Session I: Established and Emergency Powers in the Age of Multipolarity

Chair: Dr. Arvind Gupta.

Participants:

Prof. Dr. Robert Kappel: Germany, Europe and the Emerging Powers
Prof. Dr. Sujit Dutta: India and the Changing Asian Order
Prof. Dr. Rajendra K Jain: India-EU Relations: Challenges in the Partnership
Ms. Shebonti Ray Dadwal: India-EU Energy Cooperation

Prof Robert Kappel, during his presentation, focused on following areas: Economic Power Shifts, BRICS and power shifts, EU strategy, Germany as a motor of EU Foreign Policy and the outlook.

Regarding economic power shifts, Prof Koppel argued that despite the relative decline and continued financial crises in EU, Europe stays the most influential economic power in the world. Its share in world income hovers around 26% and the share in world production is around 21%. Thus its attractiveness as an economic model continues to hold. The BRICS with growing economic and political influence in the WTO, UN system, G20 and the World Bank have still not been able to challenge western hegemony in economic, political and military fields.

On the issues of how the EU can contribute to the present multilateral order, he said that the EU has thousands of strategic papers relating to institutions, significant actors and increasing range of strategic partnerships. However what is needed is a new role for Europe in the world to contribute to a multi polar order and stand up for its own values.

The EU sees itself as a strategic actor which fulfills important criteria. It must demonstrate the capacity to extract and mobilize resources from its member states, it must show that it is possible to relate these resources to agreed medium and long term objectives, it must demonstrate that it is capable of generating a strategic narrative that shapes the expectation of both its member states and also its key international partners and finally it must be able to adapt its aims with resources allocation and its strategic narrative to changes in the global context.

The emerging countries are seen as powerful players and have global and regional influence which was not the case some 10 years earlier.
Addressing what undermines the credibility of the EU, he said that the EU is in a crisis and is working to come out of this crisis. It is an incomplete monetary union, has no common defense policy, a grand strategy of the EU is missing so far.

Regarding the question whether Germany is a motor for EU foreign policy, he said that the answer is yes but its role has also transformed. In Germany, the prevalent view is Germany shouldn’t be too powerful; it shouldn’t push too much because there might be problems in the EU when Germany is too strong. The German government has put out a concept paper on how to deal with rising powers in which the main focus is on Germany pushing for a rule based multilateral order embedded in the EU and transatlantic relations.
Addressing on the future outlook and what should be the strategy for the EU in the multi polar age, he said that the EU’s external projection can no longer rely on the promotion of its economic and social model, the BRICS and Next 11 are responsible for the world order, security and peace and solving burning issues like poverty and environmental problems. The EU must play a more active role based on its principles, effective multilateral order, and inclusive rule based order, driven by cooperation rather than by competition. Cooperation should be deepened with BRICS countries to get effective multilateral order developed.

Sujit Datta, during his presentation, highlighted that, in the past two decades since the end of the Cold War, Asia on the whole seems to have made enormous amount of progress with huge strategic impact in China, India and Indonesia. Before the Cold War ended, progress was essentially witnessed in the smaller states of Asia and in the Far East which has undergone major transformation. The consequence of the growth of the past two decades in these three countries has enormous overall effect on Asia because the bulk of the population in Asia resides in these three countries. Growth has been facilitated by rapid economic growth, integration with the world system and globalization. Secondly, there has been growth of democracy in several countries, changes in Burma being the latest which gives importance to the more liberal agenda which tries to envisage a peaceful order on the basis of institutionalism, democracy and interdependence. Thirdly, interdependence has grown through the varied and huge expansion of communication and trade, both overland and sea. Fourthly new efforts are being made to create multilateral institutions, to create norms and hold together the countries of the region under a single umbrella-ASEAN Regional Forum and East Asia Summit being the two most important frameworks. In addition, global value chains are expanding in this region. Earlier East Asia was integrated in the global value chains, today; South East Asia and India are also being included.

Yet over the past two decades, the liberal vision of growing Asia maintaining peace and stability and expanding the area of stability and pacification has not come about as true. There are deep uncertainties in Asia, and these flow not only from rise of powers but also the lingering impact of old ideologies and ideological tendencies that are quite contrary to the larger processes that have been described which promote growth. Growth, interdependence/ clinging on to extreme conservative views of the nature of states and their role in the world, the growth of extremism and the continued relevance and even resurgence of nationalism in many of these countries have impeding factors. The most contradictory of these processes is of course in China itself. The country that gained maximum from globalization is also the most nationalist and revisionist in its foreign policy. We are faced with a serious dichotomy between progress and global integration on the one hand and on the other, a two pronged problem regarding the state and state system in Asia, related to the continued relevance of nationalism and the state in terms of territories, sovereignty etc that are supposed to be mitigated by interdependence, by normative structures. However, realism continues to dominate foreign policy thinking in the most important rising powers of Asia. There is resurgence of nationalism and ethno nationalism in several of these countries, most exemplified in states around India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka.

The second feature relates to nationalism and currently the biggest issue as far as India is concerned is where China is going and what it is doing with its ideology. For long time through the post Tiananmen period, as long as Deng Xiao Ping was in power, the ideology of the Chinese foreign policy domain was to keep heads down and bide time. China’s rise will benefit everyone and Asia will move forward. Unfortunately since 2005-2006 in the Sino-India case, relations began to deteriorate over territorial issues, Tibet etc which have recently reflected in other boundary questions like South China Sea, East China Sea. China has struggled with policy framework of engagement and peaceful resolution of disputes.

The Chinese though conversant with the challenges and dangers of pursuing a high nationalist course seem to be willing to take risks in terms of reshaping the sovereignty territorial question because it has huge strategic consequences. The ultimate goal seems to reshape the nature of the alliance system in Asia, undermine the US alliance system and open up new spaces for expansion of Chinese power and this can only be explained by the steady growth in Chinese military expenditure over the last two decades.

China in the past two decades has become the central pillar of the global economy and keeping alive the global growth. China is a critical part of world reordering and is extremely important when it comes to dealing with questions relating to outer space, climate change etc and therefore needs to be engaged. Yet, China needs to be dissuaded from pursuing a revisionist strategy and harking back to old historical questions of the 19th century. In order to balance this, the Americans have come forward with the notion of Asian pivot. The Asian pivot is however, not without its problems. Reassuring the balancing between rebalancing and pivot on the one hand and reassuring China so that it does not become aggressive is a major challenge Americans are struggling with. Reassuring South East Asia and not get drawn into the conflict between South East Asia and China over territorial questions is another major challenge.

The Indian state model breaks away from these nationalist discourses but India’s leverage in these Asian countries and influence politics and security in the larger area remains limited. India needs to remain firm to resolve its own domestic and nation making problems if it seeks to have any leverage abroad. India’s ties with Japan, South East Asia, EU, and China are critically important and in all these areas we have moved forward but in each of them there are inbuilt tensions and remain caught in significant divergences.

Rajendra Jain, during his presentation, discussed the major challenges in the strategic partnership: the challenge of making the strategic partnership more meaningful, challenge of global governance, challenge of coping with the growing normative disconnect between the EU and emerging powers, challenge of making the security dialogue more meaningful and the challenge of addressing visibility issues in order to overcome stereotypes and misperceptions.

He highlighted that the EU Joint Action Plan, revised in 2008 is long on sheer fundamentals and abstract political objectives and is short on specifics and deliverables and devoid of timelines. After a decade of strategic partnership, India and European Union has not been able to transform shared values into shared interests because of a big disconnect in world views, mind sets and practical agendas. To a very large extent this is because of a mismatch of structures, capabilities and priorities as well as weaker societal underpinnings and general lack of understanding for each other. And these fundamental differences will remain in future because the two are at two different levels of development and come from different geo political milieus. However we should not be too alarmed at the lack of progress of strategic partnership. These disagreements in the lack of deliverables are natural and are not sui generis to the Indian -EU strategic partnership. The EU and India are gradually learning to engage one another more intensely beyond trade and commerce. The consensus is to focus on a fewer number of priorities with clear timelines.

The second challenge is of global governance. International powers argue that the structures of global governance must be made more representative, democratic and legitimate but what we essentially find is that even though there has been limited democratization of global economic architecture, there has been virtually no change at all in the political and security architecture of the world which remains frozen in 1945. On vital issues like enlargement of the UNSC, the EU has either no common policy or is unable to formulate one because of internal differences. Indian stakeholders therefore perceive Europe as a conservative force and a staunch defender of the present order.

The third major challenge is about the normative disconnect which is growing between the European Union and the emerging powers. Europe tends to structure the normative agenda in a way which undermines the competitive advantage of emerging countries especially developing ones. To most Indians, modern Europe seems to be a lonely power which is basically a Westphalia world of pre modern and modern mindsets.

The Fourth challenge is the challenge of making the security dialogue more meaningful. After a decade, the results have not been encouraging and there is a clear difference in perspectives. Because there is a mismatch of security contexts, concerns and goals, there is neither the same urgency nor any interest in cooperating with India. The EU is not considered a factor of consequence in South Asia nor relevant to the security discourses in the region.

The fifth challenge is of concluding the FTA. Negotiations have been going on since 2007, more than 15 rounds have been held, the gap has significantly reduced but disagreements persist on key issues like automobiles, wines and spirits and services. The window of opportunity for concluding the FTA is closing rapidly with elections in India in May 2014. The Euro zone crisis has also perhaps led to hardening of attitudes in Europe. However both, India and EU feel they are better off with an agreement rather than without one.

There also continues to be an enormous information deficit about the EU in India largely because of the mutual indifference and neglect. Continued reliance on the Anglo Saxon media does not lead to a very healthy perspective in trying to understand the nuances and the intricacies of European integration but it also tends to reinforce stereotypical images and clichés about Europe. As a result, the EU suffers from low visibility and is grossly under reported. Conscious effort has to be made by the EU to overcome perceptional differences.

Finally, after a decade of the partnership, India and the EU are struggling to find a genuine strategic basis for cooperation except for trade and commerce, which will continue to dominate the relationship. At the same time, it is also true that Delhi tends to regard Brussels with greater respect than in the past and engagement has intensified.

Shebonti Ray Dadwal, during her presentation, termed India and EU as ‘natural partners’, but added that there exist very divergent geopolitical considerations and regional interests between the two parties. She charted out the potential for partnership in the energy arena. She focused her presentation into two parts- the first dealing with India’s energy challenges and the potential for bilateral cooperation with the EU and second part on the international arena where EU and India as some of the largest consumers of energy can work together for a more energy secure world.

India’s hydro carbon deficits have been increasing year on year and this has had a negative impact on our fiscal deficit situation. The Indian government faces a dilemma in meeting its growing energy challenges with least cost to the environment. Currently, the Indian government is heavily dependent on fossil fuels and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. Hence in order to achieve its goal of energy security with minimum impact on the environment, India will have to focus on developing and using cleaner forms of energy. It is in the renewable energy sector that there is maximum scope for bilateral cooperation between India and the EU. A Joint Declaration on Energy was adopted at the Summit in Delhi in February 2012 and six areas identified as priorities for bilateral cooperation: clean coal; energy efficiency of products; energy efficiency in buildings; grids (including integration of renewable energy); cost-effective ways to promote renewable energies, safety (off-shore and nuclear plants). Wind, solar and energy efficiency and smart grid systems are also promising areas of cooperation.

She highlighted that, as India and EU are both net importers of hydrocarbons, they have a similar interest in ensuring that energy supply market is secure and rule based. Some of the most challenging policy tasks for countries in the current scenario of unprecedented uncertainty in global energy markets is ensuring timely and sufficient energy supplies at the global and regional levels; staving off rising emissions arising out of resurgence in fossil fuel use and ensuring access to affordable energy for all. Such challenges can become exacerbated in the absence of effective global governance mechanisms to monitor the functioning of energy markets. The current institutions which involve the International Energy Agency, OPEC, International Energy Forum, IAEA and WTO do not adequately address the concerns of all energy stakeholders- the producers, consumers and transit countries. In order to ensure energy security, it is critical that governments adopt policies that reinforce and complement market based responses to deliver energy security at least cost. The current global energy scenario requires an overarching institution to deal with energy governance issues, the framework of which should be multilateral in nature and representative of all stakeholders.

Report prepared by Nupur Brahma