The Centre also undertakes various projects entrusted by the Ministry of Home Affairs and the National Security Council Secretariat on matters internal security. The Centre has a mix of civilian scholars and officers deputed from the armed forces and central armed police forces.
The Centre has a bilateral agreement to collaborate with the Border Security Forces’ Institute for Border Management and Strategic Studies.
Maritime security has increasingly been studied from the standpoint of the complexities of the ocean—where the ‘game’ has been played since ancient days. In recent years, however, the concept has undergone a sea change.
The Volume provides an insight into certain select documents that have shaped North East India in a variety of ways, the perusal of which would aid scholarship that is appropriately beginning to study the enchanted frontiers. The book would be useful to research scholars, policy makers and readers having an interest in the region.
The growing interest of nations in the ocean-realm has become discernable in recent years, leading to an increased significance of maritime security. This is particularly relevant to India, whose vital stakes are expanding beyond its terrestrial confines. How has this increased the responsibility of Indian maritime forces? Can we expect these forces to satiate national-security interests beyond maritime affairs? What approach and capabilities are needed for this? As an attempt to answer these questions, this book is intended for a 'wide-spectrum' readership; ranging from a layman but a keen observer of national/ global events that affect him, and who seeks an association with India's growing eminence; to the academics and Indian policy makers.
This book is an attempt to suggest a way towards peace and development in the North East. The authors, mostly belonging to the region, have provided valuable insights on the issues of insurgency, development and security and have also suggested concrete measures to tackle the myriad problems afflicting the region.
Publishers: IDSA and Shipra
ISBN: 81-7541-187-2
Rs 350
US $ 35
Publishers: IDSA and Sage
ISBN: 0-7619-9785-7
Rs 380
Publisher: IDSA and Knowledge World
ISBN: 81-86019-22-7
The article is an attempt to study the history of the Tedim Road, a 265 km transborder road connecting Imphal (the capital of Manipur in India) with Tedim in the Chin Hills (Chin State) in western Burma (Myanmar). It was constructed by the British solely for the purpose of facilitating military movements along the India–Burma frontier during the Second World War.
The objective of this article is to critically analyse the discourse within the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) or known as UCPN (Maoist) since its evolution and find out whether the Maoists have adapted themselves to the democratic process well by using democracy as a tool to achieve their own revolutionary political objectives. The article argues that the internal Maoist discourse reflects that there is no change in the UCPN (Maoist) strategy or political goals. They have only changed their tactics to suit the situation.
Naxals of the Communist Party of India (CPI) (Maoist), better known as Maoists, characterised more than once by the Indian prime minister as the gravest threat to our internal security, have been continuously fine-tuning their strategies and tactics in order to maintain their relevance. On the other hand, the state too has been making concerted efforts by taking ‘security and development’ measures to diminish, if not altogether defeat, the challenge posed by the rebels to the Indian state.
This article looks at the status quo of Indian counterterrorism policy—which largely favours ‘physical’ or ‘hard’ measures—and proposes that the government adopt a more holistic strategy. Termed ‘Countering Violent Extremism’, this would involve measures geared towards long-term prevention, with greater attention paid to the reasons for which people commit terrorism and to the impact of counterterrorism on communities.
In one of the most well-written and extensively researched books on the subject, Anuradha Chenoy and Kamal Mitra Chenoy attempt to holistically examine the state of armed conflicts in India. In their own words, the book has the modest aim of understanding the roots, the nature and the impact of the armed conflicts in India. However, the title gives the reader the erroneous impression that the Maoist conflict will be the central theme while other conflicts will be peripheral.
The granting of scheduled tribe status to the Kuki-Chin people eroded their allegiance to clan and linguistic/dialectal identities. While they do not have any problem with a pan-ethnic identity, their primary loyalty is to their own clans and communities. Invocation of kinship ties by different groups does not necessarily translate into a common political agenda. There are at least 15 armed groups among them that have combined into two larger groups—the United People's Front (UPF) and the Kuki National Organisation (KNO)—and signed a peace agreement with the state and central governments.
Most nation-states in Asia and Africa that gained independence from colonial rulers during the middle of the 20th century are diverse in their ethnic composition. The national governments make efforts to politically integrate their constituent units in the face of the continuing resistance of several ethnic groups. India adopted various means to integrate the more than 600 princely states and other loosely administered areas.
India has been grappling with the problem of devising an efficient border management strategy that would prevent the entry of dangerous elements while at the same time allowing the legitimate flow of goods, services and people. Given that it has always been vulnerable to cross-border threats and challenges such as illegal migration, drug and human trafficking, gunrunning, smuggling of commodities and cross-border terrorism, India has taken a largely unilateral approach towards border management whereby security of the borders is accorded primacy over the free movement of people and goods.
The Chinese territorial claim on the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh has negatively affected India–China relations for many decades now. In recent years, China has become visibly aggressive with regard to its territorial claim by denying visas to Indians from Arunachal Pradesh travelling to China, claiming that they are Chinese citizens and hence do not require visas. China also tried to block ADB aid sought by India for the state.
The Andaman and Nicobar islands are of immense strategic significance for India. The geographical configuration and the location of the island chain in the Bay of Bengal safeguards India's eastern seaboard as well the approaches to the Indian Ocean from the east. Its proximity to the Southeast Asian region enables India to forge friendly relations with its Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) neighbours. The physical isolation and remoteness of the archipelago, however, make it vulnerable to conventional and non-conventional threats.
There is an overwhelming sense of déjà vu in Kashmir today. This could have been deemed tiresome but for the grave implications it has for us as a nation, and as a people. We are now used to long cycles of violence interspersed by political ennui or tokenism and the ubiquitous ‘economic package’ which only serves to open up newer avenues for corruption in a state orphaned by history and politics for over six decades.
Insurgencies as well as popular unrests are generally rooted in political, social and economic deprivations, which in turn lead to the alienation and estrangement of a community. A popular sentiment seeking the empowerment of Muslim Kashmiris has been in existence for the past five centuries. History is replete with instances of the political deprivation and poverty of Kashmiri people during periods of their subjugation by the Mughals, the Pathans, the Sikhs and later the Dogras. Kashmiri alienation took firm roots during the Dogra rule (1846–1947).
The demand for autonomy in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) followed by heated discourses on the subject has been appearing and fading intermittently. The demand as well as discourses, articulated by particular parties in the state, receives equal responses from political parties and analysts at the national level. In fact, the subject has acquired sharp political overtones over a period of time.
The spate of rioting which plagued Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) from June 2010 is testimony to the mismanagement of developments by both the state and central governments. This is all the more unfortunate as near normalcy had been established in Jammu and Kashmir following the November 2008 elections and the downtrend in insurgency through 2009 and early 2010.
Terrorism in the Indian hinterland is the result of a complex set of inter-related factors. The development of a jihad culture in Pakistan during the course of the Afghan conflict in the 1980s led to the subsequent Pakistani decision to employ jihad against India as a strategy. The mobilisation of the Hindu Right in India and ensuing communal violence led to the radicalisation of Muslim youth and the resort to terrorism by both Indian Islamists and Muslim criminal networks with help from Pakistan.
There is a view that India's approach to national security is largely ad hoc and marked by incompetence. Indians as well as foreign commentators on the country's security policies seem to share this perception. However, India does have a security approach that has a discernible pattern and arguably has been a success. This comment focuses on how India has dealt with internal security since independence.
Left Wing Extremism (LWE) presents a serious internal security challenge to India that needs careful and coordinated policy response from both the security front and the development front. For the CPI (Maoists) (Communist Party of India), the main outfit propagating LWE, the plan and execution of this style of people's war against the state is like the Churchillian ‘a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma’. At one level, the LWE can be described as a ‘Democratic revolution through tactical offensive with tactical speed in the protracted people's war of strategic defensive’.
Why are the two largest democracies – India and the United States – starkly different when it comes to tackling terrorism? The answer to this perplexing question could lie in the two countries' divergent approach to security and management of national security resources. Equally relevant is the variance in their political resoluteness in exercising suitable responses to emergent threats.
Linked to the terrorist goal of intimidation of a targeted population, there is an inherent objective to spread fear and undermine the declared values of the targeted political system by pushing a frightened society and government into overreaction. On the other hand, the counter-insurgent state wishes to downplay the impact of the terrorist attack and works towards keeping the morale of the population as well as the security forces intact. In this battle, the media plays an important and influential role.
The Union Government took notice of the current phase of the Naxalite challenge with concern, for the first time, in 1998. Since then, it has been playing a coordinating role among the various affected states to address the challenge. It has also been advising the affected states on ways to deal with the challenge. By 2003, the Union Government had put in place a two-pronged approach to address the Maoist challenge - that of a development response and a security response. However, all along, the Union Government's response has largely been security-centric.
Jammu and Kashmir needs a robust early warning system to mitigate the impact of natural disasters.
Militancy in Jammu and Kashmir has continued to remain communal, even as ‘secular’ justifications for acts of terror are being professed in the information domain.
The recent neutralisation of hardcore Maoists, including one of its top leaders, in Gadchiroli District serves as a major setback for CPI (Maoist)’s expansion in the Maharashtra–Madhya Pradesh–Chhattisgarh tri-junction region. A judicious mix of security and developmental interventions would go a long way in tackling Maoist threat.
The notification regarding modification of area of jurisdiction of the BSF focuses on prevention of illegal migration and cross-border crimes. It is important that the BSF trains its personnel about various Acts and sections of the CrPC and work towards better coordination with the other agencies.
The inter-state border disputes in the Northeast have persisted for long. Efforts need to be redoubled to find a political solution, mediated by the Union government, which is binding on all the states concerned in the Northeast.
Taking positive measures to address the core issues of misgovernance and corruption and ensuring fair and rightful distribution of resources will help in the revival of the political process in Jammu and Kashmir.
With reduced levels of violent incidents and overall death tolls, the security situation in the Northeast has indubitably improved. However, there remain areas of concern that need to be addressed in a timely and suitable manner.
Although initially the Maoists suffered some setbacks due to the lockdown, their indulgence in violent incidents over the past one month indicates that they are exploiting the situation to have an upper hand vis-à-vis security forces.
While the third Bodo accord is a momentous development in the history of the Bodo conflict, caution must be exercised to ensure that it does not fall victim to the factional politics that undermined previous accords.
CAA is a humanitarian gesture. Efforts of the government to allay apprehensions regarding CAA by countering misinformation is a welcome step. A better understanding and appreciation of CAA by the people is expected to reduce opposition to the Act.
The ISIS may be down but not out as it is in the process of regrouping. A large number of their cadres are known to have survived. Any relaxation of pressure will give ISIS room for manoeuvre and ability to garner support of local allies.
If Baghdadi has possibly moved toward the east, then the proclamation of an Indian branch flashes a note of caution for the security and intelligence agencies.
Are the Maoists focusing more on IED-based blasts and in the process minimizing their own casualties instead of attempting to win a war of attrition by inflicting tactical and psychological blows to the security forces?
The Sri Lanka Easter bombings has allowed ISIS chief Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi to launch a public relations offensive and enunciate a dangerous new strategy.
It is neither the Wuhan spirit nor India’s zero tolerance on terrorism but China’s own vulnerability to terror that caused Beijing to ultimately take on board New Delhi’s concerns on terrorism.
What pales the counter-terrorism regime is not that its procedures are cumbersome or that its working is not transparent, but that it only selectively raises the cost for those who inflict terror.
To force all Rohingyas to return on the grounds of “threat to security” is against India’s humanitarian heritage. The government and its agencies are capable of sifting out Rohingya elements who might actually have links to terror organisations from the rest of the group.
The best way forward for India is to initiate talks with Bangladesh and seek a mutually acceptable political solution for the issue of illegal immigrants.
While the intended targets of the Maoists are security forces personnel, often civilians and animals become casualties in blasts triggered by pressure mines.
The declaration of the Disturbed Area provision is fundamentally at odds with the mutually accommodative integration endeavour of the Nagas with the Indian Union as envisioned in the 2015 framework agreement.
