Turbulence in West Asian State Systems: Road Blocks in the Quest for Participatory Governance

I thank the IDSA and Ambassador Jayant Prasad for inviting me today. Over the years, these annual conferences of
the Institute have shed useful light on questions of regional and global security.

The list of participants includes a good many experts who would speak authoritatively on various aspects of the
theme of the conference and put forth different perspectives. I would therefore confine myself to a backdrop
that might help understand better the context and the challenges emanating from it.

Periods of turmoil, and unexplained happenings, are often depicted as a spectre, an impending danger. Such a
spectre today seems to haunt all who look at the region of western Asia and northern Africa. The apprehensions
emanate from a dangerous mix of realpolitik and professed ideology that challenges the status quo in the
region, and has become a threat to regional and world peace.

Two years back the world observed the centenary of the First World War. It was described by a historian as
‘the first calamity of the twentieth century, the calamity from which all other calamities sprang.’ One
dimension of it was the Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 1916 that, together with the San Rimo arrangement of April
1919, brought into existence most of the modern state system in West Asia. In 1945 it acquired its own
sub-regional system in the shape of the Arab League.

It is this edifice, of post-World War I states and of newly-induced nationalisms that now seems to be unraveling.

Annalists of the future would record the years 1948, 1967, 2003 and 2010-11 as turning points in the modern
history of West Asian lands. The first inducted Israel into the region, the second and its aftermath put an end
to political Arabism, the third marked the destruction of Iraq and its resulting immediate and remote
consequences, and the fourth signaled the commencement of the so-called Arab Spring or Arab Turbulence
that shook the authoritarian order.

The new states in the region (with the exception of Egypt) lacked historical legitimacy and needed to create a
national sentiment to reinforce the existing tribal, often fragmented, ties of cohesion within their territorial
jurisdiction. This local patriotism was sought to be combined with amorphous and romantic sentiments of
pan-Arabism some of which were reflected in the 1945 Charter of the Arab League. Neither could develop an
ideological underpinning that would bring forth widespread public commitment except as a formality. This was
furthered by the fragility of the institutions of the new states; these were patriarchal, authoritarian and
hegemonic and evoked fear of the State rather than a commitment to its objectives and ideals.

Thus the domestic impulses for social cohesion were insufficiently anchored, did not accommodate diversity in
sufficient measure, and were susceptible to external pressure. This found its reflection in all aspects of
governance which remained essentially non-participatory.

The socio-economic backdrop too was not conducive to stability and social peace. Some years earlier, three
successive UNDP Arab Human Development Reports highlighted the shortcomings of knowledge, freedom and gender.
The Davos Economic Forum reports on Arab Competiveness put the focus on the implications of population growth
and youth unemployment and on the need for education and skill development to bring about a shift away from
total dependence on a rentier economy. Pervasive rural poverty aggravated the situation.

As a consequence of the erosion of the legitimacy of the broadly secular nation-state, and the ideological vacuum
created by it, various versions of Islamist solutions were presented as indigenous, more authentic, and viable
alternatives. Nor was this an altogether novel recipe since religion or religious symbolism as a motivating
force have been used in many societies for different purposes throughout history. Sociologists have dwelt on it
at some length and, making a distinction between different kinds of politics and different senses of religion,
have sought to develop a typology to classify these into politically relevant religious action, religiously
conditioned political action, religiously relevant political action and politically conditioned religious
action.1

Apart from the use and misuse of this instrumentality currently underway by many extremist groups, a few examples
from the recent past can be cited. In the wake of the Egyptian defeat in the 1967 war, a perception took root
that ‘the Arabs had turned away from God and God has turned away from them’ and this induced the Government of
Egypt to distribute in the armed forces booklets explaining the meaning of Jihad. A similar step was taken by
Iraq after its defeat in the 1991 Kuwait war and was visibly reflected in the new Iraqi flag. This trend was
reinforced in subsequent years preceding the 2003 US-led invasion. In both instances, the purpose was
empowerment. In both, subsequent developments were to show the longer term consequences; credible reports
indicate that the fighting and command component of the recently formed DAISH or the Islamic State has within
its ranks many officers of the pre-2003 Iraqi army.

Away from the Arab world, the most telling example of religious motivation for a political purpose was the
resistance movement crafted to resist the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The United States, several
Arab states led by Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan implemented this successfully and in the process gave birth, first
to Afghan Mujahideen, and subsequently to Al-Qaeda.2

These external happenings of the past left their mark on Arab societies. The process varied from country to
country in response to a multiplicity of impulses; a common thread was the sense of distress and a quest for a
psychological refuge. Thus came about a re-Islamisation of Arab societies at the grass root level that provided,
or sought to provide, solace and an ideological underpinning. A good deal has been written about this process in
different Muslim societies; it has ranged from anti-imperialist sentiments and socioeconomic concerns to a
re-emphasis on family values and cultural authenticity and has covered a broad spectrum ranging from traditional
segments to the youth, professional classes and the academia.3 The new channels of communication through the internet and social media
furthered the momentum. The latter also had its limitations and was not uniformly productive; one scholar has
called it ‘cyber-utopianism.’4

II

Despite this backdrop of an emergent social reality, the Arab Turbulence of 2010-2011 was quintessentially a
non-religious, secular, phenomenon that took the shape of a leaderless mass movement seeking dignity,
empowerment, political citizenship, social justice and taking back the State and its institutions from rulers
and their cronies. Its slogans, interestingly enough, did not resort to calls for Arab unity or advocate Islam
as the solution. Its most dramatic impact was the abandonment of the fear of the security apparatus of the
state. At the same time, it was not united or harmonious and soon gave way to sectional interests. Uncontrolled
rage did not help matters. Prospects of chaos were exploited by the counter-revolutionary forces to prevail and
impose even greater control.5

Why did this happen?

In a famous passage in his monumental History of the Russian Revolution, Leon Trotsky had observed that
‘the masses go into a revolution not with a prepared plan of social reconstruction, but with a sharp feeling
that they cannot endure the old regime.’ The political process thus unleashed, he added, results in a ‘guiding
organization’ without which the energy of the masses dissipates.6

Record shows that in the case of the countries affected by the Arab Turbulence, the emergence of such a guiding
organization happened belatedly and inadequately. There was no consensus on the political and economic model to
be put in place. It was ‘a tale of three battles rolled into one: people against regimes; people against people;
regimes against other regimes.7 The objectives of the protesting masses ranged from modest reforms and
constitutional monarchy (as in Morocco and Jordan and in a short-lived, muted, manner in Saudi Arabia) to
overthrow of the head of state (Tunisia, Egypt and Libya) to a state order based on Islamic principles (Egypt
under Morsi). The call for social justice did not, however, bring forth an implementable program of action.
While left-leaning groups and unions wanted higher wages and a reversal of privatization, others sought more
liberal policies. One observer noted that ‘the political scene in the Arab Awakening is dominated by the
sociopolitical forces of the middle classes looking for a new socio-political system, one that is more just and
free’ but added that ‘there was no dominant political or organizational force.’8

It is relevant to recall that the Turbulence was not as a single event, but a catalyst for long-term change whose
final outcome is yet to be seen. ‘The main legacy of the Arab Spring is in smashing the myth of Arabs’ political
passivity and the perceived invincibility of arrogant ruling elites. Even in countries that avoided mass unrest,
the governments took the quiescence of the people at their own peril.’9

Panic characterised the initial reaction of the traditional Arab establishments whose primary objective was to
maintain the status quo. Domestically and across the GCC, ‘an authoritarian retrenchment and narrowing of
political space’ emerged.10 Some of the GCC states took steps focused on (a) containment of the
revolts in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, (b) bring about a counter-revolution in Yemen and Bahrain, (c) support the
revolution in Syria.11 The French scholar
Jean-Pierre Filiu has ascribed these to the work of the ‘Deep State’ conducting a ‘systematic war of the Arab
regimes against their people.’12

III

Some questions arise. What were the principal characteristics of authoritarian systems that were challenged by
the two years of Arab Turbulence? What were its immediate and longer term consequences? Did it have a visible
impact on patterns of governance? What are its regional and global implications?

According to most observers, the authoritarian order in West Asia and North Africa was and is characterised by
lack of transparency, information scarcity, nepotism, political subservience, absence of a sense of equal
citizenship, ambiguous accountability, political irresponsibility, and absence of rule of law. The effort in
many cases to seek legitimacy through ritualistic references to religious injunctions about rule through mutual
consultations and requirement of obedience to ‘those charged with authority among you’13 did nothing
to alter this harsh ground reality.

Those who protested against it sought the opposite of these attributes. The response pattern, with local
variations, lent credence to Machiavelli’s dictum that ‘men forget more easily the death of their fathers than
the loss of patrimony.’ Voluntary abdication from seat of absolute power is a rarity in human affairs and did
not happen in West Asian lands.

Three consequences emanated from this; they persist to this day. One was initial gestures of financial largesse
to their public along with an immediate resort to ‘increasingly harsh measures to restrict the freedoms of their
citizens to express themselves and meaningfully to participate politically and hold power accountable.’14 Another was a decision in some of the GCC states to give generous
financial packages to the countries affected by the Turbulence. A third was to intensify their military
involvement in the internal conflicts in Bahrain, Yemen, Syria and Libya. Details of these are in the public
domain.

The continuing intensity of domestic controls has been commented upon by an observer: ‘Counter-revolutionary
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain have rejected every pro-democracy demand raised in January 2011 and have
implemented new decrees to ban popular demonstrations intended to celebrate the fifth anniversary of the
uprisings.’15

A good part of the debate on Arab Turbulence, and official pronouncements from different quarters, has focused on
alleged mischief emanating from the sectarian, Sunni-Shia, conflict. Its political origins in recent years can
be traced to the geopolitical consequences of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and to the reported 2004
pronouncement of the Jordanian monarch.16 Some of the GCC states have been its proponents in recent years. According
to one scholar, sectarianism became a pre-emptive counter-revolutionary strategy.17 This, however, clouds rather than illuminates the complex realities of
regional politics. A more realistic perspective on this was provided by the Amir of Qatar who, in his UN General
Assembly speech on September 28, 2015, described the existing confrontation as ‘political regional Arab-Iranian
difference rather than being a Sunni-Shiite dispute.’

The Turbulence in Arab lands was not immune to regional and extra-regional inputs. Bahrain, Libya, Syria and
Yemen were subjected to political and or material interventions from across national borders; some of these
emanated from within the region, some from immediate or proximate neighbourhood, and some from great or big
powers. The objective in each case was and is to prevent, retard or reverse the change sought by a visible
majority of the public. Another lecture would be required to mention the litany of ‘sins’ of all sides. It would
suffice here to say that regime change initiatives should be autonomous to the citizens of a state; record shows
that externally imposed strategies, even if used as a complement to diplomacy and deterrence, are perennially in
danger of going down the slippery slope.

The picture at the end of the year 2015 was one of total disarray, a situation in which regional and global
powers together with empowered local groups are engaged in political and military action in half a dozen
different battlefields. The immediate concern of each is to prevail upon its adversary; little thought, if any,
is being given to longer term consequences for the societies in the region. In the process, the rationale for
the Turbulence takes the back seat.

It has been said that the failure to understand catastrophes is even deadlier to a people than the catastrophes
themselves. The requirement to comprehend the prerequisites and essentials of participatory governance were
perhaps not fully comprehended by the protesting public, nor did it have a full measure of the forces aligned
against it. The need to combine rage with realism went unappreciated, except in the case of Al-Nahda in Tunisia
where the requirement of a wider consensus was appreciated.

With the exception of Egypt, the primary and primordial identity of the Arab lands of the Ottoman Empire was
essentially tribal with some regional attributes. As independent entities, no organic changes were brought about
in their internal tribal structures; instead, the tribal hierarchies were integrated in the new political
structures deliberately by domestic and external forces that, despite protestations to the contrary, ended up
being authoritarian. This deprived them of a mass base and genuine public participation through political
institutions. Aspects of this deficiency were reflected in the UNDP’s second Arab Development Challenges Report
2011 which urged the need for ‘a new social contract of mutual accountability (in which) the state becomes more
responsive and accountable to the citizen.’18

The link between the citizen and the state through the mechanism of accountability (and an implicit social
contract going beyond the ruler-subject relationship) is thus critical for domestic cohesion and internal
security but has not been sufficiently in evidence. An analysis of the states of West Asia some years back
identified among its characteristics the politics of limited association and of an essentially broad urban
middle class base in which coercion or co-option into the state structure rather than (in a) ‘durable resilience
of the system whose legitimacy is based on the full participation of the people in the body politic.’19

Decades earlier, the Moroccan historian Abdallah Laroui had spelt out the requirement: ‘The democratic principle
means that no one in society possesses political truth, that this truth will only gradually take shape through
the procedures of discussion and successive elections.’20

The failure to imbibe and implement this in sufficient measure is thus central to the crises that have afflicted
the region.

Jai Hind.

More on 2nd West Asia Conference [+]

• 1.
  Arjomand, Said Amir. The Political Dimensions of Religion (New York 1993) p 2.
• 2.
  Hegghammer, Thomas. Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism (New York 2010). The author concludes
  the book with a 2005 quote from a Saudi intelligence officer: ‘We encouraged our young men to fight for
  Islam in Afghanistan. We encouraged our young men to fight for Islam in Bosnia and Chechnya. We encouraged
  our young men to fight for Islam in Palestine. Now we are telling them you are forbidden to fight for Islam
  in Iraq, and they are confused.’
• 3. The
  process, in the case of Egypt, was graphically traced well before the Turbulence by Geneive Abdo in her book
  No God But God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam (New York, 2000).
• 4. Madawi
  Al-Rasheed. ‘No Saudi Spring: Anatomy of a Failed Revolution.’ – Boston Review, March 1, 2012
• 5.
  Gerges, Fawaz A.(ed). The New Middle East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World (New York 2014) p 4- 15.
• 6.
  Trotsky, Leon. The History of the Russian Revolution (London 1932) Vol I, pp 16-17.
• 7.
  Hussain Agha & Robert Malley. ‘The Arab Counterrevolution’ – The New York Review of Books, September 29,
  2011.
• 8. Zaki
  Sami Elkawi. ‘The geopolitical consequences of the Arab Spring’ – Open Democracy, November 24, 2014.
• 9.
  Primose Manfreda. ‘Definition of the Arab Spring’ – November 25, 2014 http://middleeast.about.com/od/humanrightsdemocracy/a/The-Arab-Spring.htm
• 10.
  Kamrava, Mehran. ‘The Arab Spring and the Saudi-led Counterrevolution.’ – Orbis, Winter 2012 p 97.
• 11.
  Madawi Al-Rasheed in Gerges, op cit, p 354.
• 12. The
  Economist, August 8, 2015 – book review of From Deep State to Islamic State-The Arab Counter Revolution and
  its Jihadi Legacy (London 2015).
• 13.
  Qur’an, xlii.38 and iv.59.
• 14.
  Khouri, Rami G. ‘The dark heart of 2015’s legacy across the Middle East.’ – Agence Global, January 2, 2016.
• 15.
  Emile Nakhleh. ‘Arab Spring Five Years On: Counterrevolution and Fading Euphoria’ – January 5, 2016 http://lobelog.com/the-arab-spring-five-years-on-counterrevolution-and-f…
  euphoria.
• 16. Ian
  Black. ‘Fear of a Shia full moon’ – The Guardian, January 26, 2007.
• 17.
  Hashemi, Nader. ‘Towards a Political Theory of Sectarianism in the Middle East: The Salience of
  Authoritarianism over Theology’ citing Madawi Al-Rasheed –October 27, 2015
• 18.
  UNDP. Arab Development and Challenges Report 2011:Towards the Developmental State in the Arb Region (Cairo
  2011) pp iv, 1-14.
• 19.
  Adeeb Dawish & William Zartman. Beyond Coercion: The Durability of the Arab State (New York 1988 pp
  282-283.
• 20.
  Laroui, Abdallah. The Crisis of the Arab Intellectual: Traditionalism or Historicism (Berkeley, California
  1976) p 28.