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That a nuclear taboo exists indicates the divide between conventional and nuclear war. It is no wonder then that India – though a nuclear weapons power – deems nuclear weapons not for military use but for deterrence purposes. These are, therefore, taken as political weapons. Seeking to deter use of nuclear weapons against India or its forces anywhere, India's nuclear doctrine promises ‘massive’ punitive retaliatory strike in case of nuclear use by its enemy. This is evidence that the Indian leadership is cognizant of the special status of nuclear weapons.
Nuclear disarmament is once again fashionable. If rhetoric was sufficient, nuclear disarmament should be easily achievable. But what the rhetoric hides is not only the difficulty of achieving nuclear disarmament, but also the instrumental manner in which that rhetoric is being deployed. At the height of the Cold War, the two superpowers traded a number of detailed proposals for controlling the atom.
India's nuclear development has been accompanied by a dual track strategy of developing and building weapons while criticising the non-proliferation regime as discriminatory and simultaneously making public statements and proposals in favour of nuclear disarmament. But with international progress likely on aspects of nuclear disarmament over the next few months, India will be in the spotlight at the forthcoming 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference to help move the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda forward.
In different international bodies and in statements by various world leaders, universalisation and a possible revision of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are figuring quite frequently. Certainly, in the emerging context for universalisation, the relationship between India and the NPT may be reviewed. Several relevant options are emerging to define the relationship between India and the NPT. This has put the relationship between India and the NPT in the international limelight.
In international relations, the more powerful have a way of underplaying history or overemphasising it, depending on how helpful or otherwise it may be in promoting their immediate objectives. It is interesting to note that even a country like India, which is beginning to sense the stirrings of power, is tending to fall into the same pattern.
Since its indefinite extension in 1995, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been on the sidelines, with its utility eroding in the post-Cold War security environment, as new instruments took over the anti-proliferation mantle. Being the cornerstone of the regime and near-universal in character, the NPT has nonetheless survived despite a host of challenges threatening its existence. Its future, however, is imperilled unless the member states take remedial actions, including a restructuring of the treaty to suit 21st century requirements.
The failure of the 2005 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference (RevCon) almost signalled doom for the treaty. The NPT, since it came into force, has always travelled a slippery slope encountering various hurdles on the way. Its problem did not end even after it acquired the ‘near universal’ status. With the exception of India, Pakistan and Israel, all countries have joined the treaty, though North Korea withdrew from it and later conducted a couple of nuclear tests.
This article examines the feasibility and advisability of India joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
The last couple of decades have seen a colossal change in terms of the influence that computers can have on the battlefield, with defence pundits claiming it to be the dawn of a new era in warfare. Under these circumstances, there has been a gradual paradigm shift in military thinking and strategies from the strategic aspect to the tactical aspect of cyber warfare, laying more emphasis on it being a potent force multiplier. The author believes this is wrong and rather than cyber warfare being an enhancement of traditional operations, the latter will be force multipliers of cyber warfare.