Nuclear and Arms Control

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About Centre

Nuclear science and technology have impinged upon global politics and security studies for decades. IDSA has focused on the study of the political and strategic facets of nuclear science and technology since its inception and is known for providing a different perspective on global nuclear issues. The Institute has been at the forefront of shaping the debate on key nuclear issues in India and in the world at large. The Center for Nuclear and Arms Control is dedicated to advance research on strategic nuclear issues. It is engaged in projects that seek to provide answers to relevant policy questions relating to global nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and anti-proliferation, nuclear energy, global nuclear governance, regional nuclear dynamics, Arms Trade Treaty, the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, among others. Through its outreach activities, the Centre has disseminated its research output in the strategic studies and policy communities.

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US Policy on Dual-Use Technology Transfers to China

This paper explores the paradox of US policy on dual-use technology cooperation with China in the face of resistance from a strong section of the security establishment. The paper examines the factors contributing to the current level of dual-use technology business between the two countries. It finds that the US Cold War grand strategy of co-opting China by dividing the socialist bloc has resulted in embedded commercial interests that have been further bolstered by the strategic need for ties with China.

India and the Proliferation Security Initiative: A US Perspective

The article considers why New Delhi has shied away from full participation in the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative despite compelling national interests in improving Indian maritime forces and cooperating with the United States at sea. Some factors examined are polarized domestic politics, Indians' ambivalence about non-proliferation arrangements that formerly targeted them, and New Delhi's desire for regional primacy. Until Indian leaders come to believe that the benefits of PSI participation outweigh its drawbacks, they will continue to hold the initiative at arm's length.

Radical Islamic Organisations in Europe: South Asia in their Discourse

In the European security calculus, terrorism has become one of the key strategic threats. Alarmingly, the continent has also become a centre of radical Islamist propaganda and activism, with a number of European countries worried over the potential of their own 'home-grown' religious extremists. Latest studies indicate a disturbing trend of a section of the youth, generally belonging to the Muslim communities of West African and South Asian origin from a poor or middle class socioeconomic background, embracing extremism and terrorism in Europe.

Counterproliferation: India’s New Imperatives and Options

Despite its excellent record in the field of non-proliferation of technologies, know-how and equipment related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to other states, India has been essentially a passive actor in global non-proliferation initiatives. As a result, it does not as yet have a comprehensive framework or strategy within which it defines its anti-proliferation objectives.

United States and the North Korean Nuclear Test

With the not so unexpected North Korean nuclear test on October 9, 2006 the world has entered into yet another nuclear age. Regional tension is the inevitable corollary of the new nuclear situation. Many apprehend East Asia may become a nuclear flashpoint. Quite naturally, the international community is closely watching the emergent situation. The United States (US) as a major and traditional stakeholder both in the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and security management in East Asia is actively involved in diplomacy to deal with the fallout of the North Korean nuclear test.

North Korean Nuclear Crises: Challenges and Options for China

The October 9 North Korean nuclear test has emerged as a major diplomatic challenge as well as an opportunity for China. China has sent mixed signals in response to the United Nations (UN) 1718 Resolution of October 14 on North Korea. It has agreed to the inspection of North Korea’s inbound and outbound trade to prevent any illegal trafficking in weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. China Daily reported that Chinese border officials have started checking trucks at the border with Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).

Japan’s Response to North Korea’s Nuclear Test

The recent nuclear test carried out by North Korea in defiance of warnings by the international community has significantly raised Japan’s security concerns. The test conducted on October 9, 2006 made Pyongyang the second nuclear weapon state in North East Asia after China. It was carried out in the backdrop of already heightened tensions in the region following a set of multiple missile launches by Pyongyang on 5 July 2006. The missiles which had plunged into the Sea of Japan, had even evoked calls for preemptive strikes from a section of the political and defense establishment in Tokyo.

South Korean Response to the North Korean Nuclear Test

The testing of a nuclear device by North Korea (hereafter the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – DPRK) on October 9 has brought to the fore South Korea’s (hereafter the Republic of Korea – ROK) measured and considered response calibrated in such a manner as to force the DPRK to return to the negotiating table. The DPRK conducted its nuclear test even as the ROK President, Roh Moo-hyun was presiding over an emergency cabinet meeting called to discuss DPRKs preparations for a nuclear test.

Closure of the Pakistan-Based A.Q. Khan Network Case: A Hasty Burial?

North Korea’s and Iran’s showdown with the US and the West on the nuclear proliferation issue are closely related to their dubious proliferation connections with the Pakistan-based A Q Khan network. Yet, Pakistan has announced that the case against Khan and his proliferation cohorts is closed. To comprehensively understand the nonproliferation challenges, it is crucial that the details about the network’s operations as also about Khan’s associates as well as their benefactors are publicly revealed.

Agni-III

On July 9, 2006, the long awaited Agni-III ballistic missiles test finally took place. This was the first test of this version of Agni designed with a range of 3,000 km. This missile used two-stage solid propellant. It took off successfully but failed to cover its determined course completely. Apparently, the missile developed a snag while entering into its second stage. Admitting the snag the Indian minister of defence said that it was not a major failure. Scientists are quite confident that the error will be rectified, and the missile would be ready for testing in the near future.

Danish Caricatures: Freedom of Provocation

The unprecedented worldwide protests and street demonstrations against the publication of a series of satirical cartoons by a Danish newspaper have become a topic of intense debate over the limits of free speech and what has been described as the ‘place’ of Muslims in the West. On September 30, 2005 the major Danish daily Jyllands-Posten from Aarhus printed a set of 12 caricatures depicting Prophet Mohammad, which Muslims believe is blasphemous.

Iran’s Nuclear Case and India

Unable to restrain Iran from continuing with its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has turned to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for help. The IAEA, a specialised agency under the United Nations, by deciding to send to the UNSC its March 2006 report on the status of Iran’s implementation record on IAEA safeguards on its nuclear installations has indicated that the situation is serious enough to be taken up by the higher UN body responsible for international security.

Partnership in a Balance of Power System

The popular perception in India is that with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of one of the two Superpowers, the bipolar international system has become unipolar. The United States is now assumed to be an unchallenged sole Superpower. Consequently, it is felt in some quarters that the Indo-US Joint Statement of July 18, 2005 is a case of US recruiting India as one of its allies for possible future containment of China. Such a perception nurtures suspicion about the US and its motivation about its attempts to befriend India.

International Nuclear Control Regimes and India’s Participation in Civilian Nuclear Trade: Key Issues

Much of the current debate on India’s decision to evolve a set of agreements with the United States and engage the international nuclear technology control regimes in order to promote civilian nuclear cooperation unfortunately has not focused on some of the key questions involved and the available options before the country. Clearly, the country needs to take decisions from a subset of options that are i) politically feasible and ii) most desirable/least undesirable from the viewpoint of national interests.

Indo-US Nuclear Agreement and IAEA Safeguards

Nuclear transfers to a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) are conditioned on IAEA safeguards on all current and future peaceful nuclear activities, what are called the full-scope safeguards (FSS) or comprehensive safeguards. Since India is a NNWS according to the NPT definition, the NSG Guidelines as currently implemented would, therefore, invoke FSS if India seeks nuclear technology or nuclear power plants – even on a turnkey basis – or nuclear fuel from any NSG membercountry.

Indo-US Nuclear Deal and Non-Proliferation

Different views have been expressed by the American non-proliferation lobbyists on possible loss or gain from the Indo-US nuclear agreement. Would the agreement complicate global non-proliferation efforts as the critics argue or would it lead to a stronger front to deal with emerging non-proliferation challenges? To answer these questions it is necessary to examine the merits of the arguments put forward by the US non-proliferation lobby carefully.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation and International Security

I welcome this opportunity to present to such a distinguished audience some views on issues relating to nuclear non-proliferation and international security. At the outset, I would like to thank the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) for inviting me to deliver this address. The Institute has a well deserved reputation as our premier strategic think tank and quite appropriately, they have focused on a subject that not only has a strong contemporary relevance but represents a long term challenge for India and the international community.

The US-Iran Deal and the Outcome

The interim deal was signed by seven foreign ministers of US, UK , France, Russia, China, Germany and Iran but the deal was not negotiated mainly in Geneva, but in Muscat and other locations where the US and Iran met secretly for months. Essentially, it is a deal between US and Iran and the rest were there to serve a choreographic purpose.

China’s Reactor Sale to Pakistan: The Known Unknowns

The reported offer of China to sell 1000 MWe reactors to Pakistan has raised a number of issues. China applied for NSG membership in 2004 only after being satisfied that it can safeguard its nuclear commerce with Pakistan even after joining NSG. It must be clearly understood that China’s application for joining NSG was at the repeated appeals of NSG and not the other way around.

India and NSG: Approaches to Indian membership

India’s admission to the NSG has, as on the previous times when the India-US Nuclear Deal and the NSG exemption of 2008 were under discussion, caused many of those opposed to the Indian nuclear programme to come out with various policy suggestions on how to get India to agree on additional conditionalities. In addition there is a move by many to use the Indian admission for membership as a means to legitimize the illegitimate nuclear commerce between China and Pakistan. All these are predicated on the assumption that India is desperate to join the NSG. India should reject any move by the nonproliferation lobby to devise a criterion-based admission procedure.

Examining the Prospects of South Korea “Going Nuclear”

In the aftermath of recent North Korean actions and threats, there has been in recent times some open debates and discussions about the prospects of South Korea “going nuclear” i.e. developing its own nuclear weapons. This brief argues that short of abrogating all its bilateral and multilateral treaties and obligations with heavy costs, the prospects of it doing so in the short/medium term are not that easy and may not be cost effective.

Addressing Pakistan’s Atomisation

Nuclear force development is at present an attractive means for Pakistan to attract international political and financial assistance, while salving the paranoias of its security establishment. Improvement in the state-society relationship could reduce the domestic appeal of endless nuclear expansion as other, more sustainable, resources become available to the state for building economic growth and security.