The Niger Delta Avengers: A Formidable Threat?
A new militant group has emerged in the Southern Nigeria’s Niger Delta. Its attacks on oil installations in Niger Delta region has led to substantial disruptions in oil production in Nigeria. The group known as Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) is said to be behind many attacks on oil facilities, infrastructure and personnel in the oil rich Niger Delta. It has notoriously challenged the oil companies and the government of President Muhammadu Buhari. The attacks on oil facilities by the NDA reminds one of the conflict in the region led by the Movement for Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) a decade back. To those who have followed Nigerian politics for years, the timing of rise of NDA will not come as a surprise. At a time when the country is going through a political transition and the resultant realignment of patronage networks in Niger Delta region, economic woes due to low oil prices, and the revamping of oil industry, the emergence of NDA is a result of the ‘politics of oil’ in Nigeria that has been ongoing for years.
Nigeria’s oil politics and rise of Niger Delta Avengers
The timing of the rise of militant group like the NDA suggests the probable motives of the group. Firstly, President Muhammad Buhari, a Northerner, is a president of Nigeria. The previous president, Goodluck Jonathan hailed from Niger Delta. His loss meant that Niger Delta groups lost prestige and privileged positions that President Jonathan had gained for them in the form of oil patronage networks and key portfolios. In an ethnically diverse country like Nigeria, identity based groups have organised around oil. Michael Watts has summed it up succinctly by stating that in “petro-states”… the “logic of extraction figures centrally in the making and breaking of community”.1 Movement for Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) fought primarily for the distribution of oil revenues between the oil producing regions of Niger Delta and the central government. The struggle for oil resources got intertwined with other movements that called for compensation for land and environmental damage that were direct result of extractive activities in the region. The movement was initiated by Ogoni ethnic group which lived in south-eastern part of Niger Delta in the region called Ogoni-land. Later, other large ethnic groups like the Ijaw joined the movement. The Nigerian government was finally able to quell the MEND by deploying an amnesty program in 2009 under President Umar Musa Yar’Adua. The amnesty program promised to give financial assistance and job training to the former rebels if they laid down arms.2 Financial assistance consisted of security contracts to former rebels and massive patronage network which helped them get their share of oil rents. The MEND movement and involvement of ethnic groups like the Ijaw hurled Goodluck Jonathan to become the vice president of Nigeria. He later became the president after Yar’Auda’s death. However, with political dynamics shifted after Jonathan’s loss to a Northerner, the Niger Delta groups fear losing the patronage they enjoyed under the previous president.
President Buhari has already shown his intent in correcting the skewed policies of his predecessor. The amnesty program that was started by President Yar’Auda in 2009 has been slated to end in 2018 and there are fears among the Niger Delta elite that the president may not continue with it. The president has gone after the corrupt amongst former officials who were showered with oil rents and profits by Goodluck Jonathan. A prominent one among them is the former MEND commander Government “Tompolo” Ekpemupolo.3 Ekpemupolo profited under the Jonathan presidency by getting security contracts to ferry passengers across the Delta creek and protect the oil and gas infrastructure. Ekpemupolo also received millions to disband his gang of fighters called the Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities.4 A warrant was issued against Ekpemupolo in a land grabbing scheme worth $65 million by the present government.5 Since then Ekpemupolo is on the run. The current Nigerian government has also come down heavily on the smuggling networks that are widespread in Niger Delta. Many of these networks have the support of politicians of the region and top executives of Nigerian National Petroleum Cooperation (NNPC) that profit from oil smuggling and pilferage.
Secondly, the president is undertaking an overall reform of oil sector itself. The Petroleum Industry Governance and Institutional Framework Bill that is likely to be passed in 2016 has provisions that target the rampant corruption in the sector. The bill has proposed to split the colossal NNPC into smaller units.6 The sheer size of the NNPC has made it difficult to monitor and many irregularities aided by corrupt officials and politicians has made the company a major bedrock of corruption in the Niger Delta. Politicians including Jonathan had used the company to dole out favours to political supporters in the region.7 The new president through the Petroleum Bill wants to split the company into smaller manageable units.8 The NNPC is also likely to be privatized partially.9 A new regulatory agency called the Nigeria Petroleum Regulatory Commission would be set up to monitor the company’s upstream and downstream operations.10 Currently, NNPC has both the production and regulatory roles, which leads to conflict of interest, rampant corruption and inefficiencies in the oil sector.11 For example, Nigeria lacks adequate refining capacity hence it swaps crude oil for refined products. These refined products are then sold to fuel distributors. However, this activity involves price inflations and payment of bribes and is mechanism for granting political patronage. The vested interests that profit from this stutter the development of refining capacity in Nigeria.12
Hence the perceived disenfranchisement of Niger Delta groups after the political transition in Nigeria, President Buhari’s attempt to destablise the status quo in Niger Delta region and target the existing patronage network and the corruption in oil sector may have angered certain groups. NDA is a likely manifestation of this displeasure with the current president. NDA is a very secretive group and the profile of its members is not known. Its political motives also remain ambiguous. In such a scenario, it can be assumed that the group is a combination of rag tag militias and oil mafia that have earlier had political support of the Niger Delta politicians and former president Goodluck Jonathan, and now feel that their privileged position and their sources of rent are in jeopardy under the current regime.
Finally, the move to target the current president is well timed as Nigerian economy is suffering from low oil prices. Crude oil accounts for approximately 90 per cent of Nigeria’s exports. The revenue from oil production and related activities are distributed between the central and the regional governments. The central government gets 54 per cent while the rest is distributed to regional states and other local governments.13 Lesser oil revenue means both the centre and the state have lesser means of financing their social and welfare activities. Hence the states are already clamoring with the centre to increase its share of the oil revenue. Already under stress, the NDA is targeting the oil sector to further hamstring the centre and cause wider discontent among the states against the central government.
Is the NDA formidable?
The question is that will NDA be successful and become as threatening as MEND. NDA has shown great alacrity at carrying out attacks on oil infrastructure. It dismissed brazenly the governments’ proposal for peace talks. All this may seem to be signs of its strength, but the group might turn out to be transient band of criminals that lack purpose and popularity. Firstly, the group lacks the popular support that MEND had among various ethnic groups in Niger Delta. NDA operates within the Warri region and has not shown the ability to operate outside it. The former MEND militia commanders have distanced themselves from the group. Despite having been probed for corruption by the present government, Ekpemupolo has asked the NDA to give up violence and talk to the government. Secondly, the political elite of the Niger Delta region for the time being are not interested in armed confrontation with the government. Buhari has been very calculative and has not completely cut-off all patronage networks. He has co-opted many political elites within his regime. There is lack of support for armed insurgency in the region among former MEND commanders as they have no stomach to fight one more protracted armed conflict. In such an environment, it seems that NDA might turn out to be a group of criminals and smugglers that would not have the penetrative power of a popular movement like MEND. In the end the group might be just a flash in the pan.
Mr. Nachiket Khadkiwala is Research Assistant, ALACUN Centre, IDSA
- 1. Micheal Watts (2004), “The Sinister Political Life of Community: Economies of Violence and Governable Spaces in the Niger Delta, Nigeria”, Working Paper No. 3, Institute of International Studies, UC Berkley, USA, p.3.
- 2. Benjamin A. Okonofua (2016), “The Niger Delta Amnesty Program: The Challenges of Transitioning from Peace Settlements to Long-Term Peace”, Sage Open, (Accessed January 4, 2016).
- 3. Stratfor, “In Nigeria, Militant Attacks Made in Vain”, January 23, 2016, (Accessed February 11, 2016).
- 4. Ibid.
- 5. “Buhari takes on former Niger Delta militant leader Tompolo”, Menas Associates, December 15, 2015, (Accessed March 21, 2016).
- 6. Lisa Goatcher and Danielle Kent, “Nigeria’s Petroleum Industry Governance and Institutional Framework Bill 2015”, JD Supra Business Advisors, January 27, 2016, (Accessed February 11, 2016).
- 7. Stratfor, “Nigeria’s New Energy Bill Hints at Wider Reforms to Come”, December 11, 2015, (Accessed January 3, 2016).
- 8. Lisa Goatcher and Danielle Kent, “Nigeria’s Petroleum Industry Governance and Institutional Framework Bill 2015”, JD Supra Business Advisors, January 27, 2016, (Accessed March 15, 2016).
- 9. Ibid.
- 10. Stratfor, “Nigeria’s New Energy Bill Hints at Wider Reforms to Come”, December 11, 2015, (Accessed March 15, 2016).
- 11. Ibid
- 12. Ibid
- 13. Leke Salaudeen, “Wanted: equitable revenue sharing formula”, The Nation, May 11, 2016, (Accessed May 11, 2016).
