Tackling or Trailing the Taliban : An Assessment

Backdrop

The Pakistani armed forces have been fighting the rising tide of insurgency in the frontier provinces for several years now. The counter offensive launched in the last week of April commenced by securing the fringe districts of Islamabad by Pakistani Rangers to ward off the immediate threat to the National Capital Region. This was done in a bid to enable smooth passage and deployment of east to west bound military formations. The counterinsurgency operations are focused on re-claiming the territory under Taliban control, clearing resistance along major roads leading to Swat and Dir valleys and re-establishing administrative control in NWFP. Having fought through several hard battles in Swat, Dir, Buner, Shangla and Malakand, the Pakistan army is now poised to extend its operations into South Waziristan. Despite several claims made by Pakistan’s political and military hierarchy, the military action seems to have yielded little success, and, in many ways, proved counter productive in light of the large civilian dislocation and collateral damage. Nearly eleven weeks of relentless fighting has claimed several hundred civilian and military casualties, besides an estimated three and half million people displaced during the operations. This piece analyses the military operations conducted so far and makes an assessment of the security situation in Pakistan.

Progress of Operations

Being the seventh largest standing military in the world, the Pakistan army has practically no dearth of troops to undertake sustained counterinsurgency operations in the frontier provinces, albeit in the absence of a trained force, this can only be at the cost of its conventional war fighting potential. Lack of capable forces to fight a non-state actor and its incessant obsession with its eastern borders inhibits commitment of adequate force levels for anti-Taliban operations. Of the total force level available to Pakistan, the army with ease can commit in excess of eight to ten divisions to fight militancy in the frontier provinces, without overly disturbing its defensive posture in the east. Praveen Swami in an article in The Hindu dated June, 8, 2009 points out that Operation Rah-e-Rast launched in NWFP and assigned to HQ 10 Corps is supported by close to seven to eight brigade size formations re-located from the east, to include elements of 23 and 37 Infantry Divisions (37 Division forms part of Pakistan’s 1 Corps and also designated as the northern army reserve). The 333 Brigade from Jalalpur Jattan, 30 and 212 Brigades from 4 Corps and 54 Brigade from 30 Corps are also part of the deployment. In North and South Waziristan operations continue with the 7 and 9 Divisions of the 11 Corps under Operation Al-Mizan. In addition, 14 Division of 31 corps has also been tasked to secure the Bannu-Dera Ismail Khan road axis against a potential Taliban thrust in Punjab.

Concerns expressed in some quarters over the fragility of Pakistan’s relationship with India and therefore its reluctance to re-locate additional formations from east is a weak argument, and perhaps an attempt to find fault with a neighbour for its own domestic problems. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Pakistani establishment has demonstrated some resolve, though far from adequate, in deploying a few military formations, to fight an estimated 40,000 strong Tehrik-i-Taliban (TPP) in NWFP. The Taliban is well known for exploiting the social network of Pashtun tribes to degrade the ongoing military operations. In light of their growing relationship with militant outfits from Punjab, it poses a formidable operational challenge to Pakistan’s security forces. Counterinsurgency operations in the frontier provinces thus far have been characterised by indiscriminate use of fire power that include artillery guns, gun ships and fighter jets and, most importantly by inadequacy of `boots’ on the ground. The Pakistani military counter offensive in 2009 is summarised in a chronological order to enable an analysis of the operations undertaken till date.

NWFP

FATA

North and South Waziristan

Note: – This compilation of events is based on reports posted by Bill Roggio at www.longwarjournal.com.

An Assessment

Pakistani military operations so far have focussed on re-establishing control over important population centres in NWFP. Bulk of the fighting has centred on important towns of Mingora, Saidu Sharif, Peochar, Kabal and Dir and along the road axes N45 and N95 leading into the region. Reports of continued fighting in the NWFP suggest that Pakistani security forces are yet to clear all pockets of resistance and establish full control in the hinterland. In all probability, the pace and pattern of operations adopted by the Pakistan army would have prompted Taliban fighters to vanish into remote areas of Swat and Dir districts, in order to avoid any serious engagement with the security forces and suffer undue attrition. The possibility of them moving further east into districts of Battagram and Manshera bordering Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) cannot be ruled out; a development that may have to be closely watched in the Indian context. The Pakistan Army too seems to be in a big rush, without concluding its operations in NWFP it has launched simultaneous operations in South Waziristan. Its ability to advance operations simultaneously could be suspect and perhaps only an attempt to evoke a favourable opinion from the international community.

An assessment of the operations undertaken till date reveals several conceptual and operational flaws in the Pakistani military’s approach towards tackling the Taliban. Some issues that merit discussion are highlighted.

• Substituting strategy with fire power can be tempting and more so for a force that lacks experience in fighting an enemy as cunning as the Taliban. Technology has a place in conventional warfare and its exploitation to initiate and sustain momentum of military operations is well known. Its relevance for counterinsurgency operations is no less important, but then its focus clearly lies elsewhere. Counterinsurgency operations call for a more restrained and calculated use of weapon platforms and fire power. The pace and pattern of operations as demonstrated by the Pakistan military clearly defies all normative principles for an effective `people centric’ counterinsurgency campaign. Fire power needs to follow boots on the ground and not the other way around and, in a given operational context in the frontier provinces, its usage would be more relevant in the field of intelligence gathering, aerial and ground based surveillance, reconnaissance of targets, rotary wing based transportation of troops and wide spectrum access communications at the tactical level. In fact, the employment of high impact ground based and aerial weapon platforms with imprudence and utter disregard for the well being of the local populace can have serious strategic consequences, both at the level of governance and for progress in subsequent military operations.
• The tough challenge presented by the Taliban has certainly put the Pakistan military on a steep learning curve, in so far as counterinsurgency operations are concerned. The deep rooted and `east centric’ mindset of the Pakistan military hierarchy seems to be inhibiting its grasp over an entirely different operational situation and in turn, affecting the smooth conduct of counterinsurgency operations. As David Kilcullen notes, counterinsurgency campaigns are best undertaken by adopting an `ink blot’ strategy, implying the need to establish and secure an initial foothold and, then gradually grow in operational size and influence to include the hinterland. This requires time and surely cannot be achieved in haste. Moreover, counterinsurgency operations are a function of simple inter-se ratios such as population versus troops, militants versus troops and acreage versus troops, all of which seems to be badly skewed in the case of operations in NWFP. Furthermore and at least in the initial stages, success in counterinsurgency operations is measured by kills achieved or surrenders engineered and, as reports indicate no Taliban leader of consequence has been killed or captured till date. Similarly, busting militant hideouts and recovery of arms and ammunition make only good news and not a good metric for measuring success on ground.
• Of an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 Taliban cadres reported in NWFP, the assessed number of Taliban fighters killed as a consequence of recent military action stands at less than 2000. In addition, the Long War Journal assesses the Taliban strength in FATA and Waziristan provinces at around 100,000 cadres (30,000 with Baitullah Mehsud; 50,000 with the other three tribal leaders namely Haqqani, Gul Bahadur and the deceased Zainuddin; and another 20,000 with minor tribes in the region). This explains the magnitude of the military problem and, however inflated these figures might be, the Pakistani military is far from arresting the tenuous situation in the frontier provinces. The Pakistan military modus operandi of vacating towns and villages prior to launch of operations too has contributed to the loss of tactical surprise and, in all probability pushed Taliban cadres to other areas including the districts bordering Jammu and Kashmir. If the recent militant attack in Muzafarabad in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) is any indication, apprehensions of the eastward drive of the Taliban may soon prove true. The border city of Muzafarabad has been the traditional stronghold of Pakistani and Kashmiri militant groups operating in Jammu and Kashmir, and in this context, the incident needs to be taken seriously.
• The appalling conditions reported at IDP camps is sure to exacerbate growing dissatisfaction amongst the local population, a situation that could give rise to yet another strain of militancy in the frontier provinces. These camps could directly or indirectly contribute to strengthening the Taliban cause or perhaps give rise to the `new’ Taliban. Another issue of concern has been the low head count in the IDP camps; as against an estimated three and a half million people rendered homeless, only a few lakhs are registered in these camps, while a majority have preferred staying away with host families or as paying guests elsewhere in Pakistan. It is also quite possible that the civilian dislocation figures could have been inflated to attract more foreign aid. This cross provincial movement could add to the worsening security situation in provinces of Punjab and Sindh, including the low profile insurgency raging in the province of Balochistan.
• Long drawn operations can be a severe test of grit and determination of the junior leadership and the military leadership at the highest level. In conventional warfare, the decision making weight of leadership clearly lies at the operational level, whereas in the sub-conventional context it is leadership at the tactical level that contributes to strategic consequences of a counterinsurgency campaign. Recent reports indicate a few incidents of insubordination in Pakistani military units deployed in the frontier provinces. Prominent amongst these have been reports of mutiny in three brigades from Parachinar, Kohat and Turbat, desertion of a few hundred soldiers and acts of insubordination by air force personnel. Sustained operations impose severe physical and mental stress on troops, manifesting in disciplinary or morale related problems. Cracks in morale can impact operational effectiveness of fighting formations and this in turn can have serious organisational consequences. This needs to be seen in the context of soldiers hailing from the Pashtun belt who constitute nearly 14 per cent or more of the Pakistani Army. Recent reports of embedding psychologists in the Pakistan Army are perhaps indicative of the impact of operations on troops in the frontier provinces; monetary allowances too have been significantly hiked to compensate fighting formations. In real terms, the actual effect on morale could be gauged eventually from the ensuing recruitment data and trends.

The Taliban Calculus

There is no doubt that the Taliban currently has the initiative in Pakistan, but whether this alliance has the drive and capacity to expand its operations and destabilize the hinterland is yet to be clearly seen. In this context, the recent initiative of dropping leaflets in restive agencies of North Waziristan by the Pakistani Army is perhaps an attempt to narrow down the operational focus on Baitullah Mehsud, rather than running a broad based anti-Taliban military campaign. The Pakistani army has strong reasons to be worried about North Waziristan and largely for two reasons. One, it is yet to convincingly conclude the ongoing operations in Swat and two, the traditional stronghold of the key Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud in South Wazirsitan is yet to be addressed. It is well known that the Afghan Taliban leader Jalaluddin Haqqani also operates from this area against Coalition forces in Afghanistan.

US forces may want the Pakistan army to pursue operations in both North and South Waziristan, but their reluctance to relocate additional forces from the eastern borders and unwillingness to unduly hurt Pashtun sentiment may hold them back from launching meaningful operations across the western frontier. But now with the North Waziristan leader Hafiz Gul Bahadur scrapping the peace deal signed by the Pakistani government with tribal elders from Dawar and Wazir sub tribes in February 2008, there is a possibility that this could give an opportunity to Baitullah Mehsud to buy out an escape in collusion with Hafiz Gul Bahadur to North Waziristan, or even Afghanistan. In this context, speculation is rife that the Pakistani army has no choice but to expand the scope of current military operations to include North Waziristan as well. Should this happen the Taliban will be successful in stretching the Pakistani army to a breaking point and in diluting the military pressure that seems to be building up against South Waziristan. Either way, the Pakistani Army has difficult times ahead in terms of stretched and stressful deployment caused by the Taliban’s alliance with the Al-Qaeda leadership in the frontier provinces.

Choices and Options

General Jehangir Karamat, in a recent panel discussion coordinated by the Atlantic Council South Asia Center on challenges facing Pakistan’s army, described the militant activity emanating from the tribal areas as a `full-blown insurgency’ and predicted a protracted struggle for the security forces to bring stability to the troubled region. He emphasized that the prevailing situation has the potential to establish links with Jehadi groups elsewhere in Pakistan, to carry out terrorist strikes within the country. In his opinion, such attacks could destabilize the civilian government and disrupt ongoing counterinsurgency operations in the tribal areas. In the Indian context, the current trajectory of events in Pakistan suggests an increase in Taliban’s presence in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) and in due course, attempts to heighten infiltration across the Line of Control and violence in the Kashmir Valley.

With additional US troops now exerting pressure in the southern districts of Afghanistan under operations codenamed Dagger and Panther’s Claw, the Pakistan Army has an added task of preventing the ingress of Afghan Taliban into the frontier provinces. The two operations launched early this month with more than 4,000 US Marines and 650 Afghan soldiers were air dropped into the districts of Nawa, Reg, and Garmsir. Several weeks before the operation, more than 3,000 British, Danish, Estonian and US troops from Task Force Helmand had laid the groundwork for Operation Dagger by seizing fifteen river and canal crossings along the Helmand River between Gereshk in Nawa and the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah. The move was designed to block Taliban forces from crossing the river as well as to secure the local the populace in the Lashkar Gah-Gereshk region. In a complementary move, the Pakistani Army too deployed forces along the border district of Chagai in Balochistan. Due to the long and porous border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the situation in the region could worsen with Taliban groups from both sides joining hands to fight the US and Pakistani forces.

Most interestingly and in view of the internal and external security challenges being faced in the region, the Pakistani Army along with the air force and naval components is conducting a major brain storming session codenamed Azam-e-Nau, attended by the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, Chief of Army Staff, Chief of Naval Staff and Chief of Air Staff at the National Defence University from 13th July 2009. The war game intends to analyse the nature and magnitude of threats faced by Pakistan and to validate an effective response in accordance with the existing operational environment. The exercise would be keenly watched by all stake holders in the region in order to ascertain the sincerity of Pakistan’s political and military hierarchy in dealing with the problem.