Vishal Chandra

There is no cause for dismay over a growing sense of marginalisation of India in regional and international forums on the Afghan issue. Similarly, the resurgence of the Taliban and increasing Pakistani influence in Afghanistan should be seen as a temporary phenomenon. Sushant Sareen is right in arguing that the ‘turn of events’ in the ‘not so distant future’ could open up possibilities of India playing a larger role in Afghanistan.

• Published: January 2011
• Strategic Analysis

The Afghan war has a long way to go. The situation has come to a point where with every passing month one wonders where the war is headed. There can be no doubt that it will be long before Afghanistan will be at peace with itself. At this moment, there does not seem to be any solution to the Afghan crisis. The Taliban and their allies, both Afghan and foreign, have notably succeeded in transforming the war to their advantage.

• Published: January 2011
• Strategic Analysis

A new actor was inducted in the decades-old Afghan conflict when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assumed command of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in August 2003. NATO's entry into the Afghan theatre took place in the backdrop of the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003. With the United States diverting its resources and greater attention to Iraq, NATO was to expand its operations throughout Afghanistan in support of the US-led coalition force in a phased manner.

• Published: September 2009
• Strategic Analysis

The Jabhe-e-Melli or the National Front (NF) is largely considered inconsequential in Afghan politics. It is often dismissed as a loose mlange of elements from the former United Front or the Northern Alliance, some ex-communists, and former royalists, which is bound to wither away sooner than later. The Front is said to represent the interests of a political class which is disgruntled with the politics and the policies of President Hamid Karzai, and which is struggling to preserve its erstwhile status and relevance in the power politics of Afghanistan.

• Published: July 2009
• Strategic Analysis

The paper attempts to examine diverse challenges to the making of the new Afghan National Army (ANA), and its future prospects. The issue assumes significance as the Taliban shift battle lines outside the Pashtun areas and there is growing difference among Western countries regarding the means and approaches to be used to stabilize Afghanistan. The paper is broadly divided into four sections. The first section seeks to identify and critically examine the role played by key institutional structures responsible for the training and mentoring of the new national army.

• Published: January 2009
• Strategic Analysis

• Published: November 2008
• Strategic Analysis

• Published: September 2008
• Strategic Analysis

The July 7 attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul which left 58 people dead including four Indians and more than 140 wounded was a highly provocative act. Those responsible for the attack are well known, and their objectives are also not a matter of speculation. It is understood that the Indian government should be taking far more stringent security measures to minimise the recurrence of such attacks on its embassy, consulates, and reconstruction projects in Afghanistan.

• Published: July 18, 2008
• IDSA Comments

Kabul has for long been wary of Pakistan’s idea of negotiating ‘peace’ deals with Taliban militants operating out of its north-western tribal areas. Pakistan’s earlier peace deals in 2004 and in 2006 were short-lived and had helped the Taliban emerge stronger. Moreover, the 2006 North Waziristan Pact had led to a notable surge in Taliban attacks west of the Durand Line.

• Published: June 30, 2008
• IDSA Comments

The Taliban are proving to be increasingly irrepressible. They seem to be adapting, faster than expected, to the challenges confronting them. Although in terms of weaponry they cannot match the vastly superior Western forces, in terms of propaganda, psyops and operational reach they are proving to be a force to reckon with. In retrospect one can say that the Taliban made good use of the time made available to them by the United States when it shifted its focus towards Iraq in late 2002.

• Published: January 2008
• Strategic Analysis