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The Resurgence of the Islamic State in the Sahel and Its Strategic Impact on Regional Security

Yashasvi Chandra
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Commentary

While the Islamic State has been officially eliminated in Iraq and Syria, it is rapidly strengthening its bases in the territories outside Iraq and the Levant like the Sahel and West Africa through its local affiliates. It is also mending terms with the Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) – now operating in the Sahel under the umbrella of the Group in Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM). Its growing affinity with Al-Qaeda could strengthen and multiply its workforce and provide access to Al-Qaeda’s existing resources.

Introduction

In March 2019, when the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Force (SDF) captured Baghuz in Syria – the last stronghold of Islamic State – the geographical Caliphate of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) or the Islamic State effectively came to an end. Later in October that year, a raid by United States Special Forces killed its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Despite these trends, ISIS is far from being eliminated. It has ‘gather(ed) new strength, retooled its financial networks and targeted recruits’ from newer territories.1 It continues to inspire its foreign-based fighters to launch terror attacks while embarking on guerrilla warfare in Iraq and Syria. It has established sleeper cells, particularly in the areas now controlled by SDF, and operates in smaller groups, mainly in the mountains and deserts of Iraq and Syria to ‘realign its forces and recruit more fighters’.2

Outside Iraq and the Levant, the Islamic State has strongly and rapidly emerged in new territories like the Sahel and West Africa through its local affiliates. Its local affiliates particularly the Islamic State in the Greater Sahel (ISGS) and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) have gained significant success in raising the profile of the Islamic State by launching several terror attacks in the region.

Remarkably, the Islamic State’s new leadership has adopted a softer approach towards its traditional rival the Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which now operates in the Sahel under the umbrella of the Group in Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM), has temporarily joined hands by opening a joint front along with Ansarul Islam against the forces of Burkina Faso. The Islamic State’s growing affinity with GSIM, could strengthen and multiply its workforce and provide access to Al-Qaeda’s existing resources.

To counter the growing terror groups, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Niger created a joint force, the G5 Sahel Joint Force (FC-G5S). This force is backed by France, which has its own strategic interest in the region. However, the joint force has not met with the level of success it was expecting to achieve, and terror activities in the region since its formation have increased significantly. FC-G5S faces its own challenges. Political instability in the region, stressed budget, and low military capability have continued to weaken its response to counterterrorism, to the delight of ISIS which is experiencing a greater success in the Sahel.

Newer territories: The Islamic State’s growth in the Sahel

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s Islamic State was a highly centralised entity which sought unconditional allegiance from its local affiliates in return allowing them little autonomy.  As a result, the Islamic State’s presence outside its geographical territory – Iraq and al-Sham (the Levant) – was restricted to smaller groups or lone wolfs with limited operational capacity. These small organisations or local militias mostly pledged allegiance to ISIS to encash its name and broaden their outreach by attracting youths to their fold.

The Islamic State’s affiliate in West Africa, Boko Haram, which renamed itself as Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in 2015 and its official affiliate in the Sahel, the Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS), which was formed after splitting from the local militia Al-Mourabitoun3 and too was largely unknown until 2017, pledged allegiance to Baghdadi to ‘boost its Islamist credentials, attract new recruits, and appeal to ISIS’ Levant-based leadership for patronage’.4

Abu-Baghdadi’s strategy was sharply in contrast with the strategy of Al-Qaeda, which allowed local groups to operate independently, some of which like AQIM and Al-Qaeda in the Arabic Peninsula (AQAP) became powerful and independent in their own right.

Since the loss of physical territories in Iraq and Syria and the death of its leader, ISIS has moved away from the centralised system, as it can see the benefit of Al-Qaeda style decentralised control.5 Operating through local affiliates and allowing them decision making power would allow its smaller offshoots to grow, providing Islamic State with the much needed financial and logistical support to launch terror attacks. This will not only keep ISIS alive while its fighters are holed in secret hideouts in Iraq and Syria, but it will also expand its operational base, boosting its profile.

For Islamic State, the Sahel region provides the right opportunity to test its decentralised system.  The region is highly unstable, volatile and it proving to be an incubator for militant groups. While Sahel has been unstable for more than two decades due to successive weak governments, the recent instability can be attributed to the breakdown of the Malian state in 2012. The fight between the government and Tuareg rebels from the National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA) and later Ansar Din Islamists (AQIM’s offshoot later merged into GSIM) escalated the crisis.6 Additionally, ‘uncontrolled circulation of arms and radical Islamists from Libya’ and the power struggle between Algeria and Morocco for ‘greater influence in Mali further destabilised the region’.7  Jihadist groups capitalising on local disputes in rural areas recruited new fighters and launched attacks against national and international forces.8   Countries like Niger, Burkina Faso and Mauritania have all witnessed an increase in jihadist activities due to increased instability in Mali. Further, Chad has also faced vulnerabilities from the South of Libya. Instability in the Sahel has also spread to West Africa with countries like Benin, Ivory Coast and Ghana getting significantly affected.9

Besides, the Islamic State’s strong presence in Libya allows them to easily oversee its local affiliates’ activities in the Sahel region and provide material and operational support to its local groups. The Islamic State remains active in the south-west of Libya with its fighters repeatedly attacking the cities in the region of Fazzan, which shares a border with Niger and Chad.10

The Sahel, therefore, offers a much easier opportunity for ISIS to increase its presence in newer territories. And, ISIS has seized this opportunity through its lesser-known affiliate, the Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS). The group has gained significant support in northern Mali and has contributed to an escalating Salafi-jihadist insurgency in Burkina Faso. The ambushed attack on Nigerian and US soldiers in Tongo Tongo, Niger in October 2017 raised the profile of ISGS in the region. It has also regularly targeted forces of Operation Barkhane, including a suicide attack in 2018. The Islamic State provides financial and logistical support to ISGS to launch terror attacks, a point reaffirmed by the United Nations Security Council on 23 February 2020.11 Reports also suggest that ISGS is cooperating with ISWAP in launching terror attacks and developing a logistics base in Sokoto, Nigeria.12

ISGS success in the Sahel and its collaboration with ISWAP will be vital for its global revival. But it is not dependent only on ISGS and ISWAP. Islamic State’s mending ties with Al-Qaeda will also prove a defining factor for its growth in the Sahel.

Mending ties: Islamic States’ changing dynamics with Al-Qaeda

In 2014, when the Islamic State defeated the US-trained Iraqi army and officially established the Caliphate, it faced a challenge from Al-Nusra. Al-Nusra was Al-Qaeda’s branch predominantly created to increase Al-Qaeda’s activities in Syria under disguise.13 Islamic State, however, fought with Al-Nusra, eliminated it and openly defied Ayman al-Zawahiri, the head of Al-Qaeda. Since then, ISIS and Al-Qaeda have been in conflict.

The Islamic State’s loss of territories since 2017 and the rise of instability in the Sahel region have witnessed increasing cooperation between ISIS and Al-Qaeda’s Maghreb affiliate AQIM. This changing dynamic between the two could become a critical factor for the ISIS resurgence and the second wave of ISIS activities. The Islamic State and Al-Qaeda fighters appear to be coordinating attacks and carving out ‘mutually agreed-upon areas of influence’ in the Sahel, particularly in weaker countries like Burkina Faso. 14

Maintaining good relations with Al-Qaeda is in the long-term interest of ISIS. AQIM, known as GSIM in the Sahel, has a much stronger presence than ISIS. GSIM became by far the most powerful group in the Sahel after the four main jihadi organisations in the Sahel, AQIM, Ansar al-Din, Al-Mourabitoun and Katibat Macina – the latter three linked directly to Al-Qaeda – announced their unification and created the Jama’a Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimin’ (JNIM) also known as Group in Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM) under the leadership of Iyad Ag Ghali.15 This unification united all major jihadi groups in the Sahel, creating one of the most powerful Al-Qaeda affiliates.

Without the support of GSIM, ISIS would be unable to strengthen its base in the Sahel, as ISGS does not have sufficient jihadi workforce and logistical support to launch significant terror attacks. The Islamic State’s another affiliate ISWAP’s presence is restricted to northern Nigeria with limited influence over the Sahel region. GSIM leader Iyad Ag Ghali is a local leader and has cultivated strong relations with local tribal chiefs, who command greater authority in their respective regions.

Good relations with Al-Qaeda will also bring economic gains for ISIS, which – once the world’s richest organisation – has now lost a big portion of its revenues. The region hosts the ancient trans-Sahara smuggling routes used for smuggling contraband items for generations, and GSIM controls the region. With no economic opportunities for youth, GSIM has recruited unemployed youth to work as human traffickers, operate kidnapping operations, and traffic illicit drugs, particularly cocaine coming from South America through Guinea-Bissau.16 Due to the patronage of local tribe leaders, GSIM operatives are guaranteed safe passage of contraband items. GSIM has also allowed local groups to operate the drug business independently, subject to the recognition of Iyad Ag Ghali as their leader. Gao which is on the main transition route for drug trafficking (and to an extent human trafficking) has become the main trading outpost for illicit trading activities. It now acts as the main transit point for the cocaine trade with Europe.17 Al-Qaeda’s involvement in drug and human trafficking have provided them with a secure line of funds, which ISIS would also like to benefit from. Central Sahel also hosts the gold mines of Mali, Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Niger and access to these mines would provide further revenue.18

However, one should note that the power equation between GSIM and ISIG is unequal. While GSIM is powerful and has an authoritative control over Sahel, ISIG is a relatively a minor player. And it appears that one of the reasons why GSIM is willing to collaborate with ISIG is to counter the G5 Sahel Joint counter terrorism Force (FC-G5S), which is backed by France. To fight with the French-backed army along with other multinational peace forces, GSIM needs additional resources like logistics and finance, which ISIS can supply through ISGS and ISWAP. Coordinated attacks would allow much effective use of their resources.

Failing regional security: The G5 Sahel Joint Force and France

The G5 Sahel, a group of five countries – Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso – was established in December 2014 to fight the expansion of Al-Qaeda and its Islamist affiliates. Later in 2017, as jihadi groups continued to grow and destabilised the region, the G5 Sahel created a counterterrorism force – the G5 Sahel Joint Force (FC-G5S) – with a 4000-strong French force19 . Its objective was to counter terrorism, organised cross-border crimes, and human trafficking.20 It is spread over three regions of the Sahel – ‘an eastern sector for Niger and Chad with two battalions; a central sector covering Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger with three battalions; and a western sector corresponding to Mauritania and Mali with two battalions’.21

While FC-G5S is backed by France, the force has not been very successful in eliminating the terror groups. In fact, terror activities have significantly increased since the formation of the joint force, uniting several big and small terror groups, including Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.

The biggest challenge FC-G5S faces is successive weak governments and political instability in all five states. Mali, which is the epicentre of the Sahel crisis, despite several peace dialogues initiated by successive presidents with rebel groups, has failed to address the concerns of the north and central regions and reduce violence.22 Likewise, while Chad and Mauritania continue to struggle with successive weak governments, Burkina Faso faces ‘widespread (public) discontent fuelled by the country’s dismal social and security conditions’. 23 Niger is facing its own challenges with power transition.

FC-G5S is also a poorly organised armed force. The armies of Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali face organisational challenges, chronic budget deficit and poor operational capabilities. Further, while the armies of Mauritania and Chad are marginally better organised and have ‘a good reputation for (its) intelligence services and rapid intervention units’, they face other internal challenges. ‘Mauritania has not participated in any major combat situations for the past four years’ and Chad’s soldiers face ‘fatigue by multiple deployments and (a) financially weak (government) after the fall in oil prices.’24

Finally, the FC-G5S force is not only fighting with the terror groups but also countering trans-border organised crimes which include drug trafficking. Drug trafficking brings, in some way, employment opportunities for the youth in an impoverished region with no economic activities. The working population of the region is often offered employment opportunities by GSIM and other smaller terror groups to transport drugs, in lieu of small amounts. They are not on the regular payroll of these terror groups, i.e. carrying out terror attacks, but work on ad-hoc opportunities like drug trafficking and sometimes human trafficking, which makes it complex for FC-G5S to counter terrorism and eliminate terror groups in the Sahel.

These challenges have ensured that terror groups like GSIM and ISGS continue to benefit from the instability which the Sahel is suffering from, particularly for the Islamic State, which is aiming to regroup and remerge.

Conclusion

From being the world’s richest organisation with a geographical territory, ISIS has now been reduced to guerrilla insurgents. However, underestimating its strength would be a strategic miscalculation. ISIS is strengthening its base in the Sahel through its affiliates – ISIG and ISWAP. Worryingly, it seems to be collaborating with Al-Qaeda, an organisation it fought in the past. Collaboration with Sahel based Al-Qaeda groups will give ISIS much needed human resources to operate in a new territory, helping them strengthen their base. Al-Qaeda also appears to mend its terms with the Islamic State as it wants to present a united front against the French and the G5 Sahel forces. On the other hand, G5 Sahel joint forces continue to struggle with inherent challenges like poorly organised forces, lack of training, stressed budget and political instability in every country of G5, much to the delight of terror groups.

Taking advantage of these weaknesses, Islamic State hopes to break the state machinery through continued and sustained terror attacks, eventually preparing for a resurgence, while attempting to recruit new warriors from its traditional Sunni base. While ISIS may not be able to launch a second Caliphate with a geographical territory, its success in emerging territories like the Sahel would make it a lethal terror force.

Mr. Yashasvi Chandra works for the British Civil Service. The views and opinions expressed here are his own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the British Government. The author would like to thank Prof. Fred Lawson, Professor of Government Emeritus at Mills College, USA for reviewing this paper and providing valuable feedback.

Keywords: Islamic State (IS)
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