Follow Facebook MP-IDSA
Follow Page
Follow Linkdin MP-IDSA
Follow Page
Follow X MP-IDSA
Follow Page
Subscribe Youtube MP-IDSA
subscribe

Radicalisation in South East Africa: A case study of Mozambique

Mathew Sinu Simon
Archive data: Person was Research Analyst at MP-IDSA Dr. Mathew Sinu Simon is a Research Analyst in the Internal Security Centre at MP-IDSA. His expertise lies in International Organizations, European… Continue reading Radicalisation in South East Africa: A case study of Mozambique read more
Commentary

A United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report of 2017- ‘Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment’ claims that deprivation and marginalisation, underpinned by weak governance, were primary forces driving young Africans into violent extremism.1 The report also observes that 51 per cent of young Africans who joined extremist organisations cited religion as a reason for joining an extremist group, 57 percent of them admitted to understanding little to nothing of the religious texts or interpretations, or not reading religious texts at all. In the light of this report, an assessment is made of the rise of radicalism in Southeast Africa, with a focus on Mozambique.

The Journey to Radicalisation

Following the growth and spread of Boko Haram and Al Shabab in eastern and western parts of Africa, radicalisation has percolated to Mozambique.2 Coastal northern Mozambique has a long history of trade and movement of people with the rest of East Africa. People in this area are predominantly Muslim. The offshore discovery of one of the largest natural gas fields in Africa in 2010 triggered dreams of wealth, but so far there has been little impact locally. Mozambique has also become increasingly corrupt in recent years and its coastal north has become a major centre for ivory, timber, heroin and ruby smuggling – with the involvement of police and other government officials. Local smuggling barons incorporated the militant young men into their networks and paid them well. The border with Tanzania is not controlled and there has always been a movement of people. This has worsened because of increased smuggling – mainly from Kenya, Somalia and the Great Lakes through Mozambique to South Africa.

The deadly mix of poverty, corruption and smuggling has created a space for radical elements to grow. A new Islamist militant group, Ansar al-Sunna (Supporters of Tradition) is gaining a foothold in Mozambique, East Africa.3 Locals call the group “Al-Shabaab”, although they appear to have no direct links with the Somali group of the same name. It arose in the northern districts of Cabo Delgado in Mozambique first as a religious group, but by 2015 began to radicalise further and include military cells. Its early members were followers of Aboud Rogo Mohammed, the radical Kenyan cleric who was shot dead in 2012, by unknown assailants. The early Ansar al-Sunna members were followers of Rogo’s work. They first settled in Kibiti, in southern Tanzania before entering Mozambique.4

Ansar al- Sunna carried out a flurry of brutal attacks in Mozambique since October 2016. They were instrumental in coordinated attacks on three Mocimboa da Praia police installations on October 5, 2017. Then, on January 11, 2018 they attacked a community from the administrative post of Olumbe, Palma district and killed seven people and burned down their houses. This was followed by a deadly attack on May 16, 2018, when a group of young men armed with guns and knives attacked Ilala, a coastal locality in Macomia. The recurrent violent attacks in terms of, shootings, stabbings, arson and killings were most evidently high in the month of June 2017. A common trend by way of their modus operandi is that they attack and decapitate people indiscriminately with machetes and firearms and burn down their houses and villages.

According to the study entitled “Islamic radicalisation in northern Mozambique: the case of Mocimboa da Praia” (2017), members of Ansar al-Sunna have been recruited through family ties and mosques.5 This study found that the group’s leaders have links (religious, military and commercial) with fundamentalist groups in Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania and the Great Lakes region. They differentiate themselves from the orthodox Muslims of Cabo Delgado by adopting a distinctive dress – white turbans, shaved heads, long beards, and black shorts. The group members allegedly enter mosques wearing shoes and carrying weapons. The group’s leaders ostensibly shun dialogue with other Muslims. Radicalised youth in the country apparently sold their property to finance their trips to Somalia. The group has used jihadist videos similar to those used by radical movements in Africa to promote and radicalise its following.

The group claims that mainstream Mozambican mosques have abandoned the teachings of the Prophet Mohammed and are a degenerate form of Islam. Ansar al-Sunna calls for the implementation of Sharia law and refuses to recognise Mozambican law. They refuse to send their children to official schools, and reluctant to enter into any dialogue with Mozambican state bodies or with the local religious leaderships. The study also stated that the group’s social base is among unemployed and marginalised youth, particularly speakers of the Kimwani language.6

The training camps are located in the Cabo Delgado districts of Mocimboa da Praia, Macomia and Montepuez, where training is provided by former Mozambican police personnel. Nuro Adremane and Jafar Alawi are said to be the leaders of the group.7 In terms of composition, the group includes Mozambicans, Tanzanians and Somalis. Reports also state that members are mostly Mozambicans from Mocimboa da Praia, Palma and Macomia districts.

Poaching, trafficking in ruby, timber and wood are said to be the group’s main source of income, which are mainly used to purchase military equipment and communication. According to an estimate, the group generates at least $3 million a year from trafficking in timber and $30 million from rubies, although these figures are likely exaggerated.8 The growth of Ansar al-Sunna is a troubling development for Mozambique as the group has focused its activities on Cab Delgado, known as a hub for mining and petroleum exploration. Recent reports also suggest that subcontractors for Anadarko, the oil firm leading the development efforts, had suspended work in Palma over security concerns. 9

As Ansar-al Sunna is a relatively young terror group, the Mozambican Government has stepped up its offensive in the form of a military crackdown. In late December 2017, government forces carried out a helicopter raid and a bombardment from naval vessels on the village of Mitumbate in Mocímboa de Praia District, which was believed to be the group’s stronghold. Government forces reportedly killed 50 people including women and children and detained some 200 others apart from security measures, the government approved a proposal for a law to combat terrorism.

Conclusion

The distinct feature of radicalisation in Mozambique is that local issues enable the Ansar ul Sunna to conduct its nefarious activities. So rather than take a hard approach, it would serve the Government well to address the growing local concerns of unemployment, social exclusion and underdevelopment in order to curb the influence of Islamic extremism in Mozambique. In terms of long term stability, the government and multinational corporations should make investments in community development, thereby providing the local population with better employment opportunities. There is a need to promote civic education for young people in the affected areas, which will be translated into a plan of action, with tasks and responsibilities, monitoring mechanisms and deadlines, to prevent radicalism of any kind undermining national stability.

Dr. Mathew Sinu Simon is Research Analyst, Internal Security Centre, IDSA.

Keywords: Africa, Radicalisation
  • Visitor No: 000058457
  • © Manohar Parikar Institute For Defence Studies and Analysis
  • XHTML validation2.0 Level Double-A Conformance
    CSS Validator
    Explanation of WCAG 2.0 Level Double-A Conformance