debate about the role of the IAEA vis-à-vis the JCPOA. These relate to resolving concerns relating to PMD, those governing ‘anytime, anywhere access’, and the IAEA’s ability to ensure Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA.

• S. Samuel C. Rajiv
• August 07, 2015
• Issue Brief

An Indian application for NSG membership should face less resistance than what china had faced. Such an option is certainly worth an attempt instead of waiting indefinitely for the NSG PGs to arrive at a consensus on inviting India.

• G. Balachandran
• July 20, 2015
• IDSA Comments

Time and again, civilian masses the world over have been at the receiving end of legions of conventional weapons systems leaving destructive direct and indirect consequences in their wake. The copious arms -and their ammunition- currently in circulation range from assault rifles, rocket launchers, anti-aircraft weapons to pistols, machine guns as well as missiles, grenades and other explosive ordnances.

• Sourabhi Mukherji
• June 23, 2015
• Issue Brief

The 2015 NPT RevCon ended on an expected dismaying note. The only positive outcome was its endorsement of the recent initiatives to project the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, though not adopting its underlying theme - a nuclear weapons prohibition treaty.

• A. Vinod Kumar
• May 26, 2015
• IDSA Comments

This Issue Brief looks back at the implementation of the JPOA and examines the extent to which the recent framework (JCPOA) agreed upon at Lausanne adheres to the letter and spirit of the JPOA, specifically as it relates to the pledge to treat the Iranian nuclear programme “as that of any non-nuclear state party to the NPT”.

• S. Samuel C. Rajiv , G. Balachandran
• April 23, 2015
• Issue Brief

The collective silence of the guardians and the state-parties by no means signifies the NPT’s good health, especially when they continue to emphasise upon the slow pace of disarmament and enduring pressures on the non-proliferation regime.

• A. Vinod Kumar
• March 02, 2015
• IDSA Comments

The Modi’s government determination to adopt a muscular stance on national security and its commitment to expedite defence modernisation are likely to translate into greater political and defence engagement with Israel.

• S. Samuel C. Rajiv
• February 19, 2015
• IDSA Comments

There is a general feeling among analysts that while US government lawyers may have been satisfied that the CLNDA is compatible with CSC in light of explanations offered by the Indian government, this view is being reportedly challenged by nuclear industry lawyers.

• G. Balachandran
• February 19, 2015
• Issue Brief

While the exact nature of the understanding between the two countries is yet to be announced and in fact may never be officially released, it is possible to offer an outline of the possible “memorandum” with possible understandings on all the three liability issues as well as the administrative arrangements.

• G. Balachandran
• February 10, 2015
• Issue Brief

India’s nuclear deal with the US is driven less by technology requirements than by the need to be integrated into the global nuclear community and gain access to uranium imports for fuelling its nuclear power expansion plans.

• Sarosh Bana
• February 10, 2015
• IDSA Comments

India is already in de facto observance of the spirit of the CTBT by maintaining its unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosive testing. Given that additional nuclear tests may not be needed, it could well reconsider its current position on signing the treaty.

• Reshmi Kazi
• December 24, 2014
• Issue Brief

India’s Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act has emerged as an appropriate template that could rekindle the nuclear energy sector while also safeguarding the public interest.

• A. Vinod Kumar , Kapil Patil
• December 06, 2014
• Issue Brief

As Australia and India have to deepen their security cooperation for a peaceful prosperous and stable Asia-Pacific region, both the countries will have to manage global nuclear commerce together.

• Rajiv Nayan
• September 15, 2014
• IDSA Comments

The editorial also intrinsically marks the return of the ‘pro-Pakistan’ lobby in the US non-proliferation community, and the American media, which was culpable in encouraging the many indulgences of the Pakistani military and nuclear establishment for many decades and facilitating favourable non-proliferation policies for Pakistan to effectively pursue a clandestine nuclear programme with technological aid from Western companies.

• A. Vinod Kumar
• July 07, 2014
• IDSA Comments

“Credible minimum deterrence” is the cornerstone of India’s nuclear doctrine. It, used in conjunction with the concepts of “No First Use” (NFU) and “Non Use” against non nuclear weapon states, clearly indicates that India envisages its nuclear weapons as only a deterrent and not as a means to threaten others.

• Satish Chandra
• April 30, 2014
• Issue Brief

The success of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 should not make the international community overlook persisting problems. The objective of the 1540 is to internationalise WMD security by targeting the entire supply chain.

• Rajiv Nayan
• April 28, 2014
• IDSA Comments

In the years to come, a lot more activity on nuclear security can be expected and much of it will arise from the commitment taken by states at the three nuclear security summits and the voluntary pledges undertaken by different countries. A good deal of pressure from civil society and think tanks on nuclear security issues can be expected.

• Arvind Gupta , Rajiv Nayan
• March 29, 2014
• IDSA Comments

There are no properly functioning Asian security institutions or regimes to regulate Asia’s nuclear politics and has to rely on global institutions and regimes for regulation of its nuclear politics and management of nuclear order. Treaties like the NPT are struggling to provide stability in the world as in Asia.

• Rajiv Nayan
• March 28, 2014
• IDSA Comments

Riyadh anticipates that in the long run a nuclear Iran will be challenging Saudi’s proxy conflicts with Iran in states like Palestine, Bahrain, Yemen and Syria. Amidst such concerns, Riyadh’s rejection of a UN Security Council seat in October 2013 followed by the revelation of the BBC news about possible nuclear weapons cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in November 2013 has raised questions whether Riyadh aspires to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

• Reshmi Kazi
• January 07, 2014
• Issue Brief

The November 24, 2013 Joint Plan of Action between Iran and its P5+1 interlocutors is the first agreement since November 2004 that contains Iran’s acceptance of certain short-term limitations on its nuclear programme.

• S. Samuel C. Rajiv , G. Balachandran
• December 09, 2013
• Issue Brief