EU-Libya Migrant Deal
Introduction
On August 23, 2016, the European Union and Libya signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) under which EU is to provide training to Libyan coast guard. The MoU was signed in Rome between Operation Commander of EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Med’s Operation Sophia and Commodore Abdalh Toumia, Commander of the Libyan Coastguard and Port Security. According to the deal, the training will take place on board one of the vessels taking part in Operation Sophia on the high seas. Later the training will shift to Libyan territorial waters. The migrant movements in the Mediterranean are increasingly being viewed from a security prism. Given the lack of feasibility of other policy initiatives in order to deal with Libya, from where majority of migrants cross-over, militarisation remains the only option. Even the military solution is going to achieve partial results and human trafficking will continue to thrive. In all the chaos, migrants will be caught between a rock and a hard place, with Libya being unpropitious to stay and journey to Europe being increasingly perilous.
The human trafficking complex and the Libyan conflict
Due to its geographical position, Libya has always been an important port of departure for immigration to Europe. It has a 1,900 kilometre coastline along the Mediterranean and approximately 4,375 kilometres of land border which it shares with six countries.1 There are many routes that provide entry into Libya from various parts of North, East and West Africa. The country has two seaports, four airports and eight land crossings. During the Qaddafi regime, entry points into Libya were clearly earmarked and manned sufficiently. Even during the Qaddafi regime, there was some amount of illegal migration that took place, yet the EU and member states particularly Italy were able to deal with it by offering incentives to the regime for managing migration. However, the current situation in Libya has exacerbated the illegal migrant flows to Europe.
The migrant crisis in Europe is the product of instability in Libya, which in turn has resulted from the institutional vacuum in the wake of the attempted regime change. Given the nature of polity that lacks truly national actors, the creation of central governing authority has become an increasingly complex task. Libya is divided into rival governments, the internationally recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) which is based in Tripoli and House of Representatives (HOR) based in eastern Libyan city of Tobruk.2 Adding to this chaos are the varied militias that hold authority in various parts of the country. Misrata-based militias are strong in the west, while eastern Libya is under the control of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the head of the Libyan National Army.
The political economy of human trafficking has got deeply intertwined in the conflict within Libya and the country has become fertile ground for human trafficking and smuggling networks. The borders in Libya have become increasingly porous; that has made it relatively easy for criminal gangs to move in and out of the country. Entry points into Libya have not been identified as the government is not in control of the entire territory and borders are being controlled by various tribal groups. Hence border management in Libya has been marred by unprofessionalism and corruption. Libya has become the hub of Sub-Saharan migrant flows towards Europe with routes from eastern and western Africa running through it. The eastern route that heads towards dessert town of Al Kufra runs from Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan. Western route runs from Mali, Nigeria and Chad into Agadez in Niger, and onward to Tripoli.3 Also, in general, adequate infrastructure and resources for border control and management are lacking in many countries like Niger, Sudan and Chad from where the migrations begin.
The human trafficking networks are being proliferated by variety of actors. Tribal groups, militia’s, former Qaddafi regime’s security personals and even some ordinary Libyan citizens have been competing for seeking rents through this network. Tribal groups are increasingly involved in smuggling of migrants as similar ethnic groups straddle across the borders as well. For example, the Tuareg control migrant smuggling routes running from North Niger and Algeria and the Zway tribal group controls eastern migrant routes running from Sudan and Chad.4 The profitability of human trafficking has made it an attractive option for criminal networks and common folk alike.
Another significant development is the increased the pressure on the Central Mediterranean route that runs from Libya. After EU-Turkey migrant deal came into effect on 20 March 2016, the Western Balkan route to Europe has witnessed drop in migrant flows especially from Syria. It witnessed a significant drop of 90 per cent in detection of illegal migrant crossings in the second quarter of 2016.5 Meanwhile on the Central Mediterranean route 51,450 people were detected in an attempt to reach Europe in the same time period, an increase of 174 per cent from previous quarter.6
Militarisation of Policy Dealing with Migrant Crisis
Incentivising is a common policy tool that EU has used to influence transit/origin states to keep a check on migration. In case of the migrant deal signed with Turkey, EU was able to incentivise the deal by offering funds and the prospect of working on liberalisation of travel visa rules for Turkish citizens to travel to the EU. During the Qaddafi regime, EU had used the prospective Framework Agreement to encourage Libya to curb illegal migration. However, the negotiation of the Framework Agreement was suspended in 2011 after the Libyan uprising. The subsequent instability and absence of a sovereign authority in Libya has led to further militarisation of the policy of dealing with the migration crisis on the Central Mediterranean route.
The latest deal signed between EU and Libya is an extension of EU’s militarised approach. Envisaged during the European Council meeting of May 18, 2015, EU launched EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Med’s Operation Sophia in the month of June 2015.7 The mandate of the operation was: first, to contribute to disturb the business of human smuggling and trafficking in the Mediterranean; second, to contribute in prevention of loss of life at sea. The mandate was expanded in June 2016 to include the implementation of UNSC Resolution 2292 that enforces arms embargo on Libya.
This operation has to progress through four phases. The first phase of the operation was about reconnaissance, surveillance and intelligence gathering, while the second phase was for boarding and destroying traffickers’ vessels in the international waters.8 The third phase consists of further extending operations into the Libyan waters, whereby boats will be seized within Libyan waters and destroyed.9 The last phase is about attacking trafficker infrastructure located on Libyan shores and ports.10 For the progression of the third and fourth phase of the operation, the EU must have the legal basis to enter the Libyan waters. The deal is the means of getting access to Libya’s territorial waters for at least the purpose of training. Further, it will involve the Libyan coast guard to check illegal trafficking in its waters. Apart from the maritime domain, EU has taken an interest in aiding Libya in controlling its land borders with its EU Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission (EUBAM Libya). Currently based in Tunis, EUBAM Libya’s focus is on planning future EU missions that would deal with capacity building in the area criminal justice, migration, border security and counter-terrorism. Such future missions will only be operational when Libya gets a stable and sovereign government.
The presence of Islamic State (Daesh) in Libya has fomented a more militarised approach to securing the Mediterranean Sea in order to secure Europe’s southern border. Given the situation in Libya, there is fear that IS might make it a permanent base to carry out attacks in Europe and North Africa. Libya provides the perfect habitat for IS to thrive. IS breeds in chaos and Libya with no national government and plethora of militias is an apt place it. Moreover, the country is rich in hydrocarbons that can be a source of financing Daesh’s activities. In 2015, jihadists associated with Islamic State started gaining foothold in Libya. Taking advantage of the power vacuum in the country, Daesh operates in parts of Derna and Benghazi in eastern Libya and took control of Noifilia and Qaddafi’s home town of Sirte in western Libya. It demonstrated its ability to carry out attacks as in January 2015 when it attacked Corinthia Hotel in Tripoli. Since then it has attacked oil infrastructure and carried out heinous act of beheading Egyptian Coptic Christians. Libya has also become a transit and training ground for IS fighters, especially from North Africa and Sahel region.
Conclusion
The Central Mediterranean route will continue to witness a more militarised approach to controlling migration. However, the success of this approach will be limited. The nature of Libyan government and the security sector will severely limit the implementation of the deal. The GNA lacks control of most of the territory, with large parts of Eastern Libya, Fezzan and Sothern Libya out of its control. The militia men and tribal networks in these regions will continue to support illegal migration since it is profitable. Libyan security sector remains fragmented and lacks professionalism and expertise. The Political Isolation Law prohibits former regime members from assuming any role in the security sector, closing the door on professionals who had training and know-how to contribute to building an effective security regime. Libyan coast guard lacks training and professionalism and in some cases is hand-in-glove with human traffickers, often helping them recover boats for a price. Along with formal Libyan coast guard under the Libyan Navy, militias also maintain coast guards that are in not in control of the Navy.
The EU-Libya deal may actually harm the asylum seekers and migrants by trapping them in Libya at the mercy of militias, local warlords and corrupt officials. NGOs like European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) and Amnesty International have warned about the conditions of migrants in Libya. In the detention centres run by Department for Combatting Illegal Migration (DCIM), in addition to inhumane conditions of detention, migrants face torture, unlawful killings, sexual exploitation and extortion by officials. The migrants are harassed by armed militias and often groups affiliated to IS abduct and abuse them. Libya, by any standards, is not a safe country for migrants and hence intercepting the traffickers and sending migrants back to Libya will only endanger the migrants. Operation Sophia may partially achieve its objectives of disrupting the business model of human traffickers and prevent the loss of life at sea, but may well end up compromising on the larger welfare and safety of asylum seekers and migrants.
Mr. Nachiket Khadkiwala is Research Assistant, ALACUN Centre, IDSA.
- 1. Altai Consulting, “Mixed Migration: Libya at the crossroads: Mapping migration routes from Africa to Europe and Drivers of Migration in Post-revolution Libya”, Tripoli, 2013, p. 94.
- 2. The Libyan Political Agreement signed under auspices of the United Nations created the President’s Council which appointed the Tripoli based Government of National Accord (GNA) for carrying out executive functions and the Tobruk based House of Representatives (HOR) to act as a legislature. However, each have turned into rival power centres. While the GNA is the internationally recognised government, even in Tripoli it faces feeble yet consistent threats to its authority by the remnant of the General National Congress.
- 3. FRONTEX, “People Smuggling in the Central Mediterranean”, http://frontex.europa.eu/feature-stories/people-smuggling-in-the-central-mediterranean-IqDY5g, (Accessed July September 15, 2016).
- 4. Op.Cit. n.1, pp. 54-55.
- 5. FRONTEX, “Frontex Risk Analysis Network Quarterly”, April-June 2016, p.7, http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/FRAN_2016_Q2.pdf, (Accessed July 5, 2016).
- 6. Ibid, p. 9.
- 7. By signing the agreement with GNA, the EU provides boost to the legitimacy of the GNA.
- 8. Council of the European Union, “Council launches EU naval operation to disrupt human smugglers and traffickers in the Mediterranean”, Press Release, June 22, 2015, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/pressreleases/2015/06/22-fac-nav…, (Accessed July 30, 2016).
- 9. Ibid.
- 10. Ibid.
