Journal of Defence Studies

The Warrior, Military Ethics and Contemporary Warfare: Achilles goes Asymmetrical, by Pauline M. Karin

The process of ‘War’, whether waged for noble or ignoble ends and for long considered a valid instrument of state policy, is broadly interpreted along the Clausewitzian dictum of the ‘application of organised violence for political ends’. The United Nations (UN) outlaws the proposition that states can use force for resolving their disputes.

Critical Analysis of Pakistani Air Operations in 1965: Weaknesses and Strengths

This article tracks the evolution of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) into a potent fighting force by analysing the broad contours of joint operations and the air war between the Indian Air Force (IAF) and PAF in 1965. Led by aggressive commanders like Asghar Khan and Nur Khan, the PAF seized the initiative in the air on the evening of 6 September 1965 with a coordinated strike from Sargodha, Mauripur and Peshawar against four major Indian airfields, Adampur, Halwara, Pathankot and Jamnagar. The IAF riposte to PAF strikes came early next morning at dawn on 7 September.

Air Power in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War: An Assessment

The 1965 Indo-Pak War came when India was in the midst of a major military expansion. India did not want to escalate matters when Pakistani forces invaded Kutch in April 1965 and accepted a ceasefire with British mediation. Although the government allowed the use of Indian Air Force (IAF) combat aircraft on 1 September 1965, action remained localised to the Chhamb area for five days. This was primarily because of India’s desire to avoid all-out war. IAF was used for counter air, air defence, and in support of the ground forces.

Indian Army’s Continuity and Transformation: Through the Prism of the Battle of Dograi

The continuum of change in militaries is derived from a number of factors, in which application of history plays an important part. The process of Indian Army’s evolution in the plains of Western India could be charted from the lessons learnt from key episodes of the 1965 War.

An Infantry Combat Leader’s Memoir of the 1965 War

The article is a recall of the 1965 War by an infantry company commander in the war. It attempts to bring out how the war was conducted at the tactical level. Charlie Company, commanded by the author, was involved in several skirmishes, company and battalion level attacks as part of 19 Maratha Light Infantry. The unit was part of 7 Infantry Division and fought on the Punjab front. The article covers the run up to the war and the battles, bringing out the human element and tactical level aspects of conflict, some of which continue to be relevant 50 years on.

Battle of Haji Pir: The Army’s Glory in 1965

In 1965, Pakistan attempted infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), with Operation Gibralter, followed by a planned capture of Akhnoor Bridge under Operation Grand Slam. While Operation Gibraltar was bold from the point of view of multi-directional infiltration, it was largely based on the utopian dream of President Ayub Khan and Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, ignoring the ground realities that J&K’s population would not support it.

Recounting 1965: War, Diplomacy and Great Games in the Subcontinent

‘Stalemate’, ‘futile’, ‘forgotten’—the descriptions of the 1965 War between India and Pakistan often do injustice to its profound Impact on the history of the Indian subcontinent. It was a war that altered the fates of India and Pakistan both politically and militarily, and officially began the new great game for Asia. For India, it was a test of leadership post Nehru and banishing the demons of 1962. For Pakistan, it was about Kashmir and testing India, playing roulette with the superpowers, and sealing its friendship with China.

The 1965 Indo-Pak War: Through Today’s Lens

This article seeks to analyse the lessons of the 1965 Indo-Pak war that are applicable today. It finds that the current army doctrine, Cold Start, has some similarities to the opening round of the 1965 war. It argues that even the attritionist strategy adopted in 1965 may have more to give today than the manoeuvre war approach of its more famous successor, the 1971 war. In particular, the article appraises Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri’s firm political control during the war and finds that it was ably reinforced by the prime ministers who were at the helm in India’s later wars.

Operation Gibraltar: An Uprising that Never Was

Launched in early-August 1965, Operation Gibraltar was designed to infiltrate several columns of trained and well-armed Mujahids and Razakars, led by Pakistan Army Majors into Jammu and Kashmir. Under the cover of fire provided by the Pakistan Army deployed on the Cease Fire Line (CFL), the columns managed to infiltrate, but failed to create large-scale disturbances and did not receive support from the people. In fact, locals often provided information about the columns to the Indian Army, which led to their being captured or neutralised.

India and Pakistan: An Eternal Conflict!

Shooting for a Century: Finding Answers to the India–Pakistan Conundrum, by Stephen P. Cohen