Internal Security

About Centre

The Centre focuses on issues that challenge India’s internal security. Secessionist movements based on ethnic identities in the Northeast and Jammu & Kashmir have been contesting the Indian state through violent means for decades. The Left Wing Extremism movement based on Marxist-Leninist ideology is engaged in a struggle to overthrow the democratic structure of the Indian state. Intermittent terrorist attacks perpetrated by foreign and home grown terrorist groups have been disrupting peace and political order in the country. Infiltration, illegal migration, and trafficking of arms and narcotics are not only breaching the country’s international borders but are also aggravating its security situation. The research efforts of the Centre are focused on analysing the trends, patterns, causes, and implications of these threats and challenges, and suggesting policy alternatives. The Centre’s research agenda includes: left wing extremism, insurgencies in the Northeast India, cross border terrorism and militancy in Jammu and Kashmir, global and national trends in terrorism, management of India’s international borders and security of its coasts.

The Centre also undertakes various projects entrusted by the Ministry of Home Affairs and the National Security Council Secretariat on matters internal security. The Centre has a mix of civilian scholars and officers deputed from the armed forces and central armed police forces.

The Centre has a bilateral agreement to collaborate with the Border Security Forces’ Institute for Border Management and Strategic Studies.

Members:

No posts of Books and Monograph.

No posts of Jounral.

Unholy alliance in North-East India

Although insurgency in several areas of the North-East region of India has declined, external manipulation and support to insurgency in Assam, the most populous State in the region, continues to be a problem.

Three States in the region, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram and Sikkim, are mostly unaffected by insurgency, while there has been substantial decline in insurgency in Tripura and Meghalaya. Thus, insurgencies in the region are largely confined to Assam, Manipur and Nagaland.

Partisanship can hurt India’s Internal Security Management

It is perhaps a truism that issues concerning India’s internal security like terrorism, Naxalism and insurgencies in the North East require a dynamic multi-pronged approach spread across states to manage and resolve them. Such a management and resolution package would possibly require crafting a national strategy capable of bypassing local political divisions and enabling India’s multiple political parties to work towards a consensus on issues concerning the nation.

National Investigation Agency: A Good Start but not a Panacea

On January 1, 2009 the National Investigative Agency Bill became a law. It provides for setting up a special agency at the national level “to investigate and prosecute offences affecting the sovereignty, security and integrity of India, security of State, friendly relations with foreign States and offences under Acts enacted to implement international treaties, agreements, conventions and resolutions of the United Nations, its agencies and other international organisations and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto”.

Changing Face of Bodo Insurgency

Intense internal rivalry among Bodo insurgents has proved to be the biggest hurdle to peace in Bodo-dominated areas of Assam. Internal differences within the National Democratic Front of Boroland (NDFB), the only surviving Bodo insurgent group, have further widened, following the expulsion of its founder-president, Ranjan Daimary, alias D.R. Nabla. Prospects for yet another round of fratricidal clashes are imminent, thus posing a significant threat to the peace process.

Lessons from the 9/11 Commission

The unprecedented scale of the terror attacks in Mumbai and the fact that citizens from more than 20-plus countries were killed or injured in the attacks have evoked an international response. This response has been a mixture of sympathy and concern along with muted criticism of what is perceived to be the ham-handed handling of the crisis as well as the inability to take preventive measures. It was reiterated by the visiting US Secretary of State that the Mumbai attacks could have been prevented and cited the example of the United States successfully preventing all attacks after 9/11.

The Pakistan Link to the Mumbai Terror Attacks

Investigations into the attacks in Mumbai and subsequent developments point to the role of the Pakistan based Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) as the key player that orchestrated the well coordinated attacks. The lone arrested terrorist is a Pakistani national and he has provided minute details of the events leading up to the attacks. Indian claims about elements within Pakistan being responsible for the attack have also been endorsed by the United States.

Mumbai Attacks: A Deadly “Performance”

For 62 hours, from the night of November 26 to the morning of November 29, the city of Mumbai was held hostage to terror attacks. A significant element in these attacks was the willingness of the terrorists to engage security forces in a frontal gun battle. Earlier attacks have generally involved simultaneous bomb blasts in crowded market places, hospitals and office complexes. The intensity and meticulous planning that went into the attacks are of an unprecedented nature.

Fishing in Troubled Waters

Investigations into the Mumbai attacks have revealed that the terrorists came in from the sea. It has been reported that in the course of their journey from Karachi they had hijacked an Indian trawler named Kuber with a Porbandar registration in the high seas off the Coast of Gujarat. The trawler, fitted with the latest communication and navigation equipment including a Global Positioning system (GPS), Very High Radio Frequency (VHF) sets, etc., was found abandoned nearly four nautical miles off Cuffe Parade in south Mumbai.

The Need to Refine India’s Response to Terrorist Incidents

The November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai which left more than 170 people killed and close to 300 injured did not conform to the pattern to which Indian security agencies have got accustomed to over a period of time. Except for the suicide attack on the CRPF Group Centre, Rampur (UP) at the beginning of 2008, terrorists had generally resorted to detonating improvised explosive devices in crowded places to cause maximum casualties.

The October 30 Terrorist Attacks in Assam

The year 2008 has seen terrorist attacks in Jaipur, Bangalore, Ahmedabad, New Delhi, Agartala, Imphal, and now Assam. The month of October alone witnessed terrorist attacks in Tripura and Manipur, before the October 30 serial bomb blasts in Assam. On October 1, four explosions in Agartala left two civilians dead and nearly 100 injured, while the blasts in Imphal on October 21 killed 18 civilians. The 9 serial blasts in Assam on October 30 killed 83 civilians and injured more than 300.

Resolving the Bodo Militancy

Bodo militancy can be effectively resolved by accommodating the only surviving Bodo militant outfit within the existing self-governing territorial council that came into existence in 2003. In the mid-1980s, the Bodos of Assam under its influential student body, the All Bodo Students’ Union (ABSU), which began a vigorous mass movement demanding a separate Bodoland state on the North of the Brahmaputra. The movement lasted for about a decade and resulted in the establishment of a territorially defined self governing council known as Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC) in 1993.

Averting Terror Attacks

On September 13, five serial bombs shattered the weekend peace across several popular market complexes in New Delhi, killing 30 innocent civilians and injuring nearly 90. An elusive outfit calling itself “Indian Mujahideen” (IM) claimed responsibility for the bombings via an email sent to national media houses 10 minutes after the first blast at Karol Bagh.

Kashmir and the Idea of India

Recent developments in the State of Jammu and Kashmir have been a source of alarm on a variety of counts. Since the decline of militancy in the Valley in recent years, disaffection was known to have existed, but the extent of it was perhaps underestimated. A related factor of concern is that the uprising in the Valley was not Pakistan-sponsored, and yet generated pro-Pakistan sentiments. The vitiated relationship between Jammu and the Valley that could trigger such immense disruption of normal life was also unanticipated.