The Second Annual K. Subrahmanyam Memorial Lecture was hosted by the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), India on 03 February 2022 at 1100hrs (IST) in a virtual format. The keynote speaker Dr.  Edward N. Luttwak, Contractual Advisor US Government and a Treaty ally, spoke about ‘Applying the Krishnaswamy Subrahmanyam Method Today’, in the presence of the Hon’ble Minister of External Affairs of India Dr. S. Jaishankar and Shri Dhruva Jaishankar. Both joined the virtual discussion in their capacity as family members of Late K. Subrahmanyam. Director General (DG), MP-IDSA, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, chaired the session and delivered the welcome addreess.

Executive Summary

Reminiscing about the memory of Late K. Subrahmanyam, Dr. Luttwak said that he foresaw the economic rise of China in the late 1970s. He anticipated that China would economically outmatch the US and argued for the India-US partnership. Dr. Luttwak opined that in the changed circumstances, the US needed allies. He maintained that Chinese belligerent behaviour had compelled the regional states to come together and form an organic coalition which was supplemented by the overlapping bilateral arrangements between the constituent states.

Dr. Luttwak suggested that China was comparatively focusing less on its land borders. Thus, it was an opportunity for the alliance to make its presence felt on the Chinese borders. Comparing China’s current political environment with Mussolini’s Italy, Dr. Luttwak contended that China under President Xi Jinping was in the Mussolini phase. He argued for an agile and downsized Indian army ready to take on future challenges. Concluding his address, Dr. Luttwak strongly proclaimed that blockade in the oceanic space remained the best way to deal with China during adverse times.

Detailed Report

Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy began his introduction by remembering Late K. Subrahmanyam on his 11th death anniversary. He said that the world had changed since the 2008 economic crisis and even more so, after the COVID-19 pandemic. He referred to China’s economic rise accompanied by its coercive military tactics to state that China’s actions might prove counter to its long-term interests. However, he observed that the United States (US) was late in recognising China’s hegemonic behaviour in the region. Ambassador Chinoy pointed to the contrast in US’s relations with Europe. On the one hand, President Biden’s recommitment to the transatlantic alliance helped evolve a consensus on China; on the other hand, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the crisis over Ukraine exposed fissures between the US and its European allies. Highlighting the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) expansion against Russian sensitivities and Russian deployment of the troops to Kazakhstan under the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) framework, Ambassador Chinoy argued that the world was neither unipolar nor bipolar nor was it multipolar. He expressed concern that these events might take the US attention away from China which was the systemic challenger in the Indo-Pacific.

Referring to the 1990 essay of Dr. Luttwak titled “From Geopolitics to Geoeconomics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce”, Ambassador Chinoy affirmed that there was a growing intersection between the political, military and economic factors, particularly their impact on peace and security.  The state and non-state actors had acquired asymmetrical means to bridge absolute gaps in economic and military heft. He argued that geoeconomics mattered but did not outweigh in importance the harsh reality of geopolitics. This was evident in US-China relations where mutual economic interdependence did not prevent aggravation of geostrategic contestation. Ambassador Chinoy underlined that the great irony was that China’s rise was facilitated in no small measure by the US. Further, he pointed to China’s debt-trap diplomacy, stranglehold over critical supply chains, unilateralism and military aggression over territorial differences to argue that there was consensus on ensuring rules-based order and a free and open maritime space in the Indo-Pacific. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and the AUKUS were manifestations of new concerns. Furthermore, the Afghan situation remained fluid and there persisted a fear that Afghanistan might emerge as a hotbed of terrorism. He said that India would pursue strategic autonomy and issue-based alignment. Further, he emphasised that Kautilyan precepts had found a definite place in India’s strategic outlook whether it was India’s “Neighbourhood First” policy or its Indo-Pacific vision.

Ambassador Chinoy observed that nationalism, pragmatism and idealism permeated K. Subrahmanyam’s writings and pronouncements. His ability to synthesise political, economic and military issues was legendary. Even today, his imprimatur runs deep – from India’s nuclear posture to the country’s higher defence management. With this broad outline, Ambassador Chinoy handed over the floor to Dr. Luttwak to interpret the application of the K. Subrahmanyam method in today’s context.

Dr. Luttwak began his address by reminiscing about his interactions with Late K. Subrahmanyam, and described his voice as a “voice of inexorable logic”. He recalled how Late Subrahmanyam tried to explain the logic of nuclear India with a strict no-first-use policy. With nuclearisation, the aim was to create a nuclear threshold. His logic was irrefutable and his prediction about the future came out correct.

Late K. Subrahmanyam also foresaw the economic rise of China in the late 1970s. He anticipated that China would economically outmatch the US and argued a closer Indo-US relationship. Thus, he had recognised the necessity of an alliance not in a realm of strategy or war but in the realm of geoeconomics. Talking about China, Dr. Luttwak stated that today the world was dealing with the “New China”. Since the 2008 financial crisis, there was a feeling in China that “the East was up and the West was down”. The financial crisis was interpreted in China as the beginning of the general crisis of capitalism. During the same time, the US also weakened greatly. The social and cultural changes in the US and the accidental presidency of Mr. Trump contributed to this phenomenon. Dr. Luttwak argued that the US needed allies in the current circumstances as it was no more a unipolar moment of the 1990s.

Commenting on the regional scenario, the speaker observed that although neutrality between the US and China was the flavour of the season for regional states, the “logic of strategy” forced them to come together to contain China due to Chinese actions. Dr. Luttwak maintained that Chinese belligerent behaviour compelled the regional states to come together and form an organic coalition, unlike NATO. The organic coalition was supplemented by the overlapping bilateral arrangements between the constituent states. The Indo-Pacific command of the US was also the manifestation of the present-day reality. Although the Southeast Asian states did not take sides, their actions conveyed that the “logic of strategy” was working itself out, resulting in organic alliances.

Speaking further about the borders of China, Dr. Luttwak contended that China was acting like an island power. It was putting more efforts into building maritime, air and strategic forces and had an army of less than a million. He suggested that China was comparatively focusing less on its land borders. Thus, it was an opportunity for the alliance to make their presence felt on the borders. He asserted that when maritime powers are confronted by land powers, the former act on borders of the latter to remind them that they are a land power. India, being a maritime power, could take a leaf out of this strategy.

Reflecting on the internal dynamics of China, Dr. Luttwak argued that the world was dealing with only one person – President Xi Jinping – and not with China as a whole. Comparing China’s current political environment with Mussolini’s Italy, Dr. Luttwak contended that China under President Xi was in the Mussolini phase. Advising India about how it should deal with the challenge, he claimed that when a country faces a challenge, it is an opportunity to make drastic reforms. India needed an agile and downsized army ready to take on future challenges. He advocated against India having an aircraft carrier. Concluding his address, Dr. Luttwak strongly proclaimed that blockade in the oceanic space remained the best way to deal with China during adverse times.

Ambassador Chinoy steered the discussion through a question-and-answer session with a comment that Dr. Luttwak’s address brought together Mahan and Mackinder in suggesting response levels. While answering questions by the audience, Dr. Luttwak maintained that although President Biden changed his predecessor’s many policies, he continued with President Trump’s China policy. The Ukraine crisis had not diverted the US’s attention away from China. He maintained that US resources were mainly focused on the Indo-Pacific, although the Ukraine crisis was getting much more media traction. Commenting on the Russia-China relationship, the speaker drew the attention of the audience to the fact that despite close partnership, Russia was supplying arms to countries that were not friendly with China including Vietnam and India. Answering a question about the US-Pakistan equation, Dr. Luttwak said that the relationship had gone through many evolutions but there was a strong view that Pakistan was hostile to the US. So, he believed that the US-Pakistan relations should be conducted in the context of the de-facto Indo-US alliance. About Myanmar, he argued that allies should work closely and defer to the country within the alliance that had vantage position vis-à-vis Myanmar. On the Ukraine and Taiwan issue, Dr. Luttwak claimed that Russia cannot contribute anything out of Vladivostok to support Chinese action over Taiwan. Neither would China do anything in the Baltic. So, there won’t be a scenario where Russians and Chinese will cooperate. Russia and China were tactical allies as against strategic allies.

Joining the interaction, India’s Minister of External Affairs Dr. S Jaishankar gave insights about his father. Dr. Jaishankar said that Late K. Subrahmanyam’s thinking was profoundly shaped by the conflicts of 1962, 1965, 1971 and 1999. His advocacy of policies was a product of a tough strategic environment where the US, China and Pakistan had come together. So, in the 1970s he championed India’s close relations with the Soviet Union. And then a decade later, in view of the US-China contradictions, he became a strong advocate of Indo-US partnership. The logic of both relationships was the same. Dr. S. Jaishankar believed that his father was an “insider-outsider”. He served in the government as well as in a think tank like IDSA. At times he held contrary views vis-à-vis the government positions. But he expressed his views very responsibly without making grand sweeping submissions. Late K. Subrahmanyam considered himself a grand strategist. His writings had geoeconomic underpinning. He focussed on non-traditional security issues such as connectivity, technology, and financing among others and explained as to how these could be leveraged to shape international relations. Thus, he was far ahead of his time.

Shri Dhruva Jaishankar delivered a vote of thanks. He remembered Late K. Subrahmanyam’s role in building IDSA, right from the 1960s as a note-taker in the defence ministry until the establishment of the institute. He also thanked Dr. Luttwak for his address on the occasion and described how Dr. Luttwak’s worldviews were shaped by his personal journey.

Report prepared by Mr. Niranjan Chandrashekhar Oak, Research Analyst, MP-IDSA

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