The new impetus in China’s security engagement with Africa
China’s evolving engagement in African security matters has off late seen new impulses in multilateral and unilateral approaches to the continent, especially in the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Since former Chinese president Hu Jintao announced Beijing’s new security policy towards Africa at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2012, the aim of addressing China’s concerns related to its local and global reputation, economic and business interests and protection of its citizens on the continent, have been at the forefront of Beijing’s policy priorities.1 The larger ‘China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security’ that was simultaneously launched was meant to integrate security issues into FOCAC, but was in need of further refinement to move from rhetorical commitment to more institutionalised involvement. Even though the complexities of this process remain a challenge to the Chinese leadership, not only clashing at times with its foreign policy principle of non-interference, but also creating novel situations on the ground that Beijing has to deal with, further steps have been taken to carve out a niche role for China’s contribution to security in Africa. This simultaneously serves Beijing’s aim of professionalizing and internationalizing its own security forces.
New Impulses
A new set of initiatives announced by Chinese President Xi at the 70th year anniversary of the United Nations in September 2015 in New York is part of the gradual approach of Beijing to increase its international security engagement. The anniversary celebrations have given Xi the opportunity to outline his UN agenda in what is generally perceived as a more proactive foreign policy. He has done so on several occasions where he has taken the main stage to announce 1) an assistance fund of 2 billion dollar for South-South cooperation plus 12 billion to the least developing countries by 2030 in the context of the SDG’s 2) 1 billion to a China-UN Peace Fund mostly aimed at boosting multilateral cooperation, the African Union in particular and 3) a UN peacekeeping stand-by force plus a peacekeeping police contingent.2 These engagements mean a fresh impetus mostly to China’s involvement with the African continent. With this China is trying to live up to the demands of the international community through the preferred UN framework, while at the same time brushing up its image of a responsible emerging power and leader of the developing world at a time that Beijing’s ‘go global’ campaign is at its apparent height. Xi’s broader initiatives came ahead of the last FOCAC meeting of early December 2015, where he committed to specific plans in contributing to APSA, in addition to many other areas. Support in boosting the capacity of the African Standby Force and the African Capacity for the Immediate Response to Crisis through 60 million dollars in aid to the African Union is one of the main pillars in this effort.
UNPKO and the PAP
In addition to these plans, Xi pledged to intensify its participation in UN peacekeeping missions in the context of China’s multilateral approach to African security. Although India, Bangladesh and Pakistan have long been the largest contributors to UN peacekeeping missions, China is catching up, slowly moving towards providing more security and military personnel to UN missions instead of its traditional contribution of technical and medical staff. Beijing has already taken part in combatant roles in UN-missions in South-Sudan, Darfur and most recently Mali, although with mixed results.3 What is remarkable here though is the increased stake of the People’s Armed Police (PAP), predominantly responsible for domestic security and stability and on which Beijing spends more than on its defence budget. Not only did Xi announce a peacekeeping stand-by force of 8000 troops, he also came forward with the establishment of a permanent peacekeeping police squad. If all this comes through, China would become the largest troop-contributing force of the UN, and it would also be a huge leap from the current 3000 Chinese blue-helmet women and men currently deployed.4
The PAP, falling under the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), is Beijing’s newest tool in the widening deployment and internationalization of its security forces. Filling a gap in the much-needed work of police officers in UN missions, China will deploy more of its armed police forces in the years ahead. But living up to the UN needs is far from the only reason the PAP is being propelled abroad. Liao Jinrong, director of the International Cooperation Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security told the China Daily that they would “deal with riots and mass incidents, as well as to help with security in large-scale activities, cybersecurity and counterterrorism actions”.5 Not coincidentally, these are also on top of the priority list in China itself. But gaining experience in these type of operations abroad, cooperating with other nations and police forces on these matters, and gathering information about the situation on the ground is in Beijing’s eyes a much-needed by-catch of partaking in UN missions in several African countries in a multilateral setting. This is broadening the scope of China’s professed international security engagements so far.
Djibouti and Counter-piracy
China’s unilateral approach to security matters has also experienced a new milestone. The long-awaited support facility that China will construct in Djibouti is a welcome facilitative logistical stepping stone not only for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and PLA Navy, but also the PAP to operate in a region far from China’s shores.6 The piracy threat in the Gulf of Aden and Western Indian Ocean being far less imminent, Beijing is looking for other ways to get practice in how best to safeguard its growing global interests. Especially, Beijing’s ability to protect its citizens abroad is under intense scrutiny of China’s active netizen-community. Xi was sure to respond quickly and fiercely to the beheading of the first Chinese citizen by ISIS last year, a prelude to more intensive Chinese involvement in fighting terrorism abroad.7 When three Chinese businessmen were killed in a terrorist attack in Mali in November 2015, the government rushed to declare through their media mouthpieces that Chinese troops in the country were too far away from the location of the attack, and were moreover present solely under UN mandate. On other occasions, China did set up evacuations to get Chinese and other citizens out of troubled areas assisted by frigates taking part in the counter-piracy missions in the Western Indian Ocean, most recently from Yemen in 2015. For China, despite clear limitations to its capability to act, both its multilateral peacekeeping efforts as well as its unilateral counter-piracy missions provide invaluable experience and lessons-learnt that it applies both at home and in its direct neighborhood. Therefore, ever since China has sent its first naval mission to the Gulf of Aden in 2009, there has been debate about whether China would opt for a military base in the region to sustain its missions on high seas or if it would continue to rely on commercial harbor facilities and logistic support through its system of diplomatic contacts as well as its globally present state-owned companies like COSCO.8 For years, Beijing has proclaimed not to open military facilities overseas. Even in 2015, when plans were well under way, some academics and military officers still stated – in line with the broader peaceful development discourse – that China would never opt for military bases, as it would pursue a different path than the US.9 However, in November 2015 China did announce what many expected; to open a ‘support facility’, carefully avoiding the phrase ‘military base’, in Djibouti. In February this year the construction work has started.10 They will not be alone in the small country in the Horn of Africa: next to France, the US and Japan already have military facilities there to support counterterrorism and counterpiracy operations. Chinese Defence Ministry’s spokesman Colonel Wu Qian stated, “This facility will better ensure that the Chinese military can carry out responsibilities such as international peacekeeping, naval escorts in the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters, and humanitarian assistance.”11 Xi used similar wordings at the 2015 FOCAC summit: “China will (…) support African countries’ capacity building in areas such as defence, counter-terrorism, riot prevention, customs and immigration control.”12
Conclusion
The unilateral and multilateral approach of China in its security engagement towards Africa seems to be coming together in Djibouti, thereby functioning as a stepping-stone to its Africa-policy and potentially its Middle-East policy. China’s role as a security player in the broader region seems to have been taken with yet another step not only of deeper involvement, but also a more comprehensive approach. The longer-term development of this set of initiatives will determine how this will affect security practices, not only in Africa (and APSA) but also of China itself.
Ms. Susanne Kamerling is a Lecturer at the Department of International Relations University of Groningen, Associate fellow the Clingendael Institute, The Netherlands, and Visiting Fellow, IDSA
- 1. Chris Alden, “Seeking Security in Africa: China’s Evolving Approach to the African Peace and Security Architecture,” NOREF Report, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, March 2014.
- 2. Jiao Wu and Yunbi Zhang, “China to Set up $1b Peace Fund“, China Daily, (Accessed May 27, 2016).
- 3. Interview of the author with Dutch military officer and high level diplomat, Beijing, November 2015. On China’s role in the MINUSMA mission, see Frans-Paul Van der Putten, “China’s Evolving Role in Peacekeeping and African Security; The Deployment of Chinese Troops for UN Force Protection in Mali”, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, September 2015, (Accessed May 15, 2016).
- 4. Janka Oertel, “How China Is Changing the UN,” The Diplomat, October 5, 2015, (Accessed May 15, 2016).
- 5. Yan Zhang, “UN Peacekeepers to Help Police Fight Crime,” China Daily, (Accessed May 18, 2016).
- 6. Although it must be noted that according to some estimates, the support facility in the Horn of Africa will take at least another 10 years to be turned into a military base that is in full professional swing.
- 7. This is in line with the Counter-Terrorism Law and National Security Law adopted by China in 2015. Also, China has recently published its first timely white paper on the Arab region, thereby stipulating the region’s growing policy priority.
- 8. Susanne Kamerling and Frans-Paul Van der Putten, “An Overseas Naval Presence without Naval Bases; China’s Counterpiracy Operation in the Gulf of Aden,” Journal of Contemporary China Affairs 40, no. 4 (2011): 119–46.
- 9. Interviews of the author, Beijing, March-June and November-December 2015.
- 10. Jeremy Page and Gordon Lubold, “China to Build Naval Hub in Djibouti,” Wall Street Journal, November 26, 2015., (Accessed May 18, 2016). Ankit Panda, “Confirmed: Construction Begins on China’s First Overseas Military Base in Djibouti,” The Diplomat, February 29, 2016, , (Accessed May 15, 2016).
- 11. Ibid.
- 12. “Xi Announces 10 Major China-Africa Cooperation Plans for Coming 3 Years”, Xinhua Net, December 4, 2015, (Accessed May 15, 2016).
