Journal of Defence Studies

Enduring Legacy of 1962: Cementing the Conflict of Perceptions in Sino-Indian Ties

Fifty years since the 1962 war, India and China have moved on to become world powers with engagement and competition characterizing their relationship in keeping with the rules of realpolitik. Both sides argue that the past has been forgotten, yet the border dispute remains unresolved. Despite the rapprochement and robust economic engagement undertaken, the relationship has a constant undercurrent of tension and is often described as fragile.

From the Managing Editor

This issue of the Journal of Defence Studies is being published 50 years after China attacked India across the Himalayas. A majority of Indians and Chinese today do not have any personal memories of the war. Since the war was seen as a victory for China and a defeat for India, it naturally evokes different sentiments in the two countries. For China, it was a punitive strike to teach India a lesson, to make it accept a lower position in the hierarchy of nations and, perhaps, an opportunity to convey its strength to the world at large, and particularly to the two superpowers of the day.

The Legacy of 1962 and China’s India Policy

This article will argue that the legacy of the 1962 Sino-Indian War continues to affect China’s policy towards India even today. The three factors that led to China’s decision in 1962 to attack India—the status of Tibet, the militarization of their unresolved border and fears of containment—are present even today, albeit in slightly modified forms. This is not to argue that another Sino-Indian War is imminent because the larger strategic context within which China’s leaders took the decision to attack India in 1962 has changed.

Learning Lessons and Revisting Myths from Kameng

Episodes in the modern military history of a nation need to assist in deriving lessons. At the same time, due to reasons such as fading public memory, local discourse in the area of conflict, non-availability of archival data, poor recording of history, and over-securitisation leads to the creation of myths. This article discusses tactics of victory employed by the Chinese in the 1962 Sino-Indian War. It then assesses the need to sustain capacity for mobility in the Himalayas. It also highlights the fact that local perceptions have not been understood at the national level.

Strategic Lessons of 1962: A Contemporary Retrospective

The 1962 India–China War is one of the most debated subjects in India’s recent military history. The discussion has been enriched by accounts of the war by a large number of principal Indian military protagonists, some to justify their own role which had come up for criticism in perspective.

Defence Reforms after 1962: Much Ado about Nothing

How have commentators perceived India’s defeat in the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962? What were its underlying reasons? Can the entire blame be cast on China for its surprise attack? Or, were India’s thoughtless actions also responsible? After touching on these questions, this article describes the defence reforms undertaken by India after the border conflict in 1962 in the light of the shortcomings and deficiencies highlighted.

The Problem of Grand Strategy

This paper interrogates the concept of grand strategy. Its proponents argue that the absence of a publicly articulated and coherent grand strategy leads to incoherence in practice: armed forces acquire technologies without a strategy, government departments pursue their specific interests without reference to overarching national goals, and diplomats have a hard time explaining India’s behaviour to foreign interlocutors.

Armies, Wars and their Food by D. Vijaya Rao

For anyone to talk and write about wars, the basic predicament is how to create novelty of information since subjects related to wars and heroism are so well covered both in text and folklore. This is precisely the aspect where the author, D. Vijaya Rao, has been able to achieve distinction.

India Russia Military Cooperation Which Way Forward?

This article considers the relationship—in defence terms—between India and Russia. It looks at the level of military cooperation and the nexus the two countries have created in regard to arms transfers and their joint research into, and production of, weapons systems. This relationship is, of course, one that is constantly evolving as different strategic and political pressures come to bear. The analysis here concentrates on the current standing of the defence links between Delhi and Moscow.

Stealth and Counter-stealth Some Emerging Thoughts and Continuing Debates

If there is one dimension in the air attack–air defence continuum that is riding high on the wings of enabling edge technologies, it is the use of stealth, both in the offensive and defensive domains.