US War on Terror and Indian Security Interests
The most dangerous aspect of the war on terror from India’s security point of view has been the CIA’s monetary assistance to the ISI.
- Anand Kumar
- December 11, 2009
Two projects that are currently under progress are ‘Developments in Pakistan’ and ‘Pakistan Occupied Kashmir’. In addition, individual scholars are engaged in researching various security related aspects pertaining to South Asian countries. The Centre has established bilateral institutional relations with leading think tanks in the region and proposes to undertake joint studies.
No posts of Books and Monograph.
No posts of Jounral.
The most dangerous aspect of the war on terror from India’s security point of view has been the CIA’s monetary assistance to the ISI.
It is true that any negotiation with the outfit in the absence of Paresh Barua is going to meet only with partial success, but if the government manages to mainstream Arabinda Rajkhowa, the support base of ULFA would further erode.
Ideally, ISAF and NATO should concentrate on urban population centres along with the ANA, and the ANA should also deploy outside the towns and cities to dominate the hinterland and crack down on Taliban controlled areas.
The United States is facing serious economic problems, and Obama seems to have drawn the lesson that national security is not just about military strength but that it is equally about the economy, partnerships and diplomacy.
The current change in the Chair of the NCA merely indicates the declining power of President Zardari and does not necessarily mean empowerment of the civilian government.
Not only will Pakistan have to take on all sorts of Pakistani Taliban, it will also have to end the network of jihadists in provinces like Punjab and Sindh if it really wants to get rid of the Islamist menace.
A disturbing aspect of the current phase of Islamist militancy in Pakistan is that the terrorist acts outside FATA and NWFP are not being staged by ethnic Pashtun elements but by local Punjabi cohorts.
The coming to power of Sheikh Hasina and General Moeen’s determined efforts to transform the army into a fully professional force have weakened elements that support terrorism in Bangladesh.
The verdict will have a balming effect on all those who not only lost their families but also on those who felt betrayed by the subsequent turn of events in Bangladesh.
New Delhi and Dhaka may have reached a tacit understanding that Northeast rebels based in Bangladesh will be simply picked up and handed over to India.
The issue of water allocation and water rights of Bangladesh, India and China could form the basis of a framework on which joint cooperation among the three countries can be formulated.
Post an American exit, China is likely to increase its investments in Afghanistan, provide employment to hundreds of unskilled Afghan workers, and assume the role of regional stabiliser.
The US may have satiated its desire for vengeance but risks losing sight of its objectives due to liberal atavism, inconstancy, pusillanimity and operational ineptitude.
Water may not become a catalyst for a direct conflict, but China could leverage Tibet’s water as a politico-military tool vis-à-vis other riparian states. As the economies of India and China grow, both are bound to treat water as a strategic commodity.
America’s new strategy in Afghanistan needs to be based on the concept of `connect–hold–build’, where the ground troops surely and silently `connect’ with the local population.
Stability in Afghanistan is vital and the stakes for India are high, but the time is over for sitting on the fence. India requires a larger strategic vision, not a blueprint for town and country planning.
The year 2009 has seen more sectarian killings in Gilgit-Baltistan than the previous two years put together. Although sniper shooting has remained the primary method of sectarian killings, owing to Taliban influences bomb blasts are also becoming common.
The August 2009 bilateral pact will fortify the security of the Maldives as well as cater to Indian security concerns on the terrorism and geopolitical fronts.
While Pakistan could still try and develop a taste for grass by rejecting US assistance, there is no way it can economically sustain the fight against the Islamist insurgency without external assistance.
Indian insurgent groups are re-establishing camps in Bhutan and are also forging links with Bhutanese rebel groups.