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Perspectives on Crisis in Central African Republic

Ahana Banerjee
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The stand-off between the Central African Republic (CAR) President Francois Bozizé and the rebel forces Seleka ended with the ousting of President Bozizé from office on March 24, 2013. The coup in CAR witnessed the deployment of French and South African military troops leading up to a final clash between South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and Seleka on March 23, near Bangui in CAR. The onset of the crisis in CAR has highlighted – first, that CAR’s firewall against the regional contagion of conflicts and coups had proved ineffective; second, that CAR’s foreign relations with China, France and South Africa in the recent years have been largely influenced by competition for the country’s natural resources; third, the CAR crisis has dented South Africa’s international image as a continental leader. Consequentially, the emerging issues include South Africa’s ability to influence continental affairs and France’s military non-intervention.

The conflict between SANDF and Seleka left 13 South African soldiers dead, making it South Africa’s biggest military loss in the post-apartheid era. The situation further deteriorated as the South African engagement in CAR became controversial following reports in the Mail and Guardian that South African troops had been deployed to safeguard South African business interests in CAR. However, the South African government maintained that their presence in CAR was in accordance with a 2007 bilateral defence agreement signed between CAR and South Africa.
The domestic political crisis in CAR has exposed deeper political fault lines. The retention of South African troops after Bozizé’s ouster is telling. It has been reported that the SANDF had ‘deployed more troops to the CAR following days of clashes between armed forces and rebels’.1 There was extreme confusion on the ground as the troops did not have a specific mandate nor were they withdrawn. The sub-optimal policy response on South Africa’s part, at worst, reinforces the allegations that private interests were the key drivers of the bilateral defence agreement between CAR and South Africa, and at best is indicative of poor decision making. The largest opposition party in South Africa, the Democratic Alliance commented that: “The conclusion is inescapable that the South African troops were deployed to defend the faltering and dictatorial Bozizé regime,”2 and called for the immediate withdrawal of troops.3 President Zuma responded by reiterating that the troops were deployed in accordance with the 2007 agreement and subsequently stated that the troops were going to be called back on account of ‘deteriorating security and absence of a legitimate government in Bangui’. 4 The final call for troop withdrawal came in as late as April 3, 2013 highlighting the delayed political response. This has led experts to comment that South Africa will be well advised to take pointers from ‘the knowledge and understanding of the African context amassed over decades by traditional powers.’ 5

In addition to the criticism of the South African policy, the bilateral defence agreement has also been strongly condemned. The Mail and Guardian reported that: ‘Zuma failed to inform Parliament, as required by the Constitution, of plans for deploying the troops’. 6 The report further quoted Maître Zarambaud Assingambi, a constitutional lawyer in CAR who said: ‘There is nothing wrong with the president signing a defence agreement, but any such agreement must be ratified by the national assembly, and Bozizé did not do that’. 7 Zarambaud is reported to have stated that there was no clear reason for bringing in external troops in the CAR for a domestic problem. 8 In this context , the South African minister Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula’s response that: “South Africa’s involvement in the Central African Republic, just as was the case in Burundi, DRC, Sudan and elsewhere, has been in pursuance of our international obligation to ensure stability and peace in the continent,” 9 – does little to dispel concerns relating to South African policy drivers.

It is interesting to note that Article 28 of the constitution of CAR has been cited10 to draw attention to the fact that defence agreements are signed for external aggression and do not extend to civil wars. This may explain why the French troops did not intervene in the current coup, despite the CAR-France defence agreement of 2010. President Hollande explained it thus: “if we are present it is not to protect any regime but to protect our citizens and our interests.” 11 However, this statement needs to be studied in the context of France’s decreasing resource access in CAR which stresses that the impact of competition for natural resources on political decisions should not be discounted.

The French and South African military deployments both need to be examined in the light of recent oil concessions and uranium extraction deals made by the Bozizé government. The competition for oil and uranium resources between China, France and South Africa in CAR is of particular significance in this regard. The contracts signed by the Bozizé government from 200912 clearly indicate that the final beneficiaries have been the South African and Chinese corporations. This proves that business interests determine the interaction between the global powers and CAR apart from the desire for stronger relations with China. Therefore, despite Hollande’s statement, the lack of French intervention can possibly be attributed to their desire for natural resources. 13 This has gained momentum in view of the CAR coup leader Michel Djotodia’s statement that the contracts given to Chinese companies could be reviewed. 14 The priority accorded to business interests is further reinforced by the impending deployment of South African soldiers in the fragile security matrix of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Zuma’s decision to deploy 1000 soldiers in eastern DRC as a part of the United Nations mandate against rebels15 in a region where Zuma’s nephew has extensive business interests has fuelled speculation regarding South Africa’s policy motives. This indicates that domestic accountability and efficient decision making in South Africa’s foreign policy is hampered by business and corporate manoeuvrings.

Keywords: Africa, South Africa
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