UN-AU Cooperation in Peace and Security: Convergence and Divergence
The United Nations (UN) was envisaged as the guardian of peace and security in the world. Although it has remained involved in peace negotiations as well as maintenance and enforcement of peace in various parts of the world since its inception, a majority of them have been in Africa. The UN has given, and still gives, most of its time and resources (approximately 80 per cent) to the conflict zones in the continent. But, over the period of its existence, the nature and extent of its peace initiatives have changed substantially. Presently, a relatively new organisation, the African Union (AU), is taking the ‘lead’ in settling disputes and maintaining peace and security in the continent; and the UN works in cooperation with the AU in many dimensions to achieve its purpose and goals.
Rationale for Cooperation: The failures of the UN in the 1990s, particularly in Somalia and other parts of Africa, in establishing peace, led to a rethinking on the strategy for ensuring peace and security. The allegations of the withdrawal of the West from peacekeeping in Africa, ineffectiveness of the UN peace missions, and the African consciousness to resolve its own issues became the drivers of the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter also provides for interaction of the UN with regional arrangements like the AU for maintenance of peace and security, provided their activities are consistent with the “purposes and principles of the United Nations”.1 However, maintaining the supremacy of the UN Security Council (UNSC), it clearly states that “no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council.” 2 In principle, the provisions are in line with the spirit of cooperation and decentralisation of responsibility; in practice, there are several issues regarding the distribution of authority and legitimacy.
Legitimacy: The UN Charter considers the UNSC as the sole body to act or authorise a ‘peace mission’ whether on its own or through some regional organisation. Although the AU has organised itself along the lines of the UN as it also has a Peace and Security Council (PSC), the question remains whether it can be an authority outside the UN system to act and authorise missions for maintaining/enforcing international peace. There are instances of the UN faltering to act in time or with ‘impartiality’, pushing the AU to act without authorisation by the UNSC. Technically, according to the UN Charter, such actions are illegitimate or illegal. Such acts may create tensions between the UNSC and the AU PSC. Although the UN is legally the conscience of the world, the AU feels that being a regional organisation it has better understanding and more information about the conflict zones, which can be true as well. But, sometimes UN seems to be more legitimate in its actions as it has a clear set of principles to establish a ‘peace mission’ and an ability to act as an impartial distant mediator/third party.
Convergence: Both the UN and AU have a common goal of peace and security in Africa. The primary criticism of the UN ‘peace missions’ in Africa has been that they do not act in a timely and effective manner. The members of the UNSC, especially permanent members, also look to serve their vested interests through these missions. In case of the conflicting parties’ opposition to UN force deployment due to the aversion to the Security Council member states or non-African troops, the AU sometimes can be more legitimate and acceptable than the UN. Therefore, the UN has an interest in cooperating with the AU to achieve its goal. Although AU has structurally prepared itself for dealing with emergency situations in the continent, it is weak at the part of funding and logistics. Most of the funds for its peace and security missions come from external sources like the UN, European Union (EU) and the United States (US), etc. Though the African countries also fund the missions through trust funds and emergency conferences initially, ultimately they have to look towards the sources outside Africa. The UN can be the most legitimate funding source for the AU for these missions. Hence, the goals, issues of legitimacy, funding and capability bring the UN and AU to a convergence for cooperation. Another convergence point is that the AU member states are willing to provide troops for peace missions, while the permanent members or the countries from the West have been dragging their feet to go on a ‘peace mission’ in Africa until there is an ‘interest’ to serve. The AU troops fill this gap of troop requirements, while the UN and other external powers provide training, funds, capabilities and logistics. Hence, due to the involvement of politics and vested interests within the Security Councils of both the organisations, different spaces of legitimacy are generated for the two organisations in different cases and stages of the ‘peace missions’, thereby creating scope for cooperation on the basis of the “adherence to the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage.” 3 However, according to critics, this very basis might also become source of disagreement between the two.
Divergence: Despite the convergence and mutual complementarity, important differences on principle and implementation of ‘peace missions’ remain between the two organisations.
First, the UN missions follow three core principles – consent of the parties involved in the conflict, impartiality, and no use of force except for self-defence and defence of the mandate. The UN also expects a positive engagement of the countries in the region of conflict. In contradiction to this posture of the UN, “The AU’s peacekeeping posture in Burundi, Darfur and now Somalia points to the emergence of a different peacekeeping doctrine; instead of waiting for a peace to keep, the AU views peacekeeping as an opportunity to establish peace before keeping it.” 4 The AU feels that the UN principles delay peace missions and render them ineffective. While the UN avoids peace enforcement missions, certain AU troop contributing countries have willingness for such provisions.
Secondly, there are disagreements on the issue of funds. The AU feels that the UN has no consistent and coherent policy for giving funds to the peace missions in Africa. Although the AU can initiate missions in extreme conditions, funds from its member countries only cannot sustain them. The AU ultimately wishes for the transition of these missions to full-fledged UN missions. However, given its principles and the dynamics of the Security Council, the UN remains selective in providing funds for the different AU missions. For example, while the UN funded the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) heavily, it has not done much for the mission in Mali. However, despite AU’s demands, UN hesitates in funding AU missions and adopting them as its own missions.
Thirdly, the AU also feels that the permanent members and the advanced countries of the UN practice a ‘peacekeeping apartheid’ in Africa by not contributing their troops. It is primarily the Asians and African who contribute to the current peace missions in the continent. In effect, the UN members are paying and encouraging the Africans to fight in their own region. In the long run, this hampers the overall internationalist spirit of the UNSC as the cosmopolitan guardian of international peace and security.
Fourthly, the two organisations have a tussle over the concept, form and command structure of the peace missions. Both want to keep control on these aspects of the missions. The general grievance of the African countries is that the UNSC has a preference for officers from the developed and advanced countries in positions of command and strategy formulation. The AU argues that its member countries have direct stakes in the region by the virtue of their location and contribution of troops. Therefore, they should have a control over the concept, strategy and strength of the missions in the region. However, the UN considers itself legally rightful and entitled to this control due to its authorising powers and funding capabilities.
Instruments of Cooperation
The UN has been cooperating with the AU since its inception through agreements and Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs).5 Despite a few crucial divergences in principle and other operational aspects, the common goal of maintenance of peace and security and the lack of the AU’s capacity to sustain its missions for long bring the UN and AU together for cooperation, although in an inconsistent manner. Therefore, the two organisations, in November 2006, signed a document titled “Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation: Framework for the Ten Year Capacity Building Programme for the AU” (TYCBP) to establish a holistic, comprehensive and systematised edifice of cooperation. The programme was formulated to help effectively deliver on the AU’s mandate. Its initial priority was peace and security; later, it focused on other areas as well – institution building, human resource development and financial management; human rights; political, legal and electoral matters; social economic and cultural and human development; and food security as well as environmental protection. This is a comprehensive programme that includes cooperation with the Regional Economic Communities in Africa (RECs). The framework has a provision of triennial review of the state of cooperation between the two entities. Coordinating with different mechanisms within Africa is a daunting task. Some of the problems identified in the UN-AU cooperation, which the framework and its reviews face, are related to financial and budget management, data collection and statistical analysis, training of personnel within the AU and its peace missions, training programmes for RECs’ officials, proper communication and information dissemination between the different bodies of the framework mechanism, lack of expertise within the AU, differences in AU’s expectations
and demands and the UN response, differences in the analysis of a situation, differences in positions of the RECs, African UNSC members not necessarily being AU PSC members at the same time, preparedness and effectiveness of the regional standby forces, etc. The ten year framework attempts to deal with all these and formulate a coherent predictable mechanism to enable AU for delivering on its mandate. As highlighted in its triennial reports, there are implementation issues with the framework, but this has brought the level of cooperation between the UN and AU to an unprecedented level. The framework’s evolutionary nature tries to address these problems. However, this programme is to end in 2016. Therefore, building on its accomplishments, the UN and AU have jointly proposed a new programme for UN-AU Partnership on Africa’s Integration and Development Agendas (PAIDA). 6
Conclusion
Despite divergences on many issues, the current level of the UN-AU cooperation on peace and security is unprecedented in the history of international ‘peace missions’. The engagement will have a long-term impact on the nature and concept of such missions in future. Given the current realities, both the UN and the AU will have to adjust with each other or change in some of their institutional and constitutional aspects. Both might need reforms in their charters elaborating more on cooperation, and harmonising their principles and philosophies on different issues, especially ‘peace missions’. Sovereignty, command and control together with sustainable funding would be the primary issues to settle. Currently, the UN has been pragmatic in authorising and legitimising some of the unilateral missions that began without its authorisation, but this cannot go on forever. 7 The principle of mutual complementarity might, in the long-term, harm the UN in terms of its legitimacy, expertise and penetration to work/act throughout the world. There are also pertinent doubts about ‘hybrid missions’ being the best practice. Given all these, UN, the guardian of international peace and security in principle, would not remain so in the long-term if it is unable to resolve or narrow down the divergences with the AU soon. The emergence of the AU as a player in maintenance of peace and security should not mean prioritising regionalism over the true spirit of internationalism that the UN ought to represent. This may need a reform or two on both sides.
- 1. Article 52(2) of the UN Charter.
- 2. Article 52(1) of the UN Charter.
- 3. Arthur Boutellis and Paul D. Williams, Peace Operations, the African Union, and the United Nations: Toward More Effective Partnerships, International Peace Institute, New York, April 2013, p.7. Also see: Article 4(iv) and Article 21(1) of the Memorandum of Understanding between AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the Regional Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa.
- 4. Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Partnership between the African Union and the United Nations on Peace and Security: Towards Greater Strategic and Political Coherence. AU Doc. PSC/PR/2. (CCCVII), January 9, 2012, para 71, p.19
- 5. For example, the UNSC has helped develop the African Peace and Security Architecture through the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and the African Peace Facility, both started in 2004. These were done with the help of G8++ and the European Union. There have been several other instruments of AU-UN cooperation. See Arthur Boutellis and Paul D. Williams, Peace Operations, the African Union, and the United Nations: Toward More Effective Partnerships, International Peace Institute, New York, April 2013, p.4.
- 6. The Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme (TYCBP) for the African Union, Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (OSAA), at http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/advocacy/capacity.shtml (Accessed on 20 September 2015).
- 7. “For better or for worse, the AU and of course the UN have been left to cooperate and legitimise unilaterally initiated peace support operations in the interests of stability.” See: Timothy Otheino and Nhamo Samasuwo, “A Critical Analysis of Africa’s Experiments with Hybrid Missions and Security Collaboration”, African Security Review, 16(3), pp.25-39, p. 32. Unilateral peace missions, later authorised by the UN, are known as ‘hybrid missions’.
