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Remembering 1962 Sino-Indian Border War: Politics of Memory

How does India remember the 1962 border war with China? The article argues that there are two ways in which the war is recalled in the country and both of them are betrayal narratives, one blaming the Chinese alone and the second blaming the Chinese expansionism as well as the naive leadership of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. The main focus of the article will be on a critical analysis of the three primary assumptions made by the betrayal narratives: the legitimacy of Indian claims; the unexpected Chinese aggression; and the singular failure of Indian political leadership.

The Stormy Parliamentary Debates of 1962

Excepting in a war-like situation when there is threat to national security, unity and integrity, parliamentarians neither have the time nor the inclination to discuss issues that do not have a direct bearing on their constituency or on electoral politics. Besides considering the sensitive and professional nature of the subject, parliamentarians tend to leave the foreign policy issues to the professional diplomats and the foreign policy establishment. But there have been exceptions to the rule in most democratic countries, including India.

Sino-Indian War, 1962 and the Role of Great Powers

The easy availability of Indian Government documents allowed early commentators to focus on the policies pursued by India to counter the relentless advance by China in the Western border region, and the prospect of a similar thrust in the Eastern region in 1962. The spotlight settled on the inadequacy of the ‘Forward Policy’, which was a response to Chinese military pressure on the ground.

The Great Divide: Chinese and Indian Views on Negotiations, 1959-62

When will states bargain while fighting and when will they evade intrawar negotiations? This article addresses this question with respect to the 1962 Sino-Indian War and provides insight into the question of why talks did not occur for the duration of the war. To do so, I analyse Chinese and Indian strategic thinking regarding the prospects of talks in the lead up and throughout the short war, with information gathered through archival work at the Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives, interviews with former Indian political and military leaders as well as scholars and secondary sources.

A Game of Chess and a Battle of Wits: India’s Forward Policy Decision in Late 1961

In spring 1962, small numbers of lightly armed Indian troops proactively established presence in the disputed border areas between Chinese Tibet and India, despite intense sabre-rattling in Beijing. What was originally intended as a ‘game of chess and a battle of wits’ in late 1961, eventually ended in war in October 1962. This article discusses the long-term and short-term factors that can help explain why the Government of India opted for the ‘Forward Policy’ in late 1961.

The Tibetan Uprising and Indian Opinion of the Chinese

China’s cruel repression of the revolt which broke out on 10 March 1959 in Lhasa provoked sharp reactions in India. The mood of agitation that captured the country found expression in the form of a flood of articles, editorials and vivid political caricatures in national newspapers, noted for creating a powerful case in support of the Tibetans and forcefully condemning the Chinese for their imperialistic adventures in Tibet.

Enduring Legacy of 1962: Cementing the Conflict of Perceptions in Sino-Indian Ties

Fifty years since the 1962 war, India and China have moved on to become world powers with engagement and competition characterizing their relationship in keeping with the rules of realpolitik. Both sides argue that the past has been forgotten, yet the border dispute remains unresolved. Despite the rapprochement and robust economic engagement undertaken, the relationship has a constant undercurrent of tension and is often described as fragile.