Two projects that are currently under progress are ‘Developments in Pakistan’ and ‘Pakistan Occupied Kashmir’. In addition, individual scholars are engaged in researching various security related aspects pertaining to South Asian countries. The Centre has established bilateral institutional relations with leading think tanks in the region and proposes to undertake joint studies.
No posts of Books and Monograph.
It is now generally accepted that energy security could be significantly enhanced through sustained cross-border exchanges in many regions. In South Asia, however, regional energy security cooperation has seriously remained entangled in geopolitics. The possibility of overexploitation of natural resources such as coal, natural gas and oil reserves and the low level of political confidence in sharing hydro resources have placed serious obstacles to enhancing the level of energy security in the region.
For decades, the dominant sense in the foreign policy establishment of India was that neither the Kashmir question nor the boundary dispute with China was ripe for resolution. Yet, in defiance of this received wisdom, two very different political coalitions have opened and sustained substantive negotiations on Jammu and Kashmir and the boundary dispute with China. Forward movement in both negotiations has also been premised on opening the closed frontiers with China and Pakistan.
With the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) taking over command from the US-led Coalition Forces in southern Afghanistan and the United States focusing on the eastern part of Afghanistan, particularly along the border with Pakistan, crucial questions have arisen regarding securing Afghanistan and its transition to democracy. How will NATO perform its new responsibilities and what will be its counter-terrorism strategies?
Pakistan is a frontline ally of the US in its Global War on Terrorism. After the 9/11 terrorist attack, the military regime was compelled by Washington to join the US effort to dismantle the Taliban-Al Qaida terrorist infrastructure in Afghanistan and Pakistan that successive regimes had nurtured. While the Pakistani military regime’s cooperation is deemed to be crucial for the success of the US counter-terrorism strategy, there appear to be growing strains and challenges that give rise to fundamental questions about the outcomes of such cooperation.
The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is a good example of how peace
“I have been a Baloch for several centuries. I have been a Muslim for 1400 years. I have been a Pakistani for just over fifty”,
Muslim women are generally viewed as victims of prevailing religious and patriarchal discourses. Their subjectivity and subordinate position is discussed as imposed, through textual representations by orthodox and radical Muslims. Radical Islamic movements are examined as militarized masculinities, oppressing women as well as terrorizing the non-Muslims. This paper argues that women are active partners of their subordination within traditionalist and radical religious movements. They are agents of orthodoxy and have carved a new role for themselves within the religious paradigms.
The myth regarding religious parties in Pakistan possessing street power sans political power was broken with the success of the Muttahida Majlise Amal’s (MMA)—a coalition of Muslim parties and groups— in the 2002 general elections. The party sprung to power for a variety of reasons including the support it received from General Musharraf’s military establishment. The MMA on several occasions facilitated Musharraf’s political schema in the hope for larger political favours, drawing severe criticism from both within and outside the party.
A series of disturbing events— from the Tashkent bombing in February 1999 to the May 13, 2005 incidents in Andijon city in Ferghana Valley of Uzbekistan— have drawn attention to the growing role of the religious extremist forces in Central Asia. The Islamic Movement of Turkestan (IMT), also known as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) until the middle of 2003, and the Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) – the two leading extremist groups— have openly declared their objective of overthrowing the constitutional system and to create an Islamic state in Central Asia.
Muslims comprise the second largest population after Hindus in South Asia. They are, however, not a monolithic community. The rise of religious fundamentalism in Pakistan and the official patronage it has got has an enormous political and security impact on the region. The terrorist campaign, sponsored by Pakistan and waged by Islamic fundamentalist groups in Jammu and Kashmir and Afghanistan, has wide implications and poses a major threat to the region. Setting up an Islamic state and Jihad are the two objectives of all fundamentalist movements.
Emergence of radical and extremist Islamist movements has proved to be a major source of instability in South and Central Asia. Radical Islamist groups emphasise that political power is indispensable to the establishment of an Islamic state. Though Muslims like non-Muslims have multiple identities – religious, ethnic, tribal, linguistic or territorial, the emphasis by the Islamists on the Islamic communal identity puts them in collision course with the state and other communities.
State-building efforts in Pakistan have been increasingly come under challenge from ethno-national movements. The current spate of insurgency in Balochistan is a product of repressive policies coupled with historical grievances that have led to increased alienation amongst the Baloch and a general perception that they are being exploited. The continuing violence has the potential to destabilise not only Pakistan but the entire region.
The US-led ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan has led to the re-establishment of the warlords, and has failed to adequately address the issue of drug menace in an effective manner. As the Bonn process ended with the September 2005 elections, and the US forces are likely to partially withdraw this year, it is pertinent to evaluate the ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan and its implications for the post-election Afghanistan.
The long drawn out ethno-political conflict in Sri Lanka has been accepted as a serious challenge for scholars, activists, peace-makers and the expanding international community of professionals engaged in conflict-resolution/ management/ transformation. In view of the intractable nature of the conflict and its escalation potential, both the parties to the conflict have welcomed external mediation to seek a way out of the crisis. However, the divide between the two parties continue to widen further.
Regionalism has not been a very successful endeavour in South Asia so far. What has gone wrong? Regionalism can be approached from both functional and neo-functional approaches. While functionalism is still relevant in Europe, primarily because of its geographical contiguity and cultural commonalities, the same does not seem to have worked in South Asia in spite of common historical and cultural roots and geographical contiguity. The article explores the specific case of Pakistan and its inability to come to terms with the basic tenets of regionalism.
The South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) completed two decades of its existence in 2005. Yet it has only made modest progress in achieving its regional goals. The reasons for this are many. Successful regionalism requires a shared faith in collective gains and a vision for long-term cooperation that has been missing. There has been a visible lack of trust among some of the principal actors, a preponderance of domestic political consideration and a strong sensitivity towards sovereignty that has prevented collective action and gains from cooperation.
The deeply troubling situation in Nepal is marked by three discernible trends. First, is the collapse of the ceasefire and commencement of violent activities, including strikes, blockades and attacks by the Maoists. This has led to the revival of counter-insurgency operations by the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA), reinforced by a fresh supply of arms and ammunition, and other military hardware from China.
The thrice postponed Afghan parliamentary and provincial council elections are finally over. But, is the Bonn-mandated political process over? With the US intent on cutting down its troop levels in Afghanistan this year, is the ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan also over? It is being said that the Bonn process has concluded with the September 18, 2005 elections. If so, then it is pertinent to examine the end-result of the four-year political process and the recently concluded elections.
The recent heavy firing by the Pakistani army is to gain public sympathy and providing it greater flexibility in the flawed civil-military relations. It is an orchestrated plan to provoke India believing that it can take such a risk of escalation in the back drop of its effective nuclear capability.
If Nawaz Sharif now plays his cards well - improves governance, makes his politics more responsive and inclusive, reaches out to opposition and his constituency, doesn’t remain aloof and keeps the parliament and political parties as his back – he could well change the power equations for good.
There are logical reasons for India to suitably intercede with both its neighours to facilitate an agreement on the border. A mediatory role by India may not be unwelcome by Bangladesh and Myanmar as both have friendly relations.
In the short-term India needs to let the internal situation within Pakistan play itself out and see what emerges from the standoff. There is no doubt that Pakistan will have to be engaged but terms and manner will be dictated by the prevailing political and economic scenario in India, Afghanistan and the region including India-China relations.
In a recent judgment, the UN Tribunal has delineated the maritime boundary line between India and Bangladesh in the territorial sea, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf within and beyond 200 nautical miles (nm). Both the countries are pleased and hope to consolidate further their relationship.
The military has ridden roughshod over Pakistan’s polity for most of the country’s history since its independence. The Pakistani army, once described as a ‘state within a state’, is now being viewed by many as the state. In fact, the army and the ISI (the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate) together form the ‘deep state’.
Prime Minister Modi has to think beyond the immediate circle and leverage the Himalayas as a bridge for India reaching out to wider Eurasian space the access to which has blocked by Pakistan. A way out could be to promote a regional market across the border, woven by a web of spiritual and commercial interests.
Realising the electoral significance of the issue the Congress seems to be engaging in a competitive politics with the BJP by talking of giving citizenship to even those migrants who came to India after 1971 but were persecuted in Bangladesh.
The army has quite patiently allowed Imran and Qadri to carry on with their protests and create a political condition unfavourable enough for Nawaz Sharif to approach the army for help. Thus like in 1993, Nawaz is feeling the heat even if the opposition is not united in their effort to dislodge his government.
For all the grandstanding by the Pakistan army and the civilian government that Op Zarb-e-Azb was going to be against all kinds of terror groups based in NWA, no such thing seems to be happening. Clearly, this operation has been launched keeping an eye on the post-2014 situation in Afghanistan.
The recently concluded Afghan Presidential election, rather than facilitating crucial political transition, is mired in controversy. An early resolution is crucial both for Afghanistan and the international community. For Afghanistan, a peaceful and non-controversial transition would ensure the legitimacy of the upcoming government and push the twin processes of reconciliation and democratization forward.
As all the votes cast in the run-off election are audited and recounted under international supervision, the final outcome could be a close finish with winning candidate leading by a much narrow margin. The process of constitutional amendment can only be initiated after the new parliament is formed as parliamentary elections are due in 2015.
There is no one nationalist Sri Lankan view. Among the Sinhalas, there are also the liberals who are quite realistic about their assessments and would argue that there may be a change in leadership in India, but the cornerstone of India’s policy vis-à-vis Sri Lanka will remain the same. The Tamils, on the other hand, are unanimous in their view that India can and should play a major role in bringing meaningful political reconciliation to the country.
While the visit was proposed as a good will visit, some of the issues that have been bedeviling bilateral relations came up for discussion particularly, from the Bangladesh side, the conclusion of Teesta and the ratification of the Land Boundary Agreement (LBA). The EAM assured Dhaka that New Delhi would conclude the LBA and is already in the process of building a consensus on Teesta.
Modi’s visit to Bhutan is politically significant. After inviting SAARC leaders to his swearing in ceremony; his choice of Bhutan as the first country came as no surprise. Bhutan is also the only country where the bilateral relationship is free from tension and expectations from each other are also easy to attain.
Before India once again goes down the path of wondering how it can rescue Pakistan from itself, some home truths about Pakistan – the state and society – need to be understood. The single most important home truth is that Pakistan's hatred for India far outweighs any fear or concern or even loathing it may have about the terrorism and extremism that the Taliban have come to stand for.
New Delhi should work out an arrangement with the Rajapakse government wherein the rights of both the countries’ fishermen are protected within the respective territorial jurisdiction. If this is not done, the welfare of the Sri Lankan Tamils, which different governments of India have endeavoured to promote as part of a decided long-term policy, will be compromised.
Sharif’s does not have any manoeuvring space to cut any comprehensive deal with the Taliban. He may not be averse to conceding their demand to shariatise Pakistani structures, yet he can’t do so unless he has the nod from the Army. On its part the Army does not want to decimate the Radical Islamists because it still sees in them a force multiplier and important strategic asset.
While Nawaz Sharif was careful not to publicly bring up the Kashmir issue, it does not necessarily portend any change in policy. It remains to be seen whether Sharif will be able to cash in on the conciliatory gesture of Prime Minister Modi and assert his own priority of improving relations with India vis-a-vis the hostile elements within his country.
India has unprecedented opportunity to follow a foreign policy to meet its developmental aspirations and security needs, both of which are complementary. Sustained economic growth is essential for India to follow a proactive foreign policy.
