China's efforts to build 'nodes' of influence in the Indian Ocean Region have been increasingly discernible in recent years. This endeavour, many argue, is driven by Beijing's military-strategic ends. However, such an argument remains a speculation, backed by frail and somewhat disjointed evidence. At least in the public domain, it may be too early to marshal tangible evidence to prove or dismiss the hypothesis.
Economic globalisation, coupled with geopolitical instability and international terrorism, has made it impossible for any single country to secure its energy supply entirely on its own. The urgent energy security issue has resulted in brisk energy diplomacy with aspirations for cooperation running high among both producing and consuming countries. The concept of energy security needs to be expanded, however, because the real risks are not 'below ground' (a lack of resources) but 'above ground' (political instability). We need a new energy security concept to ensure global energy security.
The Sunni Muslims of South Asia are divided into two major sub-sects, i.e. Deobandi and Barelvi, named after their places of origin in India in the 19th century. Because of abiding differences between them, these two sub-sects have built up walls of hatred and mistrust between them over time. The faultline between them has erupted violently in Pakistan since the late 1970s. While there are some pioneering works available on their separate worldviews, no study has yet been attempted to critically analyse the nature of their interaction at the political level.
Gilgit-Baltistan in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir has witnessed a series of political disturbances and violence over the past years. Though many analysts have viewed the often-violent assertions by otherwise peaceful residents of this remote and mountainous region as occasional eruptions of the Shia-Sunni sectarian divide, a careful examination will indicate the deeper roots of alienation of the population in this long-neglected region.
With the discovery of substantial gas in Myanmar's Sittwe region in the Rakhine state, India was keen to acquire gas from some of the new finds in the Shwe gas field, divided in several blocks, of which A-1 and A-2 blocks were closer to India and also estimated to have the best recoverable reserves. Given the geographical location, overland pipelines transiting through Bangladesh are the most cost-effective way of getting gas from Myanmar to India. Despite its initial enthusiasm, Bangladesh backtracked from its earlier willingness to be a partner to the tripartite pipeline.
Tokyo looks at energy security differently than does Washington, or other major global capitals. This persistent and deepening reality—so incongruously at odds with the continual affirmations of solidarity and alliance in the US–Japan bilateral relationship—has substantial grounding in economics. Yet, the contrast in mindset between Japan and the broader world is sharply amplified by differences in domestic institutions and politics. This perceptual gap has major implications for East Asia's energy future and for global geopolitics as well.
The Taliban are proving to be increasingly irrepressible. They seem to be adapting, faster than expected, to the challenges confronting them. Although in terms of weaponry they cannot match the vastly superior Western forces, in terms of propaganda, psyops and operational reach they are proving to be a force to reckon with. In retrospect one can say that the Taliban made good use of the time made available to them by the United States when it shifted its focus towards Iraq in late 2002.
