Is the Ceasefire Agreement in Myanmar a Step Towards Political Accommodation?

The Thein Sein government concluded a draft agreement with Myanmar`s 16 ethnic groups on 31 March 2015. The agreement was negotiated between the government`s Union Peace Working Committee and the National Ceasefire Coordination Team headed by Naing Han Tha on behalf of the ethnic groups. The draft accord is to be confirmed within a time-frame (by May 2015, according to a government spokesman) after internal consultations among the ethnic groups. The agreement involves a ceasefire, inter alia entailing a halt to recruitment by the armed groups, with a follow-up confirmation of the respective territories and stations to be held by them, and on the nature and composition of the political dialogue which will ensue. These developments have been considered by many within and outside Myanmar as a prelude to a larger understanding on certain issues of autonomy and development of the regions within the overall control of the central government at Nay Pyi Taw. But the Shan state in the north is still in ferment; the agreement with the ethnic groups does not include the Kokang ethnic Chinese group, and civil war conditions are prevailing in Shan since 9 February 2015. While the agreement may be deemed a positive development towards political accommodation among the Tatmadaw (Armed Forces)-dominated present political dispensation, Buddhist Burman majority and diverse ethnic groups, there are still contentious issues to be resolved.

The Myanmar government plans to formalise four draft bills (popularly known as `race and religion` bills) on religious conversion, inter-faith marriage, monogamy, population control, etc. in the near future. Despite the ceasefire agreement, it appears unlikely that these bills would be converted into law before the forthcoming elections in November 2015. A political consensus among all ethnic and religious groups may not be possible, as fundamental differences remain among them on these issues. It will be interesting to watch how the subject of these bills is dealt with both inside the existing Hluttaw (House of Representatives) and outside in the political arena. It is certain, however, that the Rohingya Muslim community of Rakhine province in south-west Myanmar will continue to exist in their disenfranchised and socio-economically excluded condition. In this context, Yanghee Lee, UN Human Rights Investigator on Myanmar, has observed recently that there is no improvement in the status of the Rohingyas. Their position will be further undermined by the implementation of a new law initiated by the Rakhine National Party for stripping all temporary card holders of their voting rights. The condition of the Rohingyas has only worsened since the 2012 violence against them, which displaced more than 150,000; at one time, the Rohingyas had constituted 40 per cent of Rakhine state`s three million population.

Vijay Nambiar, former Indian diplomat and UN Secretary General`s representative on Myanmar, has welcomed the draft ceasefire agreement. But he did not convey any explicit optimism on the feasibility of a comprehensive national level compromise emerging before the November 2015 general elections. This is also the view held by many international observers on Myanmar. In fact, the recent agreement with the ethnic groups had also appeared elusive till it was concluded. There is some expectation now that the agreement may help evolve a modus vivendi with a majority of the ethnic contestants and even pave the way for ultimately sharing power. But a sine qua non for this is that the ethnic groups should arrive at a basic minimum programme on sharing power among themselves in the event of success in the November 2015 elections, initially within the existing Constitutional framework. If issues on governance and regional autonomy are taken up simultaneously, it is unlikely that a national level compromise would be possible before the elections. It may not be unreasonable to opine that a substantive agreement on the issue of regional autonomy and re-distribution of powers among the different tiers of governance, i.e. national, state and local, will prove to be the most intractable. The present ceasefire agreement may not hold if the tussle on the issues of autonomy and regional spread of legislative and administrative powers are pursued vigorously by all concerned.

There are two important issues on which a consensus is needed between the government and the existing political parties and ethnic groups. The first is whether to retain the `first-past-the-post` electoral system or change to a `proportional representation` one. And the second is the removal of the ban on Aung San Suu Kyi from contesting the Presidential elections. If the Thein Sein government concedes on the retention of the first-past-the-post system in deciding the winner of a parliamentary seat, it will be a major concession. Recent by-election results have shown that under the existing first-past-the-post system, the dominance of the Tatmadaw and the Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP) controlled by it can be reduced. Electoral success of different ethnic parties will be feasible because, in multi-party contests, the USDP is unlikely to emerge as the lead party. Significant success is also expected for Aung San Suu Kyi`s National League for Democracy (NLD) as well as larger representation of the ethnic political groups than at present.

Aung San Suu Kyi has hinted recently that a boycott of the November 2015 elections will remain a Constitutional option for the NLD. This is obviously based on the premise that the reform process – particularly at the Constitutional level – does not progress satisfactorily. The ban on Suu Kyi contesting the next Presidential election is also an issue in this regard. A totally new scenario will emerge if the boycott hinted at were to fructify. Its impact on the national ethnic reconciliation process and cessation of armed hostilities cannot be predicted. With the reconciliation incomplete – as it appears most likely before the November 2015 elections – a new situation may emerge. It may well be that, with Aung San Suu Kyi as a pre-eminent national figure outside the governance structure, new opportunities will open up for working out a broad-based understanding on matters of regional autonomy and sharing of powers relating to development and control of natural resources. It is possible that with General Shwe Man, presently not part of the ruling dispensation but having some tacit understanding with Aung San Suu Kyi, a political alignment may emerge with support of most ethnic groups to control the Hutlaw. With the General as a head of a coalition of diverse political forces or as President and Aung San Suu Kyi in the role of some sort of a national political mentor, the issues of political assimilation and accord may be better facilitated. It may be an over-optimistic assessment to expect the present Thein Sein regime to achieve a substantive and comprehensive political accord in the run-up to the elections.

The present and the near-future political churning will be carefully monitored by all interested neighbouring countries, particularly India and China, given Myanmar`s geo-political position vis-à-vis China’s resource logistics through the region and India`s security concerns. While it will be in India`s overall interest to support and facilitate Myanmar`s internal political reconciliation process, New Delhi will have to ensure that the political space presently enjoyed by the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang group) which is still using the western areas of Myanmar as hideouts in tacit collaboration with the Tatmadaw, gets constricted.

Gautam Sen is an ex- Additional Controller General of Defence Accounts of Government of India, former Adviser to Government of Nagaland, and is presently Adviser to a former Chief Minister of Nagaland & sitting Member of the Lok Sabha.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.