Kashmir has been on the boil for several months now. The situation looked grim till the All Party Delegation (APD) intervened to review the situation, and since then some calm seems to have been restored. The APD treaded cautiously during its visit to gauge the public mood and angst and, above all, to ascertain the reasons for the unprecedented street rage. The central government ultimately followed up on the visit with an eight point resolution. The initiative chiefly entails nomination of interlocutors to engage all stakeholders in the Valley. It attempts to address several contentious issues such as the review of the disturbed areas, the deployment of the security forces, and the desirability of security posts in urban areas. A special task force for Jammu and Ladakh divisions has also been suggested to give a balanced look to the new proposal.
On the face of it the Centre’s approach of reaching out to the people looks encouraging, but whether it can address the fundamental issues underlying the unrest remains uncertain.
Evidently the doubts stem from the pattern of street violence witnessed during the last four months. As the protests broke out in early July 2010, the needle of suspicion was immediately pointed towards the possible involvement of foreign militant organisations and their sponsors. But soon thereafter the focus shifted to the inefficacy of the incumbent government, criticism of the excessive use of force, and a call for revocation of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, and raging unemployment in the Valley. In between, one also heard about the devious role played by the Masrat Alam – Asiya Andrabi – Mohammad Qasim Faktoo trio, and about the intransigence of the separatist leadership divided into three prominent camps headed by Syed Ali Shah Geelani, Mirwaiz Umer Farooq, and Yasin Malik. Some even allege that the leading opposition party in the state, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), also had a role in the recent unrest in an attempt to discredit the government of the day.
Some argue that the autonomy issue is not the principal cause of dissatisfaction. It is rather mis-governance by an `absentee` state leadership that led to the people’s dissatisfaction being exploited by various political entities. To put it simply, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) is rooting for the removal of the Chief Minister to make itself relevant; Syed Shah Geelani is busy resurrecting himself from being a non-entity; Mirwaiz Umar Farooq is saving his political constituency by giving an `azadi` tilt to his earlier standpoint; and Yasin Malik is reiterating his old demand for independence. It may be worth noting that the demand for `azadi` parroted by the separatists is distinctively different from the demand being articulated for administrative autonomy by the mainstream political parties in Jammu and Kashmir.
Clearly, a mix of contributory factors explains the recent public rage and stone pelting in the Valley. Whatever might be the underlying reasons for these unprecedented street protests, it is clear that one issue – the scope and extent of autonomy – has re-emerged as a point of intense debate in Kashmir today.
The debate has several aspects: the precise meaning of `azadi`, the several stakeholders involved, and the boundaries of the autonomy debate. Each of the three aspects suffers from a lack of clear understanding and interpretation. Fundamentally the debate can be explained at three levels.
The fundamental question therefore is to ascertain if any of those parties are prepared to abide by the terms of the Indian Constitution in their demands for autonomy. Clearly, Syed Ali Shah Geelani, and Masrat Alam, Asiya Andrabi and Mohammad Qasim Faktoo have already excluded themselves from this debate – both through their public pronouncements and unabashed support for the street violence. In a televised interview to News X, Geelani, made three assertions. First, there is no third option for the Kashmiris, i.e. it is either merger with India or Pakistan. Second, since the Indian state has failed to meet the demands of the Kashmiri populace, joining Pakistan is the only viable option. These demands have seldom been precisely articulated, and Geelani’s several explanations on his political stance were not convincing during the televised interview. And third, the hardliners would not like to respond to peace overtures from the Indian state. They seem to be confident that jaunty political posturing without responsibility would do no harm to them.
At yet another level, the views of the new separatist trio are probably even more extreme. Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, Yasin Malik and a few others who do not have much public following cannot make up their minds and therefore can only proffer ideas which may not have much acceptance. Most importantly, the views offered by the moderate separatist leaders are essentially limited to urban areas and invoke limited following beyond their traditional bastions. In effect, the only practical negotiating partners are the representatives of the mainstream political parties – NC and PDP. Lately, these two parties too seem to be eyeing the `azadi` slogan as a profitable political business, which partly explains the Chief Minister’s recent outburst.
Ideally speaking, the several positions articulated within the Valley on the autonomy debate need to be reconciled by evolving a political consensus among the Kashmiris themselves (including the hardliners). But this may not happen so easily. So, how can the separatists be brought to the table is an issue that will have to be addressed by the yet-to-be appointed interlocutors in the long term. And if this consensus does not come about, then when and how does the Indian state ring the bell for Geelani and his like. There are three distinct ways of dealing with this situation to the advantage of the Indian state.
While exercising the first option may not be desirable (some may even say this is the most desirable), the Indian establishment should also not be overly enthusiastic about pursuing the third option. It would instead be prudent to pursue the second option in order to keep the debate flexible so as to accommodate the fence sitters, and for once call the bluff of the hardliners. This would not only send out a firm signal to the hardliners but also shatter their political pipedreams.
A few aspects, among other important issues, would assume significance in this context.
Given the growing interest of extra-regional powers in the resolution of the Kashmir problem, it is time that the Indian political leadership, through its new set of interlocutors, clearly rings the bell on the limits of the autonomy debate, and in particular exposes the political designs and machinations of the hardline factions. Empathy and concern for the Kashmiri populace is most essential but it cannot come at cost of the state’s ability to assert itself firmly against the separatist rants and raves.