Publication Filter

The 1962 border conflict moulded our security and strategic thinking into a defensive mindset, and its 50th anniversary is an appropriate time to review those lessons as we seek our place in the new multi-polar world.

• Mukul Sanwal |
• October 19, 2012 |
• IDSA Comments

The World Bank’s decision to withhold funding for the Padma Bridge embarrassed a government that has been doing reasonable work especially in checking extremism at a time when radicalism is sweeping many parts of the world.

• Anand Kumar |
• October 19, 2012 |
• IDSA Comments

Let us examine the facts as they are, to see if the Chinese contention of a counter-attack to throw Indian aggressors out has any merit or, as India believes, it was nothing but a premeditated attack by China.

• R. S. Kalha |
• October 17, 2012 |
• IDSA Comments

A global power like China must not hesitate to acknowledge its historical mistakes: it needs to have sufficient self-confidence to withstand the consequent discomfort and embarrassment.

• Jagannath P. Panda |
• October 16, 2012 |
• IDSA Comments

A global power like China must not hesitate to acknowledge its historical mistakes: it needs to have sufficient self-confidence to withstand the consequent discomfort and embarrassment.

• Jagannath P. Panda |
• October 16, 2012 |
• IDSA Comments

Tibet has always been the core issue in Sino-Indian relations. Even during the 1962 conflict, Chinese leaders, including Mao, acknowledged that the conflict was not about the boundary or territory but about Tibet. The revolt in Tibet leading to the flight of the Dalai Lama to India in 1959 came as a rude shock to the Indian leadership. After the 1962 conflict, the issue of Tibet went on the back burner. The revival of negotiations in 1981 brought the issue back into focus.

• R. S. Kalha |
• October 2012 |
• Journal of Defence Studies

The easy availability of Indian Government documents allowed early commentators to focus on the policies pursued by India to counter the relentless advance by China in the Western border region, and the prospect of a similar thrust in the Eastern region in 1962. The spotlight settled on the inadequacy of the ‘Forward Policy’, which was a response to Chinese military pressure on the ground.

• S. K. Bhutani |
• October 2012 |
• Journal of Defence Studies

When will states bargain while fighting and when will they evade intrawar negotiations? This article addresses this question with respect to the 1962 Sino-Indian War and provides insight into the question of why talks did not occur for the duration of the war. To do so, I analyse Chinese and Indian strategic thinking regarding the prospects of talks in the lead up and throughout the short war, with information gathered through archival work at the Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives, interviews with former Indian political and military leaders as well as scholars and secondary sources.

• Oriana Skylar Mastro |
• October 2012 |
• Journal of Defence Studies

In spring 1962, small numbers of lightly armed Indian troops proactively established presence in the disputed border areas between Chinese Tibet and India, despite intense sabre-rattling in Beijing. What was originally intended as a ‘game of chess and a battle of wits’ in late 1961, eventually ended in war in October 1962. This article discusses the long-term and short-term factors that can help explain why the Government of India opted for the ‘Forward Policy’ in late 1961.

• Johan Skog Jensen |
• October 2012 |
• Journal of Defence Studies

China’s cruel repression of the revolt which broke out on 10 March 1959 in Lhasa provoked sharp reactions in India. The mood of agitation that captured the country found expression in the form of a flood of articles, editorials and vivid political caricatures in national newspapers, noted for creating a powerful case in support of the Tibetans and forcefully condemning the Chinese for their imperialistic adventures in Tibet.

• Bhavna Tripathy |
• October 2012 |
• Journal of Defence Studies