The Centre also undertakes various projects entrusted by the Ministry of Home Affairs and the National Security Council Secretariat on matters internal security. The Centre has a mix of civilian scholars and officers deputed from the armed forces and central armed police forces.
The Centre has a bilateral agreement to collaborate with the Border Security Forces’ Institute for Border Management and Strategic Studies.
No posts of Books and Monograph.
No posts of Jounral.
The coexistence of contending realities in Kashmir is a natural corollary of the transition from conflict to peace. A successful transition to peace is not only a test of Indian secularism, but also of Indian democracy.
If India is indeed interested in being a ‘rule-maker’ in a multilateral world, alternative approaches to persisting problems is the basic component of it.
The Report lends itself to all kinds of interpretations, does not attempt to correlate responses to questions in the same section, and certainly does not provide the ‘paths to peace’.
A survey of media reports in newspapers based in Jammu and Kashmir for 2010 reveals that although violence levels are down there are multiple levels at which militancy affects the state.
An absence of legal statutes in the insurgency affected areas would adversely affect the utility and efficacy of the security capacity of the state.
There are no shortcuts to overcoming the grave Naxal threat to our democratic way of life. Broadening the mandate by handing over the problem to the army is neither fair nor efficacious.
The Grid-Guard-Govern strategy would do away with the sequential application of socio-economic solutions by undertaking security-led governance cum development action.
Only social cohesion and determination by local communities to bring about peace can realistically tide over vested political interests and narrow destructive narratives that seem to be informing the present crisis between Manipur and Nagaland.
Since safeguarding the public space such as mass transportation networks, financial and industrial hubs from sporadic acts of terror is increasingly becoming difficult, socialising citizenry in democratic societies to the needs of counterterrorism assumes salience.
Unlike ‘hard’ measures, ‘soft’ ones can succeed in softening the hearts and minds of even hard-core terrorists, especially when they are disillusioned, longing for a normal life, and want to exit from terrorism.
Air presence is a critical factor in counterinsurgency operations as it provides a high level of dominance and control over the situation.
There is a need to modify existing laws and if need be create new ones so that extremists and terrorists do not go scot-free and continue to pose a threat to the country.
Nagas and Meiteis need to practice reciprocal restraint, generate new inclusive political narratives that focus on common values and ties, and establish a reconciliation forum to promote harmony.
The hard lesson of Chintalnar is that the police are simply not investing enough in their frontline leadership and training to tackle the situation. Even when attempts have been made to bring in competence, the efforts to acquire required counterinsurgency skills have been marginal.
Whereas employing Armed Forces may appear to be an attractive idea to control the naxal menace, the adverse effects of their long term commitment, particularly of the Army, need to be understood.
The Maoists have formed a State Committee comprising six members to spearhead the movement in Delhi, and it has been in operation at least for the past four to five years.
The sate and the people should be prepared for a few more Dantewada-like ‘shocks’ before the tables are eventually turned on the Maoists.
If naxal activities have to be stopped, the government must act firmly even if they have to be neutralized by the selective use of the armed forces including the Indian Air Force.
The North East of India has been plagued by insurgencies since independence in 1947. Most violent amongst the armed movements had been the Naga National Council in the 1950s and today the NSCN (IM).
The Naxal challenge is a wake up call to rejig our internal security instruments and restore their organizational ethos, autonomy and operational credibility.
