FOCAC- China’s Deepening Engagement with Africa and Its Implications
The Second Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Summit and the Sixth Ministerial Conference was held in Johannesburg, South Africa in December 2015. Among other things, this forum caught global attention for China’s announcement of a $60 billion fund for economic cooperation with African countries. The fact that this fund surpasses the One Belt One Road (OBOR) fund of $40 billion and the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) fund $46 billion says a lot about the importance China attaches to Africa.
The present commitment of $60 billion is also three times the commitment of $20 billion made in 2012 when FOCAC met the last time. This was also followed by a supplementary lending package of $10 billion in 2014. A closer look reveals that the 2015 commitments only bring together the disaggregated financial commitments China had made to Africa earlier, like the developmental assistance fund or China Africa Development Fund (CAD fund) which was hitherto outside the purview of the FOCAC loans and grants.1
The FOCAC process began in 2000 under the Presidency of Jiang Zemin when the first ministerial meeting was held in Beijing and has come a long way since then as a show of evolving Chinese interests in the African continent. Africa, in many ways, has been a learning ground for China’s international role. What China has been doing in the continent must be watched closely as it showcases the future of Chinese power. There are many examples of this. It was the Sudan conflict where China first took a proactive position on an internationally significant conflict; it was in Mali that China sent its first combatant unit under the UN peacekeeping framework in 2013; and Djibouti will be the first location of the People’s Liberation Army’s overseas base. Djibouti can also be Africa’s access point for the OBOR projects. Africa has also been a site for China to isolate Dalai Lama, as when South Africa denied him a visa for the Nobel peace summit in 2014. 2 Additionally, Africa has been a battleground between China and Taiwan for diplomatic recognition. 3 In 1949, 30 African countries had recognized Taiwan. However, now Taiwan has formal diplomatic relations with only three countries including Burkina Faso, Sao Tome and Principe and Swaziland. China’s financial support has led to this transition. At the same time, China and Taiwan had used monetary means to sway each other’s diplomatic partners until the two sides reached an agreement to put a stop to this. This form of relationship has been called “cheque book diplomacy”.4
The $60 billion commitment made by China is divided into five sub-areas. These include,
- $5 billion of free aid and interest-free loans
- $35 billion of preferential loans and export credit on more favorable terms
- $5 billion of additional capital for the China-Africa Development Fund
- $5 billion of the Special Loan for the Development of African SMEs each and
- China-Africa production capacity cooperation fund with the initial capital of $10 billion. 5
While the major target of funding is infrastructure development, some of the earlier commitments made at FOCAC were aimed fundamentally at propelling economic growth in the countries. FOCAC cooperation and focus on industrialisation in Africa has also helped improve China’s image in Africa as not being only a resource-extracting country. China has also committed to help Africa improve its human resource capacity as part of the FOCAC process. In addition, there is a process for cooperation in the field of agriculture that will improve the food processing industry in Africa. 6 China’s commitment for the human resource development in Africa has also been mentioned in its white paper on Africa wherein it pledged to increase its commitment to human resource development in Africa by ways of training and education, increased exchanges for teachers and students, institutional partnerships between Africa and China for learning best practices and teacher training and vocational training programs for African countries. 7
The Chinese support fund announced in 2015 is aimed at covering areas like industrialization, agricultural modernization, infrastructure, financial services, green development, trade and investment facilitation, poverty reduction and public welfare, public health, people-to-people exchanges, and peace and security, according to the FOCAC press release.8 I n his keynote address at the Johannesburg FOCAC Summit, China’s President Xi Jinping proposed, “that the new type of China-Africa strategic partnership be upgraded to a comprehensive strategic and cooperative partnership”. 9
The trajectory of FOCAC shows that China’s commitment to Africa is of a long-term nature. China is also conscious of the number of UN votes that the African countries have and this was also mentioned by Xi Jinping in referring to the importance of African unity. At the same time, there are obvious challenges that are not addressed as of now. These include corruption and bribery, support for military regimes, indirect interference in the form of rigged elections and violations of human rights.10 FOCAC is a work in progress and so is China’s engagement in Africa; it needs to be studied closely. The Johannesburg Summit assured China’s African dialogue partners that economic slowdown in China would not affect its engagement with the region. African development needs complement China’s excessive capacity during the era of domestic economic slowdown. Therefore, the FOCAC process allows China to fulfil the twin aims of domestic and foreign policy.
- 1. For more see, Kai Xue (2015), “FOCAC 2015: Making sense of the numbers”, Chinafrica Project, December 30, 2015, http://www.chinaafricaproject.com/focac-2015-making-sense-of-the-numbers/, (accessed 12 February 2016).
- 2. The Guardian (2014), “Dalai Lama denied South Africa visa for Nobel Summit”, September 4, 2014, http:// www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/04/dalai-lama-denied-south-africa-vis…, (accessed 12 February 2016).
- 3. Shannon Tiezzi (2013), “Why Taiwan’s Allies are flocking to Beijing”, The Diplomat, November 19, 2013, http:// thediplomat.com/2013/11/why-taiwans-allies-are-flocking-to-beijing/, (accessed February 14, 2016)
- 4. For more see, Ivan Broadhead (2015), “Taiwan on diplomatic eggshells with three remaining African Allies”, South China Morning Post Magazine, December 6, 2015, http://www.scmp.com/magazines/post-magazine/article/ 1886336/taiwan-diplomatic-eggshells-three-remaining-african-allies, (accessed March 3, 2016).
- 5. Xi Jinping (2015), “Open a New Era of China-Africa Win-Win Cooperation and Common Development”, Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Johannesburg Summit of The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, December 4, 2015, “http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1321614.shtml, (accessed February 13, 2016).
- 6. Ibid.
- 7. Information Office of the State Council (2015), “Full Text: China’s Second Africa Policy Paper”, Xinhua, December 4, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-12/04/c_134886545.htm?utm_source=…, (Accessed March 2, 2016).
- 8. FOCAC (2015), “Xi Jinping announces 10 major China Africa Cooperation plans for the coming 3 years”, 6 December 2015, http://www.focac.org/eng/zfgx/dfzc/t1322068.htm, (accessed 12 February 2016).
- 9. Op.Cit., n. 4
- 10. See for example, Katy Migiro (2014), “China’s Aid to Africa funds Corruption”, Business Day, November 20, 2014, http://www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africannews/2014/11/20/chinas-aid-to-afri…, (accessed March 8, 2016)
