This paper attempts to provide an overview of significant recent developments in US policy towards South Asia and their implications for India. It examines the proposed cooperation between India and the US, focusing on advanced technology issues. It also places this issue in the context of US-Pakistan ties, as this provides a relevant referent for comparison. This paper concludes that while the US and India are formally expanding their strategic cooperation, the results on the ground are still not in step with the rhetoric.

• G. Balachandran
• April 2005
• Strategic Analysis

On May 17, 2005, the Federal Interior Ministry of Germany published its annual report on the Protection of Constitution for 2004. For the last few years, the country’s domestic intelligence agency – Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) – under the Federal Interior Ministry, has been publishing such reports on its website.

• Alok Rashmi Mukhopadhyay
• April 2005
• Strategic Analysis

I welcome this opportunity to present to such a distinguished audience some views on issues relating to nuclear non-proliferation and international security. At the outset, I would like to thank the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) for inviting me to deliver this address. The Institute has a well deserved reputation as our premier strategic think tank and quite appropriately, they have focused on a subject that not only has a strong contemporary relevance but represents a long term challenge for India and the international community.

• Shyam Saran
• July 2005
• Strategic Analysis

The post-Cold War period saw North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) being expanded not once but twice. In foreseeing the security threats of the 21st century, NATO is seeking to recast its strategic response. The EU and the US are united in their opinion about the need for a stronger and cohesive NATO, and a wider out-of-area role for the alliance. If both the sides start working together and address future challenges, it may bring about a ‘symbiosis’ in the Atlantic Relationship.

• Prasad P. Rane
• July 2005
• Strategic Analysis

In a significant turn of events, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on September 24, 2005, adopted a resolution (22-1 with 12 countries abstaining) calling upon Iran to accelerate its cooperation with the Agency in terms of revealing its ‘secret’ nuclear programme failing which the issue will be referred to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).1 Althoug

• Manish
• July 2005
• Strategic Analysis

The popular perception in India is that with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of one of the two Superpowers, the bipolar international system has become unipolar. The United States is now assumed to be an unchallenged sole Superpower. Consequently, it is felt in some quarters that the Indo-US Joint Statement of July 18, 2005 is a case of US recruiting India as one of its allies for possible future containment of China. Such a perception nurtures suspicion about the US and its motivation about its attempts to befriend India.

• K. Subrahmanyam
• October 2005
• Strategic Analysis

Much of the current debate on India’s decision to evolve a set of agreements with the United States and engage the international nuclear technology control regimes in order to promote civilian nuclear cooperation unfortunately has not focused on some of the key questions involved and the available options before the country. Clearly, the country needs to take decisions from a subset of options that are i) politically feasible and ii) most desirable/least undesirable from the viewpoint of national interests.

• G. Balachandran
• October 2005
• Strategic Analysis

Nuclear transfers to a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) are conditioned on IAEA safeguards on all current and future peaceful nuclear activities, what are called the full-scope safeguards (FSS) or comprehensive safeguards. Since India is a NNWS according to the NPT definition, the NSG Guidelines as currently implemented would, therefore, invoke FSS if India seeks nuclear technology or nuclear power plants – even on a turnkey basis – or nuclear fuel from any NSG membercountry.

• R. Ramachandran
• October 2005
• Strategic Analysis

The 18 July Bush-Manmohan Agreement is currently being implemented, in bits and pieces. At the time of the signing of the agreement it was stated by different officials that both governments would proceed to unilaterally implement the provisions that pertained to them and there would be no expectations of reciprocity.

• Raja Menon
• October 2005
• Strategic Analysis

Different views have been expressed by the American non-proliferation lobbyists on possible loss or gain from the Indo-US nuclear agreement. Would the agreement complicate global non-proliferation efforts as the critics argue or would it lead to a stronger front to deal with emerging non-proliferation challenges? To answer these questions it is necessary to examine the merits of the arguments put forward by the US non-proliferation lobby carefully.

• Rajesh Kumar Mishra
• October 2005
• Strategic Analysis

Washington-Tehran relations have come to occupy centrestage in the recent months given the United States’ current preoccupation with the Middle East. The US-Iran association can be traced back to 1953, when the CIA organised a coup to oust the elected government of Mohammed Mossadeq. Since then, the US has never really disengaged itself from the one of the most strategically important Middle East nations. This paper attempts to identify current US concerns regarding Iran and explores the possibility of a US offensive against Iran similar to that in Iraq.

• Parama Sinha Palit
• January 2004
• Strategic Analysis

The essay defines Pakistan’s brazen retailing of sensitive nuclear technologies as Bomb Process Outsourcing (BPO) and places it in a larger perspective. It offers a short retrospective of the development and manufacture of nuclear weapons by the P-5 in which significant manpower and materials were ‘foreign’. This is true of the programmes of Israel, Iraq, South Africa, Argentina and Brazil as well. Pakistan, has now, contributed to North Korea, Libya and Iran.

• K. Santhanam
• January 2004
• Strategic Analysis

Proliferation of WMDs is a grave threat to mankind, be it their flow to ‘irresponsible states’ or to terrorists. Charged by its perception of vulnerability, the US has initiated the Proliferation Security Initiative; seeking involvement of ‘key’ states for interdiction of ‘suspect ships’ at sea. In its present form, PSI is contrary to the principle of ‘Freedom of the Seas’. Further, its operational efficacy is doubtful and it has an escalatory potential. However, bilateral arrangements as an extension of PSI may lawfully supplement global non-proliferation efforts.

• Gurpreet S Khurana
• April 2004
• Strategic Analysis

Suicide bombings in Jammu and Kashmir are patterned on Palestinian methods established that those actually originated in Europe and thus added an intriguing component to the Indian terror scenario. Mainly, the European intelligence agencies have closely observed the terror scenario in Europe as an international phenomenon, its causes, ramifications as well as the recruitment procedure.

• Alok Rashmi Mukhopadhyay
• April 2004
• Strategic Analysis

Against all odds, Iran is pressing hard to prove its nuclear innocence and keeping its promises under the provisions of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The US is refusing to go along with Iran’s denials on violation of the NPT commitments. At the same time, the Bush Administration seems determined to stop the spread of nuclear weapons beyond Pakistan to other Muslim states. However, the facts emerging out of the probe into the A.Q. Khan episode and the international grey nuclear market indicate significant patterns of concealment and duplicity even by the NPT signatory states.

• Rajesh Kumar Mishra
• July 2004
• Strategic Analysis

The 585-page National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States Report that investigated the plot, design and circumstances leading to the 9/11 attacks on the US has highlighted the dangers of organised terrorism in threatening global peace and security. The same threat has been reiterated in the recent Beslan tragedy in Russia. It is clear that terrorism has acquired global dimensions and has emerged as a fundamental concern for the international community.

• Parama Sinha Palit
• July 2004
• Strategic Analysis

In the background of former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s obituary tribute to P.V. Narasimha Rao acknowledging the latter as the true father of Shakti nuclear test of May 11, 1998, let me recall Rao’s role in the development of the Indian nuclear deterrent as narrated by him. This is important in order to understand the correct historical perspective about very important decisions of the past; in this case, Rao’s account of the evolution of the nuclear policy during his term of office.

• K. Subrahmanyam
• October 2004
• Strategic Analysis

President Bush has announced Condoleezza Rice as the new Secretary of State in his second term. Her deputy at the National Security Council, Stephen Hadley, has been named as the new National Security Advisor. These two along with John R. Bolton, the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs who serves as Senior Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State for Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament, represent the right wing of the foreign policy establishment.

• Parama Sinha Palit
• October 2004
• Strategic Analysis

During the latest war in Iraq, which has now come to an end, there has been a persistent debate on why Europe and the US are not seeing eye-to-eye on the question of war and a host of issues pertaining to it. The discourse so far has speculatively tried to probe whether the whole mismatch is about culture, history or about the power game in the post-Cold War world.

• Ajai K. Rai
• April 2003
• Strategic Analysis

The Baltic States’ search for security became a major issue after their independence in 1991. Since then these States have been trying to establish links with Europe and perceive Russia as a major threat. Their aspirations for the NATO membership are based on their security perspective. Baltic States are engaged in trying to upgrade their armed forces, solve their territorial and ethnic disputes to meet the NATO membership criteria.

• Nivedita Das Kundu
• July 2003
• Strategic Analysis

The Right of Recourse embedded in the Indian nuclear liability law has ensured that more than four years after the NSG granted exemption to enable nuclear commerce with India, India has not been able to finalise a single contract with any of the countries with which it has signed nuclear cooperation agreements for any nuclear facility.

• G. Balachandran , Kapil Patil
• November 09, 2012
• Issue Brief

There is a need to debate both the necessity and desirability of nuclear disarmament without being burdened by India’s idealistic aspirations and unfounded assumptions about the heft that this premature superpower carries in international politics.

• Yogesh Joshi
• October 10, 2012
• Issue Brief

Normative credibility bestows on the Indian and French quest for foreign policy independence the uniqueness not granted to any other bilateral nuclear relationship operating in opposition to the non-proliferation regime.

• Jayita Sarkar
• October 10, 2012
• IDSA Comments

Given the fact that there is a lot of noise being made to prod India into doing more on nuclear disarmament counter-intuitively suggests that India is actually doing very less on the issue. What explains India's reluctance?

• Yogesh Joshi
• September 05, 2012
• IDSA Comments

The proliferation of small arms and ammunition is a major issue that threatens the security of India. Aspects related to illicit manufacture of local country made guns, smuggling, pilferage from government stocks and a weak monitoring or surveillance mechanisms further complicate the issue.

• Ravinder Pal Singh
• July 27, 2012
• Policy Brief

The treaty needs to be capable of addressing existing and perceived threat of the world; at the same time, it should be flexible enough to meet emerging security challenges.

• Rajiv Nayan
• July 27, 2012
• Policy Brief

Japan’s amendment of its atomic energy law with the inclusion of a “national security” clause is being viewed within the country as a ploy to pave the way for the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

• Shamshad A. Khan
• July 11, 2012
• IDSA Comments

Since the idea of export controls may be new for a large number of countries, and most of the proposed provisions are borrowed from existing systems in developed countries, the treaty should be flexible enough to remove redundant provisions and adopt new provisions suitable for changed circumstances.

• Rajiv Nayan
• July 02, 2012
• IDSA Comments

The primary role of Israel’s current fleet of ‘Dolphins’ is likely to be limited to serve as instruments of ‘signalling’ strategic intent to potential enemies rather than as effective pre-emptive strike or competent second-strike platforms.

• S. Samuel C. Rajiv
• June 15, 2012
• IDSA Comments

Attempts by India and the US to square the circle on the nature of India’s energy cooperation with Iran have hit high gear in the aftermath of Clinton’s visit.

• S. Samuel C. Rajiv
• May 10, 2012
• IDSA Comments

Indexing will provide a further opportunity for countries to make allegations that the NGOs working on nuclear security are basically pushing the agenda of the US non-proliferation community as well as of the US government.

• Rajiv Nayan , Ch. Viyyanna Sastry
• April 09, 2012
• Issue Brief

Despite not taking a stand on nuclear security or nuclear terrorism, the NAM appears determined to adopt key elements of nuclear security.

• Rajiv Nayan
• March 16, 2012
• Issue Brief

The real test of the latest deal will be when the IAEA inspectors visit North Korea’s nuclear facility and file their report on the moratorium.

• Preeti Nalwa
• March 14, 2012
• IDSA Comments

While the project that produced the Report engaged some credible scholars from western universities and elsewhere, but the control and leadership exercised on the project by known non-proliferation activists may have sent a wrong signal to the non-western world.

• Rajiv Nayan , Ch. Viyyanna Sastry
• January 24, 2012
• IDSA Comments

While we in India should welcome a change in the strategic profile of the US, we should at the same time examine the matter closely, lest we unnecessarily get embroiled yet again with the Chinese.

• R. S. Kalha
• January 16, 2012
• IDSA Comments

While Indonesia’s ratification has given a boost to the CTBT, the positions of the other hold-out countries do not show any promise of forward movement.

• Ch. Viyyanna Sastry
• January 09, 2012
• IDSA Comments

Though India has supported and adopted the international legal framework for nuclear security, it has adopted a somewhat unique approach reflecting its policy of cautious activism.

• Rajiv Nayan
• January 05, 2012
• IDSA Comments

The year 2011 will stand out in history as the year of the Arab Spring, when people in Northern Africa and West Asia rose up against tyranny and revolted for political emancipation.

• A. Vinod Kumar
• January 04, 2012
• Issue Brief

Where the next headline grabbing cyber event would take place or in what form is difficult to predict, though it could well be perpetrated by a class that is yet to open its account, the cyber terrorist.

• Cherian Samuel
• December 29, 2011
• IDSA Comments

Concerned about Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programmes, Australia has blocked the shipment of dual-use equipment to Pakistan on at least three occasions during the past two years.

• Ch. Viyyanna Sastry
• December 14, 2011
• IDSA Comments